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Abstract 
 
Cambodia is one of the poorest and most aid-dependent countries in Southeast Asia. 
Historically NGOs have operated in Cambodia since the collapse of the Khmer Rouge 
regime in 1979. Since the Paris Peace Accord Agreement, signed by the Cambodian 
leaders in 1991, the number of NGOs has grown rapidly and played a pivotal role in 
delivering public services and advocacy. In an effort to improve efficiencies and 
effectiveness aid delivery mechanisms have become extraordinarily complex and 
cumbersome. They require all parties to have strong coordination efforts within their 
individual groups and amongst broader stakeholders.  
 
This thesis analyses the effectiveness of NGO coordination in Cambodia. It is based on 
recently completed in-country research involving participant observation and a series of 
semi-structured interviews. The paper explores NGO coordination and how the NGO 
community engages in the aid coordination processes led by the Cambodian 
government.  
 
The findings indicate that the NGO coordination efforts have encountered a series of 
challenges.  These include cultural, political and institutional challenges and poor NGO 
coordination between the national and provincial levels. They have resulted in a) the 
absence of a collective voice, b) slow progress on NGO self-regulation, c) the 
fragmentation and duplication of NGO projects, d) a poor working relationship with the 
government e) little understanding of aid effectiveness and f) poor engagement in the 
aid coordination mechanisms. Thus, the NGO coordination efforts are relatively loose 
although progress has been made since the 1990s. Consequently, Cambodia‟s NGO 
sector remains immature and weak. There are, however, some opportunities for 
improvement through creating an environment that enables policy dialogue with the 
government. 
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Chapter I: Overview 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
 
Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) have become popular development agents in 
the global aid system. Some NGOs provide humanitarian assistance and others provide 
operational, watch-dog, education, activist and advocacy services to marginalised and 
poor people who are not able to be reached by markets at local, national, regional and 
international levels (Edwards and Hulme 1995; Lewis 2006b). As alternative agents for 
development, they have tried to overcome development issues exacerbated by macro 
policies such as structural adjustment and neoliberalism in developing countries. Due to 
increased needs and demands NGOs have continued to rapidly increase in size, 
resources and scope. They have directly and indirectly influenced individuals, states, 
multilateral governmental institutions and non-state actors on international issues such 
as poverty reduction, sustainable development, aid, debt relief, human rights, the arms 
trade and climate change (Green, 2008). Although there are no official or reliable 
figures available on the number of active NGOs, estimates suggest NGOs working 
locally, nationally, regionally and globally lies in the millions (Crewe & Harrison, 1998; 
Roberts et al., 2005). At least 150 NGO coordination bodies (NCBs) exist in both 
developed and developing countries (Bennett, 1994).  
 
The new aid architectures, particularly the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD) 
(2005) and Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) (2008), aim to improve effectiveness of aid 
and development. However, there is an uneven involvement with the PD and AAA from 
Northern and Southern NGOs. Northern NGOs have been largely involved with the PD 
debates because they have technical and financial resources and political space for 
influencing policy (Burall and Datta, 2008). However, many Southern NGOs have little 
opportunity to engage in the new process due to a lack of political space from donors 
and their government, poor coordination, weak capacity to produce research and 
evidence, language barriers and high transaction costs and scarcity of resources 
(Menocal and Rogerson, 2006; Pratt and Myhrman, 2009). It is critical to get Southern 
NGOs actively involved in the processes at global and national levels through balancing 
the power relationship between Northern and Southern NGOs. There is also pressure 
from donors and country governments on NGOs to enhance their effectiveness 
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including accountability, transparency, ownership and outcomes. Therefore, the NGO 
community might need to develop a „Paris-like declaration‟ (Koch, 2008) at both 
national and global levels. Many NGOs, particularly Northern NGOs have endorsed this 
initiative. NGOs may decide to apply some component of the PD and/or their own 
„NGO codes of conduct‟ developed by national NCBs in developing countries. 
 
1.2  Context of the Research 
 
The last few decades in Cambodia have witnessed dramatic changes in NGOs working 
on development, human rights, empowerment, democracy and poverty. Since the first 
general election was organised by the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia, the number of NGOs, including local NGOs (LNGOs) and international 
NGOs (INGOs), has substantially increased to about 1,791 (Informant GOV 02 and 05 
and Appendix VI). Until recently, NGOs have played a vital role in providing 
operational, watchdog, educational, activist and advocacy services to the poor in both 
urban and rural areas. However, along with the growing number and roles of NGOs, 
there is concern over their effectiveness and coordination between the national and 
provincial levels from the Cambodian government and donors. 
 
Cambodia‟s NGO coordination has been well organised through national and sector 
NGO coordination bodies (NCBs) established after Cambodian liberalisation. The NGO 
coordination efforts have become more apparent despite many NGOs in Cambodia 
being in their infancy. NCBs have made strong progress in attracting NGO members, 
sharing information and developing a collective voice; however such efforts have 
encountered significant challenges, particularly their partnership and coordination 
between the national and provincial levels. They are accused of being donor-driven and 
sometimes reliant on donors acting as mediators to influence policy changes; it is 
claimed that their missions are shaped by donors‟ priorities and funding, more than 
local needs (World Bank, 2009d). There are many problems that the Cambodian 
government and civil society need to address. The relationship between the government 
and NGOs remains weak and unsustainable, leading to consequential misunderstandings 
and mistrust due to the lack of a legal framework for NGO operations and no genuine 
dialogue. As a result, coordination issues among NGOs remain very sensitive and if 
insufficiently addressed could lead to obstacles for development.  
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On top of their own issues concerning effectiveness, transparency, ownership and 
accountability, NGOs are facing tough challenges in the new aid mechanisms. This new 
aid mechanisms allow NGOs to represent their voices (citizens‟ voices) and hold 
government and donors accountable at the policy and technical levels. For instance, 
NGO umbrella bodies have participated in meetings of the Cambodian Development 
Cooperation Forum (CDCF
1
) and the Government-Donor Coordination Committee 
(GDCC) and some meetings of the 19 Joint Technical Working Groups (TWGs
2
) such 
as education, health, HIV/AIDS, food security and nutrition, and planning and poverty 
reduction. However there are concerns about their roles and capacity to understand the 
concepts and engage in aid coordination processes that are extraordinarily complex and 
cumbersome. NCBs have not yet been scrutinised over their roles, performance and 
effectiveness. 
 
1.3  Aim and Objective of the Study 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of NGO coordination on 
development and poverty reduction in the new aid environment adopted by the 
Cambodian government and donor community. Therefore, the main objective for this 
exercise is 
 To assess evolving coordination processes among the national and provincial 
NGOs working on development and poverty reduction in Cambodia‟s changing 
aid environment.  
To explore this objective I focus on the following sub-questions: 
1. What NGO coordination processes currently exist and what challenges 
do they face?   
2. How is NGO coordination being changed and challenged by Cambodia‟s 
new aid environment?  
3. How can NGO coordination be improved? 
                                            
1  High level policy forum where government (ministers), civil society and a head delegation of donor 
agencies annually discuss and agree on an agenda for development cooperation in Cambodia 
(CDC/CRDB, 2006c, 2006g, 2006f, 2006i). 
2  In-country aid effectiveness mechanisms initiated and implemented based on principles of the Paris 
Declaration articulating ownership, leadership, harmonisation, mutual accountability and managing for 
results, aimed at strengthening cooperation between the Royal Government of Cambodia and donors. 
The TWG meetings are held quarterly at TWG secretariat and CDC/CRDB secretariat, respectively 
(ibid). There are 19 TWGs in respective sectors (ibid). 
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 1.4  Significance of the Study 
 
This study will provide an insight into the effectiveness of NGO coordination in making 
positive differences to development and poverty reduction in Cambodia. This study also 
hopes to raise the awareness of NGOs‟ effectiveness at the national and provincial 
levels in Cambodian aid coordination mechanisms. The study complements and 
reinforces an existing Strategic Framework for Development Cooperation Management 
which argues for an expansion of the technical and political space for NGO 
representatives to meaningfully engage and participate in the Cambodian aid 
coordination processes. This can enhance confidence that NGOs can contribute to 
reducing poverty and to achieving the Cambodian national development objectives. 
 
1.5  Outline of the Study 
 
Figure 1.1 provides an overview of how this thesis is structured. Chapter 2 comprises a 
literature review covering the basic concepts and roles of NGOs, NGO coordination in 
both developed and developing countries, and NGO coordination in aid coordination 
mechanisms. Chapter 3 outlines the predominantly qualitative methods including desk 
reviews, participant observation and semi-structured interviews, and discusses forms of 
analysis. Chapter 4 briefly portrays the Cambodian socio-economic, cultural and 
development contexts. Chapter 5 looks at how NGO coordination in Cambodia has 
developed and encountered challenges since Cambodian liberalisation. Chapter 6 
examines how NGO engagement and participation is conducted within the new aid 
coordination mechanisms. Chapter 7 concludes with a discussion of the results and with 
recommendations for future research. 
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Figure 1.1: Thesis Outline 
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How do better NGO coordination efforts contribute to 
Cambodian development and aid effectiveness? 
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Chapter II: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Over the last 30 years Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) have become a key part 
of the global aid system, providing humanitarian, operational and advocacy services at 
all levels (Edwards and Hulme 1995; Lewis, 2006b). They have elucidated development 
issues caused by macro developmental discourses. NGOs have been increasingly 
scrutinised with a key focus on their important roles in poverty reduction, human rights, 
trade, politics and other issues in developing countries (Ahmed and Potter, 2006; 
Anthony et al.,  2008). Alongside the benefits that they bring, a number of questions are 
being asked of NGOs by many actors. However, the coordination work among NGO 
groups and between other actors such as state and aid agencies and even the private 
sector has so far received little attention from academics (Bebbington, 2004; Lewis, 
2006a). NGO coordination is the key instrument in aiding their effective advocacy work 
at the national and global levels, especially now they are under the pressure of a New 
Aid Paradigm (Anthony et al., 2008). This chapter seeks to develop a conceptual 
framework for NGO coordination based on a limited amount of literature in areas of 
NGO coordination and management, humanitarian relief efforts and partnership, the 
nature of development NGO experience and the new trends in aid policy following the 
Paris Declaration.  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first sector looks briefly at the original 
concept and evolution of NGOs and their roles since the end of the Second World War. 
The second section discusses the importance of NGO coordination at the national and 
global levels. The final section provides an overview of NGO coordination bodies and 
their involvement in new aid architecture including the Paris Declaration and Accra 
Agenda for Action. 
 
2.2 In search of an NGO Definition and Roles 
 
There are many different definitions of NGOs in different countries. Generally an NGO 
is a non-profit and non-criminal organisation that is free from government control. They 
influence and/or challenge governments or political parties by primarily focusing on 
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either delivering socio-economic services or policy advocacy and putting people at the 
centre of development (Salamon and Anheier, 1997; Desai, 2002). The term NGO or 
international NGO was first used in the UN Charter in 1946 and the NGOs have become 
increasingly influential in the last two decades (Boli and Thomas, 1997). In this study, 
the term NGO is used to explore INGOs and LNGOs according to their specific nature, 
structure and roles in development and international aid. 
 
Development INGOs are generally based in developed nations, but deliver their services 
in developing countries. In their home countries, they are limited to fundraising and 
public awareness of international development and aid. Their offices in the developing 
countries consist of foreign and local staff. They often assist LNGOs financially and 
technically. Indeed, they help to build a strong civil society in many countries. 
According to Boli and Thomas (1997) INGOs have generally been formed under five 
basic principles including universalism, individualism, rational voluntaristic authority,  
rationalising progress and world citizenship (See Boli and Thomas, 1997, p.180-182).  
 
LNGOs are indigenously established in developing nations. They are usually small 
organisations that provide public services to the poor in remote communities and urban 
areas. Some are also involved in advocacy work. They are often dependent on and 
accountable to INGO counterparts and donors. They gather information about the real 
needs of the poor in their daily life and experience in order to form their development 
projects, goals and strategies (Nyoni, 1987).  
 
2.2.1  Development of NGOs 
 
As alternative agents for development, NGOs have rapidly increased in number and size 
in both developed and developing worlds. There are estimated to be some 30,000 
INGOs in the developed world and millions of LNGOs in the developing world (Crewe 
& Harrison, 1998, p.6; Roberts et al., 2005, p.1846). They are powerful new suppliers 
that meet large demands for social and economic services while also undertaking 
advocacy work in many parts of the developing world (Salamon and Anheier, 1997).  
They have benefited from the decline of the state under neoliberalism. 
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Within the growth of the NGO sector, the state has played a key role in managing and 
regulating NGOs in both developed and developing countries. However, the NGO legal 
registration varies from one nation to another with some being more restrictive than 
others. While legal registration allows NGOs to operate, Salamon and Anheier (1997) 
argue that in some countries the legal framework and legal restrictions have prevented 
NGO growth even though there are supportive conditions for NGOs. This may arise 
when the process of registration involves corrupt state institutions regulating NGOs. 
Despite this the number of NGOs continues to rise across the world. Within this 
context, NGOs have played a number of roles, both nationally and internationally.  
 
2.2.2 The Roles of NGOs 
        
 a) Disaster and Famine Relief 
 
After the Second World War, NGOs have played a key and active role in famine relief, 
particularly during emergency situations of wartime or destruction caused by natural or 
human-induced disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake and various food crises.  Such work gave birth to the first generation of 
NGOs (Martinussen and Pedersen, 2003). The assistance is done through providing 
immediate food, medical aid, shelter, or similar basic necessities. Charity and relief aid 
remain key roles for NGOs today (Ahmed & Potter, 2006); and many OECD countries 
and agencies such as the European Union and United States Agency for International 
Development have largely channelled their humanitarian and food aid through such 
NGOs. In recent years, a specific role for NGOs, particularly INGOs like World Vision 
International (see Appendix I), has been delivering humanitarian relief and other 
services in fragile or failed states, in the hope of achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs).  
 
 b) Development Work 
 
The second generation of NGOs, broadly arising since the 1970s, has been more 
concerned with long-term issues of poverty and economic inequality in developing 
countries, shifting from giving help to enabling self-help. This approach is to assist 
people to help themselves: „teaching a man how to fish‟ (Martinussen and Pedersen, 
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2003). They provide technical services and resources both tangibly and intangibly for 
many purposes. They target the poor both in remote and urban areas such as slums. 
They are able to target the powerless and vulnerable groups whom the governments‟ 
universal services have not reached. These NGOs have become specialised in a number 
of sectors and sub-sectors. They work closely with and use local knowledge. Therefore, 
there is a rising governmental interest in such NGOs as they fill the gap where 
governments cannot provide public goods to their own people.  
 
 c) Advocacy Work 
 
Moving to the third generation of NGOs, Korten (1987) states that problems at the 
ground level demand wider policies of the government. Therefore, advocacy and 
lobbying has increasingly been seen as a key NGO role on behalf of the poor nationally 
and internationally since the 1980s. The advocacy NGOs set their goals to contribute to 
democratisation of the political systems and promote respect for basic human rights and 
good governance (Hulme and Edward,1997). Their work aims to change the structure, 
social, political and economic conditions and policy of the patronage government‟s 
institutions toward the marginalised. For example, INGOs serve as lobbyists for LNGOs 
to influence Southern governments‟ policies and priorities including increased support 
of foreign assistance (Nelson, 2004; Teegen et al., 2004).  
 
 2.2.3  The Global Roles of NGOs 
 
The third generation of NGOs has built networks across countries to undertake their 
international advocacy work. According to Keck and Sikkinck, the advocacy roles 
involve four kinds of international politics (cited in Ahmed and Potter, 2006). Firstly, 
they pursue international information politics through their networks in developing 
countries (see Appendix I) by finding new issues and setting international agendas such 
as gender, environment, or debt relief. Secondly, NGOs use symbolic politics to raise 
global awareness of issues in order to change the discursive positions and procedures of 
international actors. For example, they highlight failed projects to argue for new 
policies or structures and frame issues to take advantage of international norms (Nelson, 
2004). This is done through cooperating with sympathetic staff and managers and 
forming alliances with the UN bodies, the World Bank, governments, other 
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CSOs/NGOs and researchers. Through their public awareness campaigning, NGOs 
work closely with the media to highlight environmental, humanitarian, human rights 
and social problems across borders (Anthony et al., 2008). This measure has had 
positive influences on individuals and the governments in both the developed and 
developing world. Thirdly, through leverage politics they persuade the states, donors 
and multinational corporations to act on an issue. For instance, the NGOs have been 
successful in demonstrating mass support, as in the case of debt relief and trade issues 
(Nelson, 2004). Finally, Keck and Sikkinck identify a fourth NGO advocacy role as the 
use of accountability politics, persuading the states to live up to accepted international 
norms through bearing upon the states‟ behaviour. For example, the Japanese and 
Indonesian NGOs successfully used lawsuits against the Japanese government and 
contractors to stop dam construction in Indonesia and influence both governments to 
compensate the affected residents (Ahmed and Potter, 2006). Thus, NGOs are able to 
make governments accountable though the international norms. 
 
2.3     Why is NGO Coordination Important? 
 
The terms „NGO coordination‟ and/or „aid coordination‟ originated within the work 
among humanitarian relief actors in the 1980s and 1990s in an attempt to make aid more 
effective. With the end of the Cold War, the number of complex emergencies and 
emerging failed states increased. During this period a larger scale of external financial 
resources were directed to a number of war-torn countries and regions (Forman and 
Patrick, 2000). This funding was aimed at reconstructing and rehabilitating those 
countries from violence and chronic damage, repairing severely damaged institutional 
and physical infrastructure
3
 and alleviating economic and social poverty. The assistance 
was delivered in the form of complex humanitarian relief by a number of actors, 
particularly the UN systems and NGOs, mainly INGOs.  
 
The large number of NGOs, both INGOs and LNGOs, rapidly increased. For example, 
according to Smillie (1997) in Strand (2005, p.88) the estimated number of INGOs 
                                            
3 The institutional and physical infrastructure devastation include the breakdown of governance systems 
such financial and procurement systems, legal and judicial systems, government institutions and 
ministries, the destruction of many kinds of physical infrastructure (roads bridges, railways, airports, 
hospitals, schools, universities, and other public good entities), the displacement of population, 
insufficient skill labour and manpower, and massive human suffering (Forman and Partick, 2000, p. 3) 
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working in the Southern countries was about 4-5,000 in 1997, Hulme and Edwards 
(1997, p.4) indicate that LNGOs registered with the Nepalese government grew from 
220 in 1990 to 1,210 in 1993, and those registered with the Tunisian government from 
1,886 in 1988 to 5,186 in 1991. The growing number of NGOs also aimed to absorb the 
massive increase in resources provided, as Cohen and Deng (1998, p.364) indicate that 
in 1998 alone US $8 billion or 10% of total Official Development Assistance (ODA
4
) 
was channelled from developed to developing worlds through NGOs
5
.  
 
NGOs have become the executive agents or sub-contractors for the UN agencies in 
humanitarian situations, moving beyond the welfare and safety net services
6
 with skilled 
professionals
7
 (Duffield, 1997). Moreover, donor countries are also interested in 
supporting CSOs/NGOs to build democracy and good governance including human 
rights, rather than supporting governments that are fragile due to corruption and poor 
governance systems.  Donors can closely manage the utilisation of their funds through 
their selected NGO partners (Strand, 2005).  
 
Additionally, NGOs claim that they are capable of mobilising funds and utilising the 
resources in a more efficient, less hierarchical and more cost-effective way than the 
government institutions or UN agencies. As Hulme and Edwards (1997, p.5) conclude 
“…their supposed cost-effectiveness was in reaching the poorest.” They have become 
specialised in a number of sectors and cover a broad range of activities. They are 
crowded mostly in the city or frontline regions, aiming to strengthen their legitimacy, 
access information, and seek resources.  
 
                                            
4 Increasing Official Development Assistance (ODA) toward CSOs/NGOs resulted from the change of 
donor funding policy with the emerging alternative approach as „development is for people‟ and 
development policies based on neoliberalism and the market economy introduced in 1980s and 1990s 
(Pieterse, 2001).  
5 NGOs, particularly INGOs, mobilise resources from public and private sources. Only a few do not 
accept public sector funding, while others are funded between 60%-70% of their revenue from their 
respective donor governments (Natsios, 1995, p. 407). Their private revenues are primarily from public 
fund-raising events through mass media including television, internet and others (ibid.).  
6 The welfare and social safety net services include a number of sectors such as agriculture, primary 
health care, education, water and sanitation, micro-finance and enterprises, reforestation and road 
construction (Natsios, 1995, p.407). 
7 The skilled professionals are educators, health care professionals such as nurses and doctors, and those 
with expertise in aircraft logistics, large-scale commodity handling, engineering repairs, civilian 
policing, and judicial structures and others (Duffield, 1997, p.538). 
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Previous experience reveals that there were fragmented and unfocused activities, badly 
planned and independently implemented relief efforts, and a lack of shared information 
of the real needs and existing resources among humanitarian actors, especially NGOs 
(Strand, 2005). This led to under-coverage in some geographic areas and sectors, 
replication, competition, and ineffectiveness of resources used. Munslow and Brown 
(1999) note that the emerging coordination efforts
 
were not achieved due to the different 
and complex organisations and financial sources. Therefore, this distorted the peace 
building process in failed states (ibid.).  
 
Nevertheless, the concept of coordination has been adopted, albeit differently, within 
the UN system and amongst NGOs, particularly INGOs. They intend to make use of 
financial resources more effectively and efficiently. Eventually, the poor will directly 
gain benefits from it. The next section will elaborate on the meaning and the concept of 
coordination and NGO coordination. 
 
2.3.1 Definition of Coordination and NGO Coordination 
  
a) Coordination 
 
The definitions of coordination are given in different ways. Coordination is “the action 
of coordinating; harmonious combination of agents or functions towards the production 
of a result” (Simpson and Weiner, 1989, p.898). Robinson et al. (2000, p.7) define 
coordination as “a way to bring together disparate agencies to make their efforts more 
comparable (in the interests of equity, effectiveness and efficiency) and they caution at 
the same time that “without coordination, the danger is of lapsing into chaos and 
inefficiency.” Moreover, Hvinden (cited in Strand, 2005, p.91) views coordination as 
“the process whereby two units are brought to operate together in a (more) harmonious 
way”; but he warns that “this concept is only meaningful when these units are 
presupposed to act in a coordinated manner”. The term „coordination‟ in the current 
aid context refers to coordination between and within government, NGOs and donors. 
Coordination is seen as a form of hierarchical and top-down mechanism, reflecting the 
power relationship in the chain of administrative and institutional management. 
Robinson et al. (2000) argue that the state legitimately plays a coordinating role over 
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other actors, particularly NGOs, as the regulator. Thus, coordination is formally formed 
by one actor in the bureaucratic structure and it always exists at the policy level. 
 
Robinson et al. (2000) maintain that the terms „coordination‟ and „cooperation‟, which 
are often used synonymously, have distinct meanings. „Cooperation‟ is based on the 
voluntary principles associated with power generating from knowledge, experience, 
expertise and contribution, rather than from hierarchical roles and functions. 
Cooperation is often seen in the spirit of cooperative process in organisations interested 
in the notions of „participation‟, „process management‟, and „learning organisations‟ 
(ibid. 2000, p.8). Therefore, cooperation is often used in an informal and voluntary 
structure with equal partnership between members and positions at the technical level. 
Therefore, coordination differs from cooperation in this context. 
 
In the context of aid coordination, Disch (1999, p.18) says coordination is associated 
with policies, principles, priorities, procedures, and implementation or practice. Disch 
(1999) also notes that coordination involves a different degree of 
„intensity/commitment‟ between governments, donors or NGOs/CSOs including 
„consultation‟, „cooperation‟ and „collaboration‟. The coordination process is a formally 
complex structure and involves both political and technical levels.  
 
 b)  NGO Coordination and NGO Coordination Bodies (NCBs) 
 
Historically, NCBs exist at the global, regional, national and/or community level. 
Within this growing number there are more than 150 field-based NGO coordination 
bodies (Bennett, 1994). They vary internationally and nationally in both the developed 
and developing worlds (Stremlau, 1987). They have evolved over time, becoming focal 
points between the governments, donors and NGOs for exploring national development 
issues. NCBs in developing countries were created for and have played particular roles 
in facilitating financial assistance during the humanitarian crises in the 1980s and 
1990s. However, they differ with regard to tangible and intangible features such as 
missions, activities, size, financial and human resources and NGO self-regulation. 
Bennett (2000) writes “Coordination is also about the power to determine the allocation 
of resources, to exert influence over warring parties, governments. Most NCBs 
comprise several dominant agencies that have a vested interest in using the body as a 
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vehicle for pursuing policies complementary to their own programme”. (Bennett, 2000, 
p.172). Therefore, NGO coordination is a means to an end, rather than an end in itself.  
 
These kinds of organisations use various terminologies to portray themselves and their 
different structures. Jon Bennett, an expert on coordination issues, says that NCBs 
describe themselves variously as consortia, councils, federations, umbrella agencies, 
networks, unions and coordination bodies (See Box 2.1).  
 
Bennett (2000, p.169) indicates that these organisations require: 
 Independence from government, though they may include government 
participation; 
 The setting up of a secretariat, answerable to an elected executive committee, 
that takes responsibility for administering the day-to-day activities of a 
membership organisation; 
 A national perspective, i.e., they will usually cover more than just one sector and 
will take on some kind of representational role. 
 
NCBs discussed in this report are the formally-constituted institutions registered with 
their country‟s government ministries. They can be the national NCBs or geographic 
sector NCBs. The majority of them do not represent all NGOs in their country 
(Stremlau, 1987; Bennett, 1994), because many NGOs are interested in being 
independent and autonomous (Roberts et al., 2005). There is often more than one 
national NCB in one country working and pursuing different objectives and mandates 
(Strand, 2005). Other NGO networks, particularly provincial or community networks, 
called NGO networks or alliances in this study, are informal groupings of NGOs 
working together to achieve common goals and they might not register with their 
government‟s ministries. The organisational structures and roles of NGO coordination 
bodies will be comprehensively discussed in the following sections.  
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2.3.2 Southern NGO Coordination Bodies


NCBs have been set up in war-torn countries under the initiative from donors, 
particularly UN agencies, governments and INGOs and/or LNGOs (Stremlau, 1987; 
Bennett, 2000) to enhance the programmatic and managerial capabilities of NGOs and 
Box 2.1: The Eight Different Types of NGO Coordination Bodies 
 
1. Umbrella organisations of NGOs: Independent membership umbrella organisations of NGOs active 
at national and regional level. They usually cover several sectors such as health, education, etc. 
They may comprise Northern and Southern NGOs together or may be set up exclusively for one or 
another. 
2. Umbrella organisations of NGOs for a single sector/issue: Similar to Group 1 but specifically for 
one sector. They could also include groups which lobby on one specific issue. Can be either national 
or regional in scope. 
3. Groups of grassroots organisations: Federations, unions or networks of grassroots organisations, 
they include human rights groups, women‟s groups, etc. usually national in scope, though 
sometimes regional. 
4. Consultative councils: NGO councils set up by the national government as part of a consultation 
process between itself and the NGO sector. In some cases a council may be the only permitted 
coordination structure; in others it may be simply an irregular meeting point for government and 
NGOs. 
5. Councils of social welfare or social services: Mostly affiliated to the International Council on 
Social Welfare (ICSW). In Africa these are usually pre-independence institutions, mostly in 
Anglophone countries. Several have now changed their emphasis towards more general 
development activities, thus joining Group 1. In other cases the Council groups both government 
services and NGOs and receives a large proportion of its budget from the government. 
6. International NGO consortia: Consortia which bring together a number of northern and/or southern 
NGOs, combining financial and staff resources for a specific programme of activities. Often such 
consortia exist where it is more difficult for the individual members to operate alone. 
7. Religious affiliation consortia: Consortia dealing with relief and development activities within 
particular religious bodies (usually the Christian church, though there are also several Islamic 
consortia). Generally, these consortia bring together the development offices of national 
church/Islamic organisations. In rare cases they represent an ecumenical inter-church alliance. 
8. Sub-regional networks of NGOs: These may either be sector-specific or comprise members from 
other national/regional groupings (Group 1-5). 
Source: Bennett (2000, p.170)  
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Box 2.2: The Roles of  NCBs 
1. Minimising project replication and waste 
2. Sharing information and/or providing 
resources 
3. Building a collective voice 
4. Influencing government policies and 
strategies toward affected citizens 
5. Participating in international and national 
aid structures 
6. Enhancing  NGO professionalism through 
capacity building and NGO self-
regulation 
7. Identifying NGO partners for the 
government, donors and INGOs 
improve their effectiveness. Bennett (1994) notes some NCBs are established outside 
international conferences, responding to the common demands and needs of NGOs on 
the ground. However, Stremlau (1987) argues that in some circumstances NGOs have 
hesitated to create discernible NCBs due to concern at attracting unwanted government 
attention. Conversely, outside the scope of humanitarian crises, host communities might 
directly and indirectly encourage NGOs to establish NCBs in order either to have better 
working relationships with government or to protect themselves from a dictatorial 
government.  
 
a) The role of NGO Coordination Bodies (NCBs) 
 
NCBs are created by a number of groups, both LNGOs and INGOs, in respective 
countries where they meet to agree on common goals, values and activities, and swiftly 
respond to and coordinate efforts in humanitarian crises or natural disasters and national 
development issues (Bennett, 1994, 2000). This approach brings not only effectiveness, 
accountability and cooperation, but also ownership and flexibility to the NGO sector in 
developing countries. However, Bennett (2000) argues that NCBs are service providers 
and not regulators as governments are.  
 
According to Bennett (2000) the principles of NCBs are to avoid duplication and 
wastage through voluntarily sharing information and/or resources and to have an 
independent forum for collective views of NGOs to be expressed to the government and 
donors. Bennett also highlights other responsibilities as following: 1) advocacy for, and 
demonstration of, the comparative advantages of a buoyant NGO sector and guarding 
against unwanted influence from either 
governments or donors; 2)  engaging in the 
wider aid industry structure, acting as 
educational NGO agencies for NGO 
advancement through capacity building and 
information exchange; 3) assisting INGOs, 
governments, and donors to identify their 
NGO partners through which to work; and 4) 
enhancing NGO effectiveness through NGO 
self-regulation for good practice such as operational and ethical guidelines and codes of 
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conduct (2000, p.174). However, there is no clear blueprint for such formal or informal 
coordination arrangements that could be easily adapted to different situations. The roles 
of NCBs (See Box 2.2) need to be prioritised based on unique current political, social, 
and cultural contexts in individual countries.   
 
There are a number of sector membership organisations playing more pivotal roles in 
delivering services (Bennett, 2000). However, tensions between national NCBs and 
sector membership bodies may occur due to different views on their operation and 
development policies. There are also a number of NGOs that separately run their 
projects without awareness of the potential for coordination. As Bennett (2000, p.171) 
states “everyone is for coordination, but no one wishes to be coordinated, at least not 
just now”. Specifically, Bennett does not clarify what mechanisms may be used to avoid 
duplication and waste. The result is that project and activity replication and wastage 
remain key issues.  
 
NCBs serve as a forum to link members with different needs and expectations in 
everyday practices of activities and programmes across a country (Bennett, 2000). 
Technology transfer might also be included in their services. This would effectively 
help members to strengthen areas of possible collaboration in future programmes and to 
avoid duplication and wastage (Stremlau, 1987). Therefore, the NGO sector becomes 
more effective both individually and as a group. In order to cut costs and to enhance the 
managerial and programmatic capacities of members, NCBs also provide administrative 
services; technical assistance, programme strategies and implementation; training 
programmes in project design, monitoring and evaluation such as logical framework 
approach; management from accounting to organisational development, and access to 
funding sources (Stremlau, 1987; Bornstein, 2003; Roberts et al., 2005).  
 
The relationship between membership bodies, donors and INGOs, becomes more 
important in a funding role. In order to attract funding from donors and INGOs 
(Bennett, 2000; Bornstein, 2003; Roberts et al., 2005) for their own operations and 
increasing allocation of funds to members, NCBs disclose information about the 
capabilities of members and updated local situations and needs (Bennett, 2000). In 
doing so, they need to have skilled staff, new forms of management and effective 
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accounting procedures. NCBs in different geographical areas such as Asia, Africa and 
Latin America have different abilities in allocating grants to members (Stremlau, 1987).  
Therefore, independent selection committees and membership secretariats must be very 
effective in their ability to secure grants. Some of them play this role very effectively by 
gathering members to analyse and document their experiences and share these practices 
with donors (Stremlau, 1987; Bennett, 2000). The funding role may limit their 
autonomy due to certain conditions or controls set by donors. Thus, NCBs are not only a 
means to an end but an end in themselves in this case. However, some members reject 
any type of funding role to maintain their absolute independence and legitimacy 
(Bennett, 2000). Another important role for NCBs is to influence and make donors 
accountable for the quantity and quality of their aid delivery to the country. 
 
As pressure from their own operation and donors, many NCBs have now enforced their 
own NGO self- regulation to build a better image of NGOs everywhere. However, Pratt 
and Myhrman (2009, p.6) argue that:  
 
“self-regulation is voluntary and often is not monitored to assess the level of 
compliance (internally or externally). Some of the initiatives provide code of 
conduct rules, without specifying very many detail as to what implementation 
would look like.” 
 
 There is little awareness of how initiatives such as operational, ethical and management 
guidelines and other best practices may be fully adapted and implemented by NGOs, 
particularly LNGOs, and what progress has been made. This involves staff members' 
efforts, time and cost for each NGO. LNGOs are even worse than INGOs in that 
capacity and staff and management understanding of NGO self-regulation and 
management remains limited.  
 
b) Organisational Structure and Management 
 
NCBs have formal structures, with contracted staff, permanent offices (usually based in 
the capital city), a clear vision and mission, strategy and annual action plan, 
membership guidelines, boards of directors and committees (See Figure 2.2). The 
NCB‟s organisational management is characterised in horizontal form using the 
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participation approach (collaboration and cooperation practice) in contrast with vertical 
and authoritarian approaches (Bennett, 2000). However, Kjellman, et al., (2003, p.856) 
point out that “co-ordination bodies have often been unable to reconcile the disparate 
goals and strategies actors have, and at times have proven rigid, reluctant or simply 
unable to adapt to the changing needs of dynamic contexts”.  
 
Bennett (1994, p.16-17) suggests four different types of management structure: General 
Assembly
8
, Executive Committee
9
, Executive Director
10
 and Secretariat
11
 (See Figure 
2.2). Bennett determines their distinctive tasks and responsibilities in order to make the 
NCBs effective operationally.  The capacity, commitment and efforts of NCB staff and 
the executive director can make a significant difference in coordination work as Bennett 
(2000, p.18) argues that “the prestige and image of an NCB is largely a reflection of 
how good the Secretariat is.”  
 
Figure 2.2: Typical Structure of Southern NCBs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Bennett (1994, 2000)  
 
 
                                            
8 The General Assembly is given the highest authority of the organisation, responsible for approving the 
annual programme, annual budget and work plan; providing comments on policy and strategy and 
major events; and recruiting new officers. The Generally Assembly is often held annually or more 
frequently organised based on the decision made by the members of NCBs (Bennett, 1994, 2000).  
9 The Executive Committee consists of a small number of selected members and/or individuals voted 
during the General Assembly. The committee actually meets bi-weekly or monthly to work on the 
organisation‟s policy, work plan and budget plan before submission to the General Assembly, and 
appointment of the Executive Director (ibid).  
10  The Executive Director is the key person of NCBs. The trusted, experienced and knowledgeable 
Executive Director is responsible for NCBs‟ daily operation, setting policy, debating external issues, 
developing approaches to particular problems facing the NGO sector and mobilising financial resources 
(ibid).  
11 The Secretariat usually comprises the Executive Director and support staff. They need to have strong 
backgrounds and experience at the ground level and institutional management in order to provide the 
daily services to their members. They are paid staff (ibid).  
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At the management level, their executive directors and staff must be skilled and 
professional in leadership, development practices and policy analysis at a national level, 
holding the ability and capacity to manage coordination work between their members, 
governments, INGOs and donors (Hailey and James, 2004). Additionally, staff need to 
assess member NGOs in the field, ensuring they are effective (Bennett, 2000), but they 
are not authorised to manage members‟ internal operations. Along with paid skilled 
managers and staff, their organisational structure is seen as being far from local 
communities. NCBs are not project/programme implementers at the community level. 
In addition, reporting and daily operational work and the monthly meeting with 
members should be conducted in the local native language in order to understand the 
cultural, social and economic contexts. 
 
Furthermore, NCBs might find it difficult to fulfil members‟ needs, both INGOs and 
LNGOs, because of their differences in size, structure, mandates, culture of working, 
nature of the programmes, funding sources and their relationship with the host 
governments (Stremlau, 1987). INGOs and LNGOs have different expectations on how 
NCBs should provide services. Basically, LNGOs seem to seek material support (funds) 
and practical services from NCBs (ibid). LNGOs often have limited knowledge and 
understanding on NGO self-regulation and other development policy and issues to 
contribute in the NCB‟s regular meetings. In contrast, INGOs that are strong institutions 
aim to share information, coordinate projects/activities and contact LNGOs (ibid). 
NCBs function effectively and efficiently if their members are active and provide 
support and comments to achieve common goals and interests.  
 
 c)  Membership and Fees 
 
Characteristically, membership defines NCBs, their roles and services. NCBs may have 
a large number of members based on their type of work, mandate and the services they 
provide. The number of members has a direct impact of the NCBs‟ performance 
because the members are the reason for their existence. Stremlau (1987 p.215) observes 
that “how to balance the role of the coordinating body and the interests of independent 
members is one of the most common, and difficult, problems facing these 
organisations.”  
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Generally, NGOs are required to meet specific conditions to be a member of NCBs. 
Those conditions could be a statement of interest, being registered with a government‟s 
ministries, providing a NGO description
12
, filling the membership application and fee 
forms. Then, NCBs review and assess the application before their executive committee 
approves the membership request. In association to this, NGO members will need to pay 
a regular membership fee, usually an annual fee. The membership fees vary from one 
NCB to another based on the quality and quantity of the services provided. The fees are 
calculated in different ways. There may be a fixed annual fee, based on a proportion of 
the annual budget of NGOs and others. 
 
There might be a number of reasons why NGOs do not want to be the member of an 
NCB. Roberts et al. (2005) notes that many NGOs are not interested because of the fear 
of losing their independence and autonomy. Some NGOs do not want to share 
information and ideas due to the tough funding competition (Strand, 2005). Some might 
only be interested in parts of an NCB‟s role but they might feel that they cannot be a 
full member. Others cannot afford to pay the membership fees or they might not have 
the budget items to spend on membership fees as their Memorandum of Understanding 
with their funders might require funds to be strictly used for the specific projects and 
activities. NCBs are usually situated in the capital city rather in the regions or 
provinces, and LNGOs might find it difficult to participate on a regular basis in meeting 
due to the costs of long distance travel and mission expenses. Bennett (2000) says doing 
coordination work is associated with cost and time. This might prevent NGOs from 
joining NCBs. Additionally, NGOs might not be well aware of NGO coordination and 
common benefits that can achieve certain goals. 
 
d)  The Working Relationship between NCBs and the Government  
 
 
Most NCBs improve their relationship with a government by exchanging information, 
assuming advocacy roles on behalf of NGOs over development issues and government 
policies, and by significantly contributing to formulating national policies (Stremlau, 
1987; Bennett, 2000). However, this role varies from one country to another and is 
determined by the nature of the respective governments and their relationships. 
                                            
12 The description of an NGO includes mission, activities, office, staff, budget, management structure, 
intended beneficiaries, annual report, reporting and auditing, monitoring and evaluation systems. 
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Moreover, governments require precise details of NGO activities and funding (Bennett, 
2000) and some governments claim that NGOs‟ complaints are overstated to gain donor 
aid. NGOs are also subjected to probes and accusations of foreign manipulation (Parks, 
2008). The states may not provide any subsidy to them. Like many LNGOs, NCBs 
heavily rely on donors‟ and INGOs‟ funding (Demars, 2005). 
 
Under a new security agenda, some governments strictly regulate, monitor and 
investigate the NGO sector due to rising political concerns on security and terrorism 
(Howell et al. 2008). This government control brings confrontational challenges. Also, 
in some cases, government leaders create government NGO-like bodies to attract 
funding from donors (Bennett, 2000; Demars, 2005), leading to tension with 
independent NGOs.  
 
e)  NCBs and their Partnership with Donors 
 
International donors have played supporting roles for NCBs and NGOs. Although 
NCBs raise revenues from membership fees, most rely on external financial resources 
because they will be unable to generate money from the general public, companies, or 
the government within a country. Instead NCBs are intermediary agents sharing 
information with donors about what happens on the ground and they share the 
information from donors with members. Indeed, position papers prepared annually by 
NCBs can be used to inform donor policy and practice in the country. This might hold 
the donors accountable for their country aid practice. 
 
2.3.3 Northern NGO Coordination Bodies 
 
There are a number of NCBs in developed countries such as the US and European 
countries (See Appendix I). They were established after the Second World War and the 
Cold War. Many NCBs work to improve the livelihood and human well-being in 
developing countries, and include such bodies as InterAction, The Voluntary 
Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies (VOICE), and The European NGO 
Confederation for Relief and Development (CONCORD). Some such as EUROPARC 
and EuroNGOs focus their activities toward their region and country. Their 
organisational structures are quite different from those in developing countries. They 
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usually have NGO members but some NCBs might have individual, honorary and 
constituent
13
 members. The International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease 
(IUATLD) had 2,727 members in 127 countries creating a strong international network 
in 2008 (www.theunion.org, retrieved date July 26, 2009). As part of an international 
network, the constituent members influence health care and public health policies in 
their own country and abroad. 
 
Since the 1970s many OECD governments have realised the importance of good 
working relationships and cooperation with NGOs working in their own country and in 
international development (Rugendyke, 2007). The governments and NGOs have 
common objectives and interests towards poverty alleviation and sustainable 
development across the world. They can play complementary roles in the targeted areas 
and serving the needs of citizens (NZAID, 2008). Significantly, based on this 
relationship, Northern NCBs are able to have some influence on the aid policies of their 
governments. For example, the Australian Council for International Development 
(ACFID) announced its success in influencing Australia's White Paper on the aid 
programme in 2006 (ACFID, 2006).  
 
Northern NCBs act as the catalyst for communication and negotiation with their 
governments, particularly in relation to government funding of NGOs and the NGOs‟ 
engagement in international aid and development. They aim to coordinate their overseas 
activities and present a single voice on issues among a growing community of very 
diverse members. They also aim to enhance NGOs‟ relationships with the Western 
governments, multilateral donors such as the UN agencies, the World Bank, IMF, ADB, 
and others, and strengthen NGO visibility through their representation at international 
and national events (Rugendyke, 2007). Some provide capacity building and training to 
members and they also produce a large number of research-based evidence documents 
available in English, French, Spanish or Portuguese. They enhance the national and 
international connections organisationally and individually, raise issues with political 
parties and build the public awareness of international aid and development issues. They 
promote the use of codes of conduct and ethics among members.  
 
                                            
13 The constituent members are the members who represent the country to Northern NCBs. There can 
only be one Constituent Member per country (www.theunion.org, retrieved date  July 26, 2009). 
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Northern NCBs have sustainable financial resources funded by their governments in 
addition to income generated from membership fees, donations and grants from the 
public, enterprises and private foundations, and  revenue from their own products and 
services,. For example, the core funding arrangement between New Zealand CID and 
NZAID has been renewed for the four year term 2008-2012 (CID, 2008). Some NCBs 
such as the ACFID and CID receive more than half of their total budget income from 
governments (ACFID, 2008; CID, 2008). VOICE received more than 60% of its income 
from membership fees in 2008 to ensure its independence (Voice, 2009). Some make 
revenue from their products (journals, other publications and services) (ACFID, 2008; 
EUROPARC, 2008); while InterAction and EURONGO raise income from public and 
private foundations (InterAction, 2009; www.eurongos.org). 
 
According to their programmes and activities, NCBs do not have a long-term strategic 
framework coordination or alliance to build partnership between Northern and Southern 
NCBs. There is a gap in a global partnership in the NGO sector that has not been 
addressed. Fowler (1992, p.28) argues that “strategic alliance between like minded 
NGOs with complementary skills both within and between the North and the South are 
needed in order to rationalise efforts and use of resources…harmonise policy positions 
on issues affecting NGOs as a whole, nationally and internationally.” In essence, 
Southern and Northern NCBs can learn and share information and experience between 
them. This could improve their effectiveness and help achieve their international goals.  
 
2.4 NGO Coordination Efforts and the Changing Aid Environment 
 
As noted, NGOs and NCBs have influenced governments, donors and others outside the 
international aid architecture. Since the 1980s they have connected and built a 
relationship with senior staff members and managers of the international organisations 
(Ahmed and Portter, 2006; Anthony et al., 2008). However, they have not fully engaged 
in the policy dialogue and government-donor aid coordination mechanisms that are 
organised to ensure national institutional participation in structural adjustment and other 
aid programmes and modalities (Martinussen and Pedersen, 2003). Their roles and 
responsibilities within the aid architecture have not been clearly identified. 
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The aid architecture has evolved from project-based to programme-based approaches, 
reducing the amount of tied aid and conditionality. The donors‟ aid policies have shifted 
the focus from macro-economic growth to poverty reduction or MDGs and from 
structural reforms to state capacity-building reforms (Martinussen and Pedersen, 2003). 
Donors have also become more harmonised among themselves through changing their 
practices, procedures and principles (OECD, 2003). While efforts have been made to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness, aid delivery mechanisms have paradoxically 
become extraordinarily complex and cumbersome. They require all parties to have 
strong coordination efforts within their individual groups and among broader 
stakeholders. These changes have negatively and positively impacted NGOs‟ operation 
and advocacy work at the national and global levels, while NGO engagement within the 
movement of aid mechanisms seems to be doubtful and less apparent. 
 
The issue of NGO coordination has become critical in dealing with the changing aid 
environment sectorally, nationally and globally. Although Stremlau (1978), Bennett 
(2000) and Strand (2005) address coordination issues, they seem to mainly concentrate 
on NGO coordination in periods of wartime, hardship and/or humanitarian relief. This 
issue has been given little attention in the general context apart from humanitarian 
relief, particularly in the context of the emergence of the new aid paradigm: the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD). CSO/NGO engagement at international and 
national aid mechanisms is discussed in the next section. 
 
2.4.1 CSO/NGO/NCB Engagement in Global Aid Mechanisms  
 
The notion of aid effectiveness emerged as a key issue from the Monterrey Consensus14 
(2002) to the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation15 (2003), and the PD (2005). The PD 
was signed by OECD governments and recipient governments aiming at increasing 
recipient government ownership, donor harmonisation and alignment with partner 
                                            
14 Monterrey Consensus was conducted in 2002 aimed at (1) Mobilising domestic financial resources for 
development; (2) Mobilising international resources for development; (3) Recognising international 
trade as an engine for development; (4) Increasing international financial and technical cooperation for 
development; (5) Addressing external debt; (6) Addressing systemic issues (De Toma, 2009, p.8). 
15  The Rome Declaration on Harmonisation was held in March 2003 in Italy, with participation by donors 
and country governments. The declaration is an “international effort to harmonise the operational 
policies, procedures and practices of our institutions with those of partner country systems to improve 
the effectiveness of development assistance, and thereby contribute to meeting the MDGs” (OECD, 
2003, p.1). However, there was no CSO/NGO/NCB involvement. 
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Figure 2.3: Aid Effectiveness Agenda from Paris 
(2005) to Accra (2008) 
 
 
Source: OECD, 2009 
 
systems and priorities and enhancing mutual accountability and managing for results 
(OECD, 2005). The DP includes 12 indicators and 21 targets with grade scales under 
five principles (See Figure 2.3). This modality has changed the design and 
implementation of international development cooperation. It seeks to strengthen 
recipient governments‟ capacity, institutions and systems; thereby maximising aid 
impacts. However, NGO networks and NCBs were not signatories but rather observers 
and agreed to endorse the declaration albeit with significant concerns (Lavergne and 
Wood, 2006). Thus, they were not involved in the preparatory processes and had no 
opportunity to provide comments and recommendation over the PD‟s implications.  
 
NCBs and CSO/NGO networks argue 
that the PD has not broken down the 
vicious cycle of poverty (ROA, 2007) 
and has excluded a civil society voice 
(AGCS, 2008). On behalf of the poor, 
they claim that the PD does not contain 
democratic ownership and social 
accountability (Fleming et al., 2007; 
Schmidjell et al., 2009). Sen (2007) 
argues that the donor aid disbursement 
process, including tied aid and aid 
conditionality, food aid and financial and technical assistance delivered by the 
Programme Management and/or Implementation Units (PMUs/PIUs16), maintains the 
same degree of exclusive policies toward the poor. The NCBs/NGOs are concerned 
over the persistence of the blurred indicators of the PD with the limited progress on 
gender mainstreaming and human rights (Sen, 2007, Fleming et al., 2007). The above 
arguments were brought to 2008 Accra High Level Forum (HLF) by CSO/NGO 
representatives through their 18 month efforts, gathering information, consulting, 
coordinating, with Northern and Southern CSOs/NGOs and producing a CSO/NGO 
issue paper and concept paper (AGCS, 2007a, 2007b, 2008). There is a positive and 
negative side to their involvement. 
 
                                            
16 PIUs are a parallel units like the government‟s department of the ministry or agency, implementing, 
managing and evaluating stand-alone projects initiated and supported by DPs and/or INGOs. 
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a) CSO/NGO Engagement Outcomes 
 
The CSO/NGO engagement in Accra HLF was an impressive political success17 with 
diverse representation, pursuing strategic roles in enhancing CSO/NGO roles and voice 
and shaping aid and development effectiveness (Wood and Valot, 2009). The outcomes 
resulted from solidarity, quality, well-researched analysis and messaging through wide 
intensive consultations and coordination across Northern and Southern 
CSOs/NGOs/NCBs (ibid). Some proposals were well accepted, particularly democratic 
ownership, social accountability, transparency and gender and human rights issues. 
Specifically, over 700 CSOs/NGOs gathered in the HLF and 80 CSO/NGO delegates 
participated in its Roundtables and Plenary sessions with over 100 ministers from donor 
and recipient countries (ibid). Significantly, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) 
provides potential engagement of CSOs in the aid structure as follows: 1) the important 
contribution of CSOs in applying the PD within their own boundaries; 2) promotion of 
CSO development effectiveness through improving CSO coordination efforts with the 
governments, strengthening CSO accountability for results and enhancing information 
on CSO activities; 3) provision of an enabling environment that maximises their 
contribution to development (OECD, 2008b, p.4). The OECD and Accra HLF 
stakeholders recognise CSO/NGO roles as „central players‟ and „independent 
development actors in their own right‟ (OECD, 2008a, 2008b; Wood and Valot, 2009). 
This means that donors and recipient governments realise and need to interact with 
CSOs/NGOs and parliaments.  
 
CSOs/NGOs‟ budgets accounted for approximately 10% of the total $104 billion ODA 
flow to developing countries in 2006, and these bodies raised approximately $20-25 
billion on their own from the public and foundations in that year (AGCS, 2008, p.9). 
Thus, they are both aid recipients and donors and have a wide range of roles, including 
as advocates, watchdogs, service providers, educators and activists. Within the PD and 
                                            
17The success reflects the strong commitments and efforts of a CSO International Steering Group that was 
made up of CSO/NGO networks and Northern and Southern NGOs and AGCS with a highly ambitious 
agenda and realistic set of proposals. There were over 700 CSO/NGO participants in one week at Accra 
and 80 CSO/NGO delegates to its Roundtables and Plenary sessions (Wood and Valot, 2009). The 
AGCS was established and led by CCIC to prepare CSO documents for the Accra HLF 2008. At the 
Accra HLF, the CSOs/NGOs that gathered to comprehensively discuss the issues and their roles for 
Accra HLF for 18 months produced their own positions including “Synthesis of Findings and 
Recommendations” and “Issue Paper and Concept Paper on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness” 
(AGCS, 2007a, 2007b). 
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AAA framework the donors, recipient governments and CSOs/NGOs need to work 
collectively to demonstrate the big picture of how much aid is committed and disbursed 
to whom, when and with what results. 
 
b) CSO/NGO Engagement Constraints 
 
While their engagement was a political success at HLF it faced some challenges 
including limited resources, capacity, global representativeness, opportunities and space 
and CSO/NGO effectiveness. Firstly, CSO engagement processes are an exhausting 
exercise with a lack of resources (Wood and Valot, 2009, p.28) and their dependency on 
donors is apparent. Secondly, the impact of the International CSO Steering Groups 
(ISG) and Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness (AGCS) and 
awareness of the aid effectiveness agenda have been limited due to poor information 
dissemination and awareness campaigns and different layers of CSO engagement 
processes (ibid, p.29). The level of CSO teamwork has not been sufficient and the 
capacity and knowledge of CSO representatives in effective lobbying is deficient 
(Wood and Valot, 2009). Some argued that CSOs/NGOs have fewer constructive ideas 
to put on the table and placed more negative points (ibid). Thirdly, global 
representativeness and a solid constituency of CSOs/NGOs are very sensitive issues due 
to the absence of a global civil society representative body (Pratt and Myhrman, 2009). 
CSOs/NGOs in the global engagement processes are characteristically dominated by the 
North, rather than the South, particularly the inputs from social movements (Wood and 
Valot, 2009; Pratt and Myhrman, 2009). This brings in to question their constituency, 
legitimacy, and process structure. Fourthly, CSOs/NGOs were trapped by the technical 
and political blockages at the HLF. There were a lot of agendas for discussion in the 
Accra HLF, CSO/NGO representatives lost opportunities to engage directly with 
different donors including the World Bank, the USA and many recipient governments 
(Wood and Valot, 2009). CSOs/NGOs were not able to speak at the table, particularly 
ministerial meetings where the AAA negotiations were conducted only between donors 
and recipient governments (ibid).  
 
Finally, many donors and recipient governments are concerned about NGO 
effectiveness in terms of their use of funds, multiple accountabilities and transparency. 
Northern CSOs/NGOs have few ideas on how to develop relevant indicators and targets 
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such as ownership and alignment of their programmes/projects with Southern NGOs. 
Although Northern CSOs/NGOs have strong types of partnership with Southern NGOs, 
their programmes and strategies are shaped by their governments‟ policies and 
strategies as most secure funding from their governments (Demars, 2005). Northern 
CSO/NGO strategies and programmes seem to be far from Southern CSOs/NGOs. 
Many CSOs/NGOs, particularly Southern CSOs/NGOs, have not released their annual 
budgets and evaluations to the public (Demars, 2005; Aminjanov et al., 2009). Thus, 
their transparency is also questionable. 
 
There is a turning point where CSOs/NGOs have started the CSO Development 
Effectiveness Processes and Framework18, aiming to improve CSO effectiveness and 
policy engagement based on CSOs‟ own development approaches, relationships, 
institutional realities and the impact of their actions (De Toma, 2009, p.14). Many 
CSOs/NGOs, particularly Northern CSOs/NGOs, have endorsed the initiative. Thus, 
CSOs/NGOs have rejected the PD applicability due to complex politics of aid reform, 
the limitations of the PD to CSO and the nature of CSO/NGO roles as donors and aid 
recipients (ROA, 2008; Wood and Valot, 2009; Pratt and Myhrman, 2009).  
 
2.4.2  Country Aid Architecture and National CSOs/NGOs/NCBs 
 
a) CSO/NGO Engagement Process in Country Aid Architecture 
 
Historically, CSOs/NGOs in developing countries have directly and indirectly 
influenced governments‟ policies and strategies at both national, sector and sub-national 
levels. The heart of aid effectiveness in the aid architecture is better aid coordination. 
This requires donors, recipient governments and NCBs/NGO representatives, moving 
together at the same speed from a rhetorical to a practical approach. Aid coordination 
mechanisms introduced by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
                                            
18
An International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness is under consultation, processes  
among CSOs/NGOs across the globe that will include a set of principles, indicators, context-specific 
implementation guidelines, good practices for accountability mechanisms, and minimum standards for 
external enabling conditions. The expected outcomes include (i) A common understanding, shared by 
CSOs from around the world, of the challenges to realising CSO development effectiveness; (ii) 
Increased CSO accountability; (iii) Increased awareness and knowledge of existing tools, mechanisms 
and initiatives; (iv) Strengthened partnerships to promote development effectiveness and (v) 
Understanding and support among official donors, governments and possibly other development 
stakeholders for an enabling environment for CSO actions (De Toma, 2009. p.14-15). 
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Development/Development Assistant Committee (OECD/DAC19) with the contribution 
of DAC member countries have been adopted and implemented by recipient 
governments to improve the effectiveness of aid. The aid coordination now has been 
transformed from a donor-led to a government-led process at country level under the 
PD. Recipient governments have developed their own aid mechanisms to work closely 
with donors. The mechanisms include Consultative Group (CG20) or Round Table (RT) 
meetings, semi-annual or quarterly policy meetings21, and sector coordination group 
meetings22 between country governments, donors and CSO/NGO representatives (Disch, 
1999) (See Figure 2.5). Disch (1999) mentions that CSO/NGO representatives are 
invited to participate in forums but fails to identify what roles they should play as there 
is no blueprint for aid coordination. There is no clear guideline of the selection of 
CSOs/NGOs to attend in standardised policy processes (Mundy et al., 2008) as 
governments remain the absolute decision-makers. 
 
In this regard, the aid coordination and management frameworks developed by the 
country governments and endorsed and supported by donors need to be changed to 
include the roles and responsibility of CSOs/NCBs. In doing so, a broader dialogue 
between the country governments, donors and CSOs/NGOs/NCBs should be held to 
agree on the following issues:  
 CSOs/NGOs‟ positions and roles as „central players‟ and „development 
actors in their own right‟ (OECD, 2008b) 
                                            
19
 The OECD/DAC is first and foremost a secretariat to the donor community. The coordination in 
OECD/DAC is conducted through DAC high level meetings and the technical committees to persuade 
and negotiate with the donors to change attitude and actions. As the result of a series of meetings with 
its members, policy recommendations, guidelines, lessons and best practices and standards have been 
adopted toward improving the aid modalities and mechanisms for better effectiveness and efficiency. 
Specifically, OECD/DAC conduct an annual review of donor practice (Disch, 1999, p.20). 
20 The CG meeting is an annual high level meeting between donors and the recipient government, chaired 
by the Minister of Finance or the Minister of Planning, or an appointee from the Central Bank or the 
government-appointed coordination body. The agenda and structure of such meetings are different from 
one government to another. The documents, agenda items and other positions papers produced by the 
government and donors are often shared beforehand. The main objectives of the meetings are to discuss 
policy issues related to social and economic development, and resource mobilisation (commitment and 
pledges) as well as to oversee and manage the budget disbursement and program/project 
implementation. The role of donors has transformed from co-chair to lead donor facilitators (Disch, 
1999).  
21 The quarterly meetings are often organised by the government before and after CG meeting to follow-
up the progress and the project/program implementation, provide policy options and resolve problems 
raised by the sector coordinating working groups (ibid). 
22 The sector coordinating working group meetings are at the technical level where the government‟s line 
ministries and donors discuss the issues (project design, implementation and evaluation), sector policies 
and programmes/projects and budget allocation (budget support, sector-wide approaches, program-
based approaches, and others) (ibid). 
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 The degree of participation and engagement in the policy and technical 
dialogue in CG/TR, sector working group and/or and sub-national 
working group meetings  
 Information sharing and aid disbursement of CSOs/NGOs (IATI, 2009) 
 
This would make NGOs‟ bargaining powers stronger and hold donors and governments 
to account for the quality and quantity of their development programmes, transparency 
and performance. Also, this would turn the backlash against the NGO sector into 
opportunities for receiving long-term and significant funding and more space for policy 
influence.  
 
b) CSO/NGO Challenges in Aid Effectiveness Engagement Processes 
 
As mentioned in previous sections, the new aid agenda has provided both great 
opportunities and significant challenges for CSO/NGO participation and engagement in 
national and sector policies and strategies. CSOs/NGOs encounter issues including 
financial scarcity, institutional capacity and legitimacy, and uncertain and unfriendly 
political environments.  
 
Firstly, CSOs/NGOs claim that the scarcity of financial resources limits their 
coordination work and capacity to have influential engagement in policy processes at 
both national and sector levels (Mundy et al., 2008; Bird and Caravani, 2009;  
Schmidjell et al., 2009; Wood and Valot, 2009). Specifically, shifting single projects to 
budget support or SWAps in donor giving-aid policies may result in dramatically 
decreasing funds for the NGO sector (Lister and Nyamugasira, 2003; Howell et al., 
2008).  
 
Secondly, the limited capacity of Southern CSOs/NGOs is substantially apparent. An 
important question here is the ability and capability of Southern NCBs to capture the 
macro-vision of their global networks/NCBs to enhance their ability to address national 
and international policy issues (AGCS, 2007a). INGOs have been largely engaged in 
the PD process, while most of Southern CSO/NGOs have little involvement or even 
awareness of the PD in their own country (Menocal and Rogerson, 2006). 
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Figure 2.4: Structure of the Aid Coordination Mechanisms 
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Sources: (Disch, 1999, IHSD, 2003; CDC/CRDB, 2006c, 2006g, 2006h, 2006j; Mundy et al., 2008; Alemu, 2009; Bird and Caravani, 2009; Mwega, 2009; 
Schmidjell et al., 2009). 
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Bird and Caravani (2009) argue that CSOs/NGOs have expertise on the ground by close 
cooperation with communities but limited understanding of national policy and 
budgetary processes, leading to weak independent monitoring of government policy 
objectives and donor programmes. Country aid coordination processes remain highly 
diplomatic at the policy level; thus, this requires NCB/CSO/NGO representatives to be 
knowledgeable and have experience in raising issues within that environment.  
 
Finally, an uncertain and unfriendly political environment in developing countries often 
limits active CSO/NGO engagement in policy processes. For example, in Tanzania 
well-coordinated CSO/NGO involvement reveals strong evidence-based policy 
advocacy; but the Tanzanian government has ignored their advice (Mundy et al., 2008). 
Schmidjell et al. (2009) suggest that governments‟ political will is vital for expanding 
CSO/NGO political space.  
 
 2.5 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, NGO coordinating bodies are normative, distributive, obligative and 
communicative, aiming at strengthening civil society. The NCBs have played a number 
of pivotal roles in minimising duplication and wastage through sharing information, 
knowledge and best practices and/or allocating resources to members. They act as focal 
points for donors, states and the private sector through genuine partnerships. The 
successes of NCBs in some developing countries have not come without challenges. In 
fact, NCBs still face constraints such as establishing sole representation and collective 
voices, limited political space for policy influencing and limited alternative resources 
with aid dependency on donors. 
 
With their roles evolving over time, they move in the same direction as development 
assistance, particularly the new aid paradigm. Although they face threats and work in 
the uncertain context of the changing aid environment, the coordinating bodies may 
play a more important role in analysing the current status of NGOs and building their 
capacity to engage, as well as sharing updated knowledge to their members and non-
members. Moreover, the increasing interest and awareness of coordination work in the 
new aid structure, particularly the Paris Declaration, and aid effectiveness among NGOs 
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to justify their efforts and to maintain their resources and capacities (Handmer and 
Dovers, 2007), should be addressed.  
 
The PD and AAA have provided opportunities and significant challenges for CSO/NGO 
participation and engagement in national and sector policies and strategies. CSOs/NGOs 
claim to enhance democratic ownership, effectiveness, social accountability and 
transparency. However, the PD and AAA create more complex knowledge, mechanisms 
and policy processes, limiting the NGO‟s political space and technical and financial 
capacity to understand and be effectively involved in the processes. The country 
governments‟ coordination body and the donors need to build the capacity of NCBs; 
while the donors need to continue supporting CSO/NGO coordination at the country 
and global levels.  
 
Northern and Southern NCBs and CSOs/NGOs view the PD and AAA as not being 
applicable to CSOs/NGOs due to due to the complex politics of aid reform, the 
limitations of the PD to CSO and the nature of CSO/NGO roles as donors and aid 
recipients. They have started their own CSO Development Framework aiming to 
improve their effectiveness, accountability, transparency and managing for results and 
their policy engagement at the national, regional and global levels. However, they need 
to continually build genuine partnerships with both recipient governments and donors in 
order to accomplish their goals and development effectiveness. 
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Chapter III: Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the methods employed to investigate the three research questions 
mentioned in section 1.3. Primary data on NGO coordination and the aid coordination 
processes is generated using a case study approach, which employs semi-structured 
interviews and participant observation. Secondary data, from Cambodian newspaper 
articles, television reports, documents from the Cambodian government and the NGO 
community, is used to capture a wider understanding of the local context. A desk review 
that includes organisational studies on the government ministries/institutions and 
organisations of NCBs and provincial NGO networks, is also employed. This chapter is 
divided into three main sections. The first section outlines the research techniques. The 
second section describes the computer-based qualitative analysis and data analysis 
approach. The third section provides an overview of my adopted position, reflections 
and (re)presentation of the field research. 
 
3.2 Qualitative Methods 
 
To allow for analysis of specific views on NGO coordination and the changing aid 
environment, qualitative methods were used in this study. Qualitative methods offer 
direct and spontaneous sharing of information, local knowledge, expertise and 
experiences between researchers and participants (Mikkelsen, 2005). This enables 
researchers to generalise, explain and draw conclusions from the data that varies from 
issues expected by researchers (Fitzgerald, 2006). Qualitative case studies were also 
employed as they focus on historical and experimental knowledge and provide accurate 
information on the influence of social, political and other contexts (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2005, p.444). Furthermore, the methods also involve the „boundary systems‟ including 
the particular people, institutions, phenomena, themes, issues, processes, stories and the 
local contexts (e.g economic, geographical, cultural, political, social, legal and 
aesthetic) where the research is located (Stake, 2003, p.134-156). This research used 
multi-case designs, describing, discussing and explaining the case studies at policy and 
technical levels and by sectors including 19 Technical Working Groups. Government 
institutions, donors, NGO Coordination Bodies (NCBs) and NGOs alliances in 
Cambodia were involved. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) note that the use of case studies 
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allows further investigation on the research questions and allows generalisations to be 
drawn from specific local contexts. Therefore, the results generated from the case 
studies are relevant to the contemporary Cambodia aid coordination context. 
 
The data collection techniques used consist of three methods. Firstly, secondary data 
was collected from the Cambodian Government‟s institutions, NGO coordination bodies 
and information from the local newspaper articles such as The Cambodian Daily News 
and The Phnom Penh Post. Also, a desk review of a variety of related literature 
covering the context of NGO coordination, the new aid structure and organisational 
studies among selected NGOs was carried out. Finally, the primary data was gathered 
through participant observation and semi-structured interviews with the voluntary 
informants from the relevant government ministries, donors and NGOs. This research 
took place in the field in Cambodia over the 11 weeks from 18 March to 7 June, 2009. 
 
3.2.1  Secondary data 
 
Using qualitative methods, secondary data from various sources and organisational 
analysis (desk review) were employed in this study to bring about a wider 
understanding of the international and local contexts and comparison. 
 
a) Data Sources 
 
Data was sourced from NGOs and the Cambodian Government to bring about a wider 
understanding of the local context (Neuman, 2006). The Cambodian Government‟s data 
and documents are available at the CDC/CRDB‟s website (www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh) (See 
Appendix II) and other related ministries‟ websites, particularly the Ministry of 
Education, Youth and Sport (www.moeys.gov.kh). A number of NGO websites 
including Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC) (www.ccc-cambodia.org), 
NGO Forum on Cambodia (NGOF) (www.ngoforum.org.kh), NGO Education 
Partnership (NEP) (www.nepcambodia.org), Medicam (www.medicam-cambodia.org), 
Action Committee for Human Rights (CHRAC) (www.chrac.org) and End Child 
Prostitution, Abuse and Trafficking in Cambodia (ECPAT) (www.ecpatcambodia.org) 
were also used. Some documents were also gathered from a number of donor websites 
such as the World Bank (www.worldbank.org), the Asian Development Bank-ADB 
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(www.adb.org), and the United Nations Development Programme-UNDP 
(www.undp.org).  
 
In addition, NGO development, NGO coordination efforts and NGO self-regulation 
were observed through the analysis of reports in the media including local newspaper 
articles from The Cambodian Daily News and The Phnom Penh Post, and television 
news reports. I also read the local news on the internet such as the Radio Free Asia 
(www.rfa.org/khmer) and the Phnom Penh Post (www.phnompenhpost.com) until I 
completed my thesis report. 
 
With comparisons between local and global contexts, I reviewed literature available at 
international and national levels as well as that covering other Cambodian field 
research. The literature reviewed academic studies on NGO coordination, aid 
coordination, global and local aid architecture, NGO sector and global aid systems, 
NGOs‟ self regulation, aid and donor policies. This draws lessons from best practice in 
different countries to improve NGO coordination and NGO engagement, contributing to 
the advancement of aid effectiveness in the local context.   
 
b) Organisational Analysis 
 
Furthermore, in order to gain a deep understanding of NGO coordination in Cambodia, 
a number of major NCBs and provincial NGO networks and alliances were analysed 
through organisational studies (See Appendix V and VI). The organisational studies 
included their planning, strategy and budgeting, organisational and staff management, 
governance systems and their effectiveness, accountability and transparency. The 
analysis was done through collection of the existing information and literature from 
these organisations available on their NGOs‟ websites, field research interviews and 
other related material available at the time of the research. 
 
3.2.2 Primary Data 
  
a) Sampling and Snowballing 
 
The total number of voluntary informants participating in this research was 28. Initially 
a sample of 65 key informants was drawn up covering government officials, donor 
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management staff, NGOs and research institutions. These were selected from the formal 
list of Joint Technical Working Groups (TWGs 23 ) and the Government-Donor 
Coordination Committee (GDCC24) list prepared by the Council for the Development of 
Cambodia/Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board (CDC/CRDB) (See 
Appendix VII), and an Non-Government Organisation (NGO) directory developed by 
Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC). The 65 were contacted through email 
while I was still in Wellington, New Zealand, and informed about the objective and 
process of the study. However, the number of the planned informants dropped to 54 as 
11 did not respond. Later, the final interviewed informants were the 28 who agreed to 
cooperate in the study with the appointments set through email and phone contact. The 
28 informants included seven senior government officials, 11 development partners and 
10 NGOs. The 10 NGOs included two NCBs, five members of NCBs and three non-
members of NCBs (See Table 3.1). 
 
The key informants were selected based on the local context of where these participants 
are involved in the NGO sector and the new aid modalities in Cambodia. The new aid 
coordination mechanism introduced in late 2004 by the Cambodian Prime Minister 
consists of three main forums between the Government, development partners and NGO 
representatives (CDC/CRDB, 2004e, 2006c). The three key forums are the Consultative 
Group meeting that later was renamed as the Cambodian Development Cooperation 
Forum (CDCF25), the GDCC and the TWGs. The CDCF, GDCC and TWGs are aid 
coordination structures developed within the Cambodian context. In the three forums, 
the key stakeholders are the government, donors, and NGO representatives.  
 
                                            
23 TWGs: There are 19 TWGs (See Appendix III). TWGs are chaired by a senior Royal Government 
official to bring about national ownership on their respective sector and represented by lead donor 
coordinators or facilitators. Their roles and tasks are to identify, prioritise and sequence their activities 
through formulating their own action plan to coordinate external support with an agreed set of priorities 
based on perceived need, available resources and existing capacity (CDC/CRDB, 2006c, 2006f, 2006g). 
24 GDCC: is chaired by the Senior Minister of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and the First 
Vice-Chairman of CDC/CRDB. The membership of GDCC includes ministers and heads of 
government agencies, ambassadors or heads of diplomatic missions, and country representatives of 
multilateral institutions. The GDCC meeting is a forum to provide policy guidance, to identify priorities, 
and to resolve issues raised by the TWGs. The GDCC secretariat is located in CRDB/CDC under the 
daily management of the Secretary General (CDC/CRDB, 2006c, 2006f, 2006g). 
25 Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF) chaired by the Royal Government of Cambodia 
has been transformed from the Consultative Group (CG) meeting held in 2007. The CDCF is a high 
level policy forum where government (ministers), civil society (NGOs) and a head delegation of donor 
agencies annually discuss and agree on agenda for development assistance to Cambodia (CDC/CRDB, 
2006c, 2006f, 2006g). 
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Table 3.1: List of the Interviewed Informants 
 
No. 
Code 
Number 
Type of Organisation Position Location 
1.  GOV 01 Government institution Deputy Secretary General Phnom Penh 
2.  GOV 02 Government institution Director Phnom Penh 
3.  GOV 03 Government institution Deputy Director Phnom Penh 
4.  GOV 04 Government institution Secretary General Phnom Penh 
5.  GOV 05 Government institution Deputy Director Phnom Penh 
6.  GOV 06 Government institution Director Phnom Penh 
7.  GOV 07 Government institution Director Phnom Penh 
8.  DP 01 Donor/Development Agency 
Senior Programme 
Manager 
Phnom Penh 
9.  DP 02 Donor/Development Agency  
Team Leader Democracy, 
Good Governance and 
Human Rights 
Phnom Penh 
10.  DP 03 Donor/Development Agency 
Counsellor for 
Development Cooperation 
Phnom Penh 
11.  DP 04 Donor/Development Agency NGO Desk Coordinator Phnom Penh 
12.  DP 05 Donor/Development Agency 
Development Programme 
Manager 
Phnom Penh 
13.  DP 06 Donor/Development Agency First Secretary Phnom Penh 
14.  DP 07 Donor/Development Agency 
Senior Democracy and 
Governance Officer 
Phnom Penh 
15.  DP 08 Donor/Development Agency Country manager Phnom Penh 
16.  DP 09 Donor/Development Agency Coordination Specialist Phnom Penh 
17.  DP 10 Donor/Development Agency Aid Prgramme Officer Phnom Penh 
18.  DP 11 Donor/Development Agency Senior Advisor Phnom Penh 
19.  CSO 01 INGO Executive Director Phnom Penh 
20.  CSO 02 LNGO Executive Director Phnom Penh 
21.  CSO 03 LNGO Executive Director Phnom Penh 
22.  CSO 04 INGO Regional Administrator Phnom Penh 
23.  CSO 05 INGO Executive Director Phnom Penh 
24.  CSO 06 INGO Executive Director Kandal Province 
25.  CSO 07 LNGO Executive Director Battambang Province 
26.  CSO 08 LNGO Programme Manager Ratanakiri Province 
27.  CSO 09 LNGO Executive Director Kratie Province 
28.  CSO 10 LNGO Executive Director Siem Reap Province 
 
The informants were also chosen based on their political appointment and formal 
positions, particularly a number of senior government officials from the Cambodian 
Government ministries and management staff from donors providing both short-term 
and long-term financial resources to NGOs in Cambodia. Most participants from the 
ministries and donors are involved in CDCF and GDCC and are members of TWGs.  
 
There were ten NGO informants including four from INGOs and six from LNGOs. The 
NGO informants comprised two NCBs, five members of NCBs and three non-members 
of NCBs.  The NGOs were selected based on seven criteria. They are NGOs that: 
(i) are active  
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(ii) have boards of directors and/or a proper strategic organisational plan 
(iii) are formally registered with the government institutions 
(iv) work in the priority sectors such as health, education, governance and 
administration, rural development and land management, human rights, 
democracy, gender mainstreaming, agriculture, water and sanitation, and 
environment 
(v) are NCBs, members and non-members of NCBs  
(vi) have operated in Cambodia for more than five years and  
(vii) cooperated for this study.  
 
I directly contacted five that are located in Phnom Penh, the capital city of Cambodia. 
Another five NGOs are from Battambang, Kandal, Mondulkiri, Ratanakiri Siem Reap 
and Stung Treng province, where a large number of LNGOs are located (see Table 3.1 
and Figure 4.1). One provincial NGO informant was directly contacted. Four NGO 
informants based in the provinces were chosen through the suggestion of other NGO 
informants based in Phnom Penh. They are chairmen, former chairmen and members of 
NGO networks and alliances of their province.  
 
I did not get any response from the formal research institutions and think-tank agencies. 
As this was different from what I had planned in Wellington, I focused on the three key 
main stakeholders mentioned above. However, I made sure that that analysis from the 
wide range of the data and information from different sources would minimise the bias 
and errors in the study.  
 
As a result, by combining data from a variety of informants such as the Cambodian 
senior government officials, senior donor management staff and NGOs‟ leaders I was 
able to produce a more complete picture of the current NGO coordination and the aid 
environment in Cambodia. 
 
b) Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Interviews were conducted through developing semi-structured questions to collect in-
depth information (primary data). Key informant interviews are valuable in accessing 
the knowledge and experience of people involved in a given area and in highlighting 
41 
 
issues related to social reality, cultural meaning, existing and explicit values, and 
authenticity (Neuman, 2006; Bryman, 2008). This brought more accurate information 
and data about how NGOs should coordinate their work and operations to proactively 
and constructively engage in the new aid structure in Cambodia. It also informed what 
actions the government and donors should undertake towards a new form of NGOs‟ 
effective collective action within the current aid coordination mechanism.  
 
The key informants were told about the topic of the interview and the purpose and the 
process of the research, and related information and documents, both in English and 
Khmer, were made available. I translated from English into Khmer all documents 
including information sheets, the consent form, and the interview questions (for donors, 
government officials and NGOs) (See Appendix IV).  
 
I developed an interview guide outlining the main topics and questions that steered each 
interview with different institutions, particularly government institutions, donor 
agencies and the three different types of NGOs. However, interview questions were 
modified according to the type of organisation or the position of the key informants. 
Again, the adjusted guide provided scope to redirect the interview as necessary during 
the period of interviewing in order to get in-depth information based on the knowledge 
and experience of the informants (Bryman, 2008). The interview guide was eventually 
modified to reflect emerging themes and categories. The interview questions included 
introduction questions, follow-up and probing questions, specifying questions, direct 
and indirect questions, structuring questions, silence, and interpreting questions 
(Bryman, 2008) (See Appendix IV).  
 
Twenty-seven interviews had an audio recording made of the conversation, and they 
were transcribed using a pseudonym for the interviewee; one interview with an 
informant was not recorded due to security reasons. The majority of the interviews were 
carried out in the office of the informants. I conducted the interviews in English with 11 
donor management staff and two English-speaking executive directors of INGOs based 
in Phnom Penh and Kandal province. Also, I interviewed in the Khmer language seven 
senior government officials, seven NGOs‟ executive directors based both in Phnom 
Penh and different provinces, and one NGO‟s programme manager based in one 
province.  
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The length of the interviews varied. Some interviews were more than one hour and 
others were less than 30 minutes, with an average of about 45 minutes. This is because 
the informants have different knowledge, background and experience on the particular 
issues related to NGOs and the aid coordination process in Cambodia. Some have more 
knowledge in the NGO sector rather than the aid architecture and vice versa.  
 
During the interviews, the important points were written down in the form of notes. 
After each interview, I wrote memos of each interview and my reflection and 
understanding from the conversation. Twenty-seven of the interview recordings were 
later transcribed, while the one interview without an audio recording was summarised.  
 
c) Participant Observation 
 
In addition to the research techniques mentioned above, participant observation, as a 
component of the qualitative methods, was employed in the research study. Tedlock 
(2005, p.474) notes that “the observation of participation produces a combination of 
cognitive and emotional information that ethnographers can use to create engaged 
ethno-dramas and other forms of public ethnography…address important social issues 
in a humanistic, self-reflective manner, engaging both the hearts and the minds of their 
audiences.” Also, it portrays the set of problems and solutions that occur, how the 
involved and affected people interact and deal with them (Dingwall, 1997). On three 
occasions in the field research, I undertook a participatory approach. I attended and 
observed an NGO seminar in one province and two meetings in Phnom Penh.  
 
I had an opportunity to participate in a one day NGO seminar in a province located in 
North-Western Cambodia. Based on the good relations between myself and an NGO 
coordinating body based in Phnom Penh, I was invited to participate in the provincial 
seminar with 65 out of 87 LNGOs in the province. The NGO seminar was organised by 
one NCB in collaboration with the NGO alliance in the province. The purpose of the 
seminar was to build awareness of NGO legislative framework and NGO effectiveness 
and good governance, to share the updated information between NGOs and the 
Cambodian Government and increase the understanding of the roles of civil society 
organisations and the aid effectiveness agenda. The seminar discussion provided me 
with good information about the NGO coordination at the provincial level, the working 
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relationship between the national and provincial NGOs, the understanding of their own 
self-regulation and their practical relationship with the Cambodian government. It also 
gave me a clear picture about the level of provincial NGO understanding of the aid 
effectiveness agenda set by the government and development partners. 
 
I also attended a meeting of the Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC) 
and a meeting of the Joint Government-Donor Technical Working Group on the health 
sector (TWG). The Director of the Bilateral Aid Coordination Department in charge of 
Asia and the Pacific, agreed to allow me to participate in the GDCC and the meeting of 
TWG on health at the Ministry of Health. The GDCC meeting on was held by 
CDC/CRDB at the CDC/CRDB on 28 April, 2009. I participated in the meeting as an 
observer and a staff member of the CDC/CRDB (currently on study leave). I gathered 
the relevant documents and observed the NGO representatives, their level of 
participation and engagement in the two meetings and their interaction with donors and 
the government officials on the agenda of the meetings. Moreover, I could assess the 
NGO representatives‟ current position and their contribution in the two forums. 
 
3.2.3  Limitation of the Study 
 
I am an ordinary government staff member, working for the CDC/CRDB. I also am an 
international student, studying for a Masters in Development Studies at Victoria 
University. My views expressed in this report do not reflect or represent any official 
position by my employer.  
 
There are some limitations of this study. I could not reach and did not interview as 
many of the initial sample of 65 members of GDCC and TWGs, NGO representatives, 
NCBs and NGO networks and alliances in all provinces as hoped for. Many did not 
respond to my request through email and phone contact. Eventually, the information 
from 28 interviews tells just parts of the story of NGO coordination and aid 
coordination processes in Cambodia.  
 
Many people working in the same field and processes have different views and interpret 
the context differently because they have different educational backgrounds and 
understanding. They also experience and interact with other people and stakeholders 
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about different thematic issues. Thus, their knowledge in the aid coordination process 
and the reflection of NGOs‟ operations is different. The people who are members of 
GDCC and TWGs are very busy with their daily work. The government institutions and 
ministries and the donor agencies are very bureaucratic. It is not very easy to get 
appointments with some of the members. Specifically, I could not travel to interview 
and seek information from NGO alliances in all provinces and cities in Cambodia due to 
limitations of time and cost. There is no official record about how many provincial 
NGO alliances and networks and NGO representatives in each TWGs exist. Therefore, 
there might be other information that was not captured by the scope of this study. 
Nevertheless, my questions and approach attempted to gain as broad an understanding 
as possible within these limitations. 
 
3.2.4  Ethical Issues 
 
This study was reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Human Ethics 
Committee at Victoria University of Wellington on 14 March, 2009. Fortunately, I was 
then able to start in the field on the 18 March, 2009 in Cambodia. In the field research, 
all informants were asked to sign a consent form and 26 informants signed it; two senior 
government officials did not agree to sign and instead gave me verbal consent. This 
protected the informants from any expected or unanticipated issues arising after 
completion of the study. The majority of the interviews were conducted at their offices 
with audio recording. One informant agreed to be interviewed in a restaurant and 
another interview was carried out without audio record. Confidentiality was offered to 
interviewees to avoid any potential harm to their political, social and personal security 
as well as their positions in the government, donor agencies and NGOs.  
 
At the coding and data analysis stage, the interviews were quoted by using a 
pseudonym. I used the terms „GOV‟ for government official, „DP‟ for Development 
Partners or Donors, „CSO‟ for Non-Government Organisations I used coding numbers, 
for example GOV 01, DP 02, and CSO 03, to identify individuals in order to protect the 
informants from any potential harm (See above Table 3.1).  
 
After the completion of the thesis report, notes were kept in a safe location. Moreover, 
upon completion of the project, notes, tapes and informed consent forms will be 
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submitted to the course supervisor to lock in a filing cabinet in a locked office. In the 
final report, no individuals were identified by names or position. A summary of research 
findings will be made available to the interested participants upon request after thesis 
completion.  
 
3.3 Nvivo 8, Coding and Data Analysis Approach 
 
With reference to Corbin and Strauss (2008) and Bryman (2008), I also used open 
coding, axial coding and selective coding strategies to classify and categorise the 
themes and sub-themes of the field interviews. The concepts are grouped and regrouped 
through classification and categories through axial coding (ibid). The procedure of 
selective coding is conducted through systematically prioritising and/or integrating the 
categories to get the key categories for refinement and development (Bryman, 2008). 
The basic strategy to determine the themes and categories was derived from the broad 
concepts of NGO coordination and the new aid coordination mechanisms at the 
international, national and provincial scales and by sectors. When it came to the 
analysis, I coded the themes in Nvivo 8 through creating tree nodes with hierarchical 
structures (ibid).  
 
In the interpretation stage, based on the primary data collected from the field with the 
combination of historical evidence, I re-examined the case studies, while being open 
about my personal involvement and experience (Neuman, 2006). Accordingly, I 
imposed particular orders of concepts about the NGO coordination and aid coordination 
processes on the research study. I regularly checked the field notes and memos over 
time to assess new and emerging ideas. I determined the key coding themes as 
followings:  
 The challenges of NGO coordination  
 The importance of NGO coordination 
 The improvement of NGO coordination 
 NGO development and changes 
 NGOs‟ understanding and adoption of the aid effectiveness agenda 
 The roles of NGO representatives in the aid coordination processes 
 The challenges of NGO representatives in the aid coordination processes 
 The working relationship between NGOs and the Cambodian Government 
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Through using Nvivo 8, the themes consist of sub-themes with a hierarchical structure 
developed after a long series of revision of coding themes (See Figure 3.1). The 
integration stage is the final and the most difficult part of the qualitative data analysis. It 
took more time and effort including reworking, rewriting and editing.  
 
Figure 3.1: Sub-theme Analysis of Institutional Challenges to NGO Coordination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I developed the concrete story lines, created diagrams, and concentrated on the relevant 
topics to analyse the data. The concrete story lines that emerged reflect the particular 
period of the NGO coordination and the changing aid environment currently 
experienced in Cambodia. This is part of narrative analysis (Bryan, 2008). This 
combination was coherently and effectively linked with data collection, the 
methodology and organisational studies of the key government institutions and key 
NGOs that were examined. 
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3.4 Positionality, Reflection and (Re)Presentation of the Field Research 
 
3.4.1 Positionality 
 
I am a government official currently on study leave, and I have worked with 
CDC/CRDB for more than six years. I was in charge of regional aid programme 
coordination, basically focused on regional training courses provided by the Japanese 
Government under the South-South Cooperation Framework. I was involved with 
regional training programmes and projects for Cambodia, Laos PDR, Myanmar and 
Viet Nam. My involvement included the basic design studies, negotiation, participation 
in a series of meetings with relevant stakeholders, implementation and monitoring and 
evaluation. I have known and worked with some of the informants and other members 
of GDCC and TWGs. I also have a good working relationship with them, particularly 
the government officials and some senior donor management staff. I worked in 
partnership with UNDP staff and the advisors based in CDC/CRDB under the Multi-
Donor Support Programme for Aid Coordination. I used to work part-time as 
development consultant for one INGO called Khmer Arts Academy. I have a good 
understanding of different working environments. I understand the concept of aid 
effectiveness in the local contexts and aid coordination processes. I not only 
participated, but also contributed to help organising both CDCF and GDCC and other 
TWG meetings. 
 
This previous work provided me with some research advantages, including easy access 
to the wide range of information related to my research, and the ability to get interviews 
with the most relevant people. Firstly, I was able to quickly access information related 
to aid coordination mechanisms; specifically government documents. As a native 
speaker of Khmer, I have been able to converse freely with people from whom I need 
important information. The most relevant informants in my research were selected from 
the list of members of the TWGs and GDCC participants, provided by my former 
colleagues, when I was still in Wellington, New Zealand. Secondly, because I already 
had a good working relationship with some of my informants in Cambodia, I received 
positive responses and appointments from them at an early stage. For instance, I 
interviewed 11 senior donor management staff partly because they knew that I was a 
staff member of the CDC/CRDB. Moreover, they considered my topic relevant to the 
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current aid structure in Cambodia. The results of this study might establish substantial 
information which could  improve their operations.  
  
By having the same appearance, speaking the same language, understanding the 
cultural, political and social contexts, I managed to build a strong partnership with my 
key interviewees, especially Khmer interviewees. I was comfortable and had good 
conversations that provided me with information that seemed to come from their heart 
and soul. I was able to build trust with them. I also developed partnerships with non-
Khmer native informants from donor agencies and INGOs. The interviews proved 
fruitful due to their understanding of the local contexts and their long working 
experience in Cambodia.                                                                                                  
 
In the field research I considered myself as a researcher from the „inside‟. Before the 
field research I worked hard to position myself neutrally. I did not align myself with any 
groups of informants. I discussed with informants the sensitive questions related to 
political issues between the government and NGOs. However, I could see that the three 
different types of informants perhaps each saw me differently. The government and 
donor informants thought I was aligned with the government because they thought I 
would return to work for the government and because my close working relationship 
with them would remain steady. However, most of the NGO informants knew only that 
I used to work for the INGO in Phnom Penh.  
  
3.4.2 Field Research Reflection 
 
To be a good researcher there is a need before the interviews to be well organised in 
terms of location, time management, dress code, and to have a prepared set of questions. 
For example, I often went in advance to see the locations where the interviews would 
take place. Then, I determined how long it would take me to go from my office, my 
house, or from one ministry or donor office or NGO office to another. It took a lot of 
time to travel around. I spent time reviewing the questions and sub-questions as well as 
studying the organisations that I inquired about. Therefore, during the interviews, I 
could manage to ask the informants the most useful and relevant questions. 
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Not all key informants have the same level of knowledge or personal experience with 
NGOs, particularly NGO coordination, or the aid coordination processes in Cambodia. 
The informants are from different levels of responsibility at work. Some are quite 
knowledgeable about policy and some only have a working knowledge of the technical 
aspects of their job. Several informants have both policy and technical knowledge 
including experience with the aid coordination processes consisting of three main 
forums and different NGO work. Some can only comment on issues and experiences 
they have had within their own round of work. Some of the NGO informants understand 
the complexity of coordination and aid structure; conversely some were not so 
knowledgeable and not aware of what the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is. A 
few did not know NGO coordination efforts made by the NGO community or the aid 
structure developed in the country. It was a challenge in each interview. Therefore, I 
asked each different informant a set of questions but I made sure that the questions were 
relevant to my main research and the objective of the research study.  
 
Sometimes, I felt the informants misunderstood difficult questions that are political in 
nature, particularly the roles of the NGO representatives in the three different kinds of 
aid coordination forums. For instance, when interviewing five informants about the 
roles of NGO representatives as one of the key stakeholders in CDCF, GDCC and 
TWGs I had to ask them in three different ways to get accurate information. Sometimes, 
they did not understand the concepts or the terminology. Sometimes, I explained the 
story first to make sure they could understand my ideas and the questions. Even so, I 
questioned the government officials, donor management staff and NGO‟s executive 
directors in a diplomatic and respectful way.  
 
I interviewed seven government officials and eight INGOs‟ and LNGOs‟ executive 
directors in the Khmer language and the rest I conducted in English. After that I 
transcribed all the interviews. In audio recordings of the interviews in English it is a 
great challenge to decipher the meaning of words and phrases delivered in different 
accents. I carefully checked the transcripts with the interview notes to ensure my 
interpretation was always correct and coherent. The most difficult was translating 
Khmer into English as I could not find some words that meant exactly the same in 
English. Some Cambodian informants quoted Khmer proverbs. These were difficult to 
transcribe and translate.  
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3.4.3 Field Research (Re)Presentation 
 
Field research reflectivity plays a pivotal role in the writing process. It involves 
considering the power relationship between researchers and the participants throughout 
the entire research process (Jasper, 2005). In the (re)presentation and interpretation, 
Holliday (2007, p.136) stresses that “academic writing is an „arena of struggle‟ in which 
students and researchers can find it hard to achieve personal power and voice.” The 
power inequalities remain a burden for researchers to decide what information to  
include in their research and also to (re)present what is found in the field. Therefore, 
speaking on behalf of others that, like me, come from the Third World, it is very 
important to carry inclusive messages of the marginalised. 
 
Concerning the power relationships in the field, I had no intention to influence my 
research process; but, as a new researcher from „inside‟, I characteristically influenced 
the research process in a number of ways. For instance, I accessed the field research 
data and documents, and informants‟ appointment through my previous network and 
working relationships with them. I did not rely on anyone to determine the number of 
informants, or different kinds of informants, to make the appointments and interviews, 
or to translate and I did not ask for any technical assistance. However, during the 
interviews, I was largely reliant on the information provided by the informants; thus, I 
still had limited power when undertaking research. When it came to the writing process, 
I felt that I was empowered to write and present information on behalf of informants 
and my self-reflectivity and experience. Thus, it helps me to be aware and accountable 
for the consequences of my engagement. My analysis is based on the original interviews 
with informants, with no second interviews. This  thesis targets academic audiences.  
 
3.5  Conclusion 
 
To sum up, the entire research process employed qualitative methods, including 
secondary data, a desk review, participant observation and in-depth semi-structured 
interviews. These methods are often seen in the development field. This chapter 
highlighted some of the issues and complexities of this research and potential impacts 
on the research results. Taking into consideration, positionality, reflectivity and 
(re)presentation is a significant part of the study.  
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Although there were some challenges in the field research, I had good interviews with 
different kinds of informants. The fact that I was a local researcher helped me avoid 
many problems. However, some challenges remain concerns for both the experienced 
and new researchers because conducting field research in development studies requires 
multiple disciplines. The situation in the field varies across regions, sectors, 
governments, donors, NGOs and individuals. There needs to be flexibility in how one‟s 
methodology is designed and adopted as researchers face different socio-economic, 
political, social and cultural contexts.  
 
I have sufficient information from the field provided by my informants from using the 
methodologies and research techniques that were suitable for the study. As a local 
researcher, conducting research on my home country problems, the results are directly 
enhanced by my background and working experience, my understanding of the cultural 
and local contexts, positionality and field research experience. This study has benefited 
from the values and knowledge of the course work that I have obtained from 
undertaking a Masters in Development Studies at Victoria University of Wellington and 
the perception and guidance from my supervisor during the analysis and thesis writing 
process. This enhanced the quality of the data analysis.  
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Chapter IV: The Cambodian Socio-Economic and Development Contexts 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter briefly gives a portrait of the Cambodian social, economic, cultural and 
development contexts. It is divided into three sections. The first section describes the 
lessons from the Angkor period through to the peace and reconstruction periods. The 
second section provides the summary of civil society development from the Angkor 
period to present. The final section overviews the current political, socio-economic and 
development context of Cambodia. 
 
4.2  Lessons from Previous Histories 
 
Cambodia is situated in Southeast Asia and shares borders with Thailand to the north 
and west, Laos PDR to the north, Viet Nam to the east and south and the Gulf of 
Thailand to the south-west. The current area of the country is smaller (about 181,035 
square kilometres) than that of the ancient empire (See Figure 4.1). The total population 
is now estimated to be more than 14 million (World Bank, 2009a). Khmer remains the 
dominant ethnic group with Cham or Cambodian Muslim, Vietnamese, Chinese and 
Laotian minorities (Peou, 2001). The majority of the population is employed in the 
agricultural sector (World Bank, 2009a). Almost a third of the population lives under 
the poverty line, earning less than US$1.25 dollar a day (ibid). Cambodia is one of the 
poorest and most heavily aid-dependent countries in Southeast Asia (World Bank, 
2007b). Tully (2005) notes that Cambodia is still underdeveloped and many people live 
lives little different from their ancestors. This is the result of a series of internal and 
external wars, conflicts and power struggles from the collapse of the Angkor Empire to 
the late 1990s (See Table 4.1).   
 
From the ninth to the 13th centuries, Cambodia‟s Angkor monarchy ruled much of 
Southeast Asia from South China to the Andaman Sea and northwards into modern day 
Laos (Tully, 2005). In that period, Cambodia had a highly developed civilisation with a 
rich culture and economic and political development. Economic surpluses were used for 
celebrating rituals and ceremonies and building the great temples, which employed 
massive numbers of labourers and artisans. This success was the result of the strong 
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leadership and control exerted by the monarchy (Tully, 2005, p.34), with the healthy 
and populous civilisation of Angkor driven by an agrarian society that included 
irrigation systems (barays), bridges, footways, rest houses, hospitals, canals, road 
networks, reservoirs, embankments and trading routes (Higham, 2001; Tully, 2005).  
The empire was based on three pillars: Hindu/Sivaism and Mahayana Buddhism, 
administrative organisation and a highly efficient irrigation system (Esterlines, 1986). 
However, Cambodia turned from the „Golden Age‟ of Angkor into the „Dark Age‟ in a 
series of wars caused by internal and external factors. The collapse of Angkor was 
caused by 1) loss of the great kings and a weaker state, 2) social and economic problems 
such as diseases, rebellions, a rapid crime increase and economic crisis, 3) adopting a 
new religion (Theravada Buddhism), which affected economic and social patterns 4) 
ecological degradation and 5) the rise of powerful and aggressive neighbours including 
Siam (modern-day Thailand) and Viet Nam (Esterlines, 1986; Tully, 2005). Since then, 
Cambodia has been invaded by both countries while Cambodian politics was dominated 
by Cambodian kings appointed by Siam and/or Viet Nam to rule the country. Khmer 
kings often sought military support and switched sides between these two powers to 
ensure Cambodia‟s sovereignty, stability and survival. Thus, Cambodia became a vassal 
state of both neighbours until the arrival of the French protectorate in 1863. 
 
The French protectorate shielded Cambodia from her neighbours, particularly Siam, in 
return for trade concessions and economic development that benefited France 
(Esterlines, 1986). The French eliminated slavery, strengthened Cambodian armed 
forces, restructured administrative and legal systems, including the taxation system, and 
introduced private ownership, especially of land (ibid). However, Cambodia was 
financially, administratively, judicially and commercially controlled by France (Tully, 
2005). Corruption emerged in the ways taxes were collected from the peasants by 
officials. Public work schemes, education and social welfare systems were not 
introduced, while the legal system was underdeveloped (ibid).  
 
After World War Two when France‟s power was weakened, Prince Sihanouk 
proclaimed Cambodia‟s independence from France and set up his own government after 
winning the first national democratic election in 1953 (Esterlines, 1986). His absolute 
power was derived from the traditional kingship and monarchy as well as his 
charismatic personality. 
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Figure 4.1: Map of Cambodia 
 
Source: Maharajh, 2009 
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Table 4.1: Cambodia Key Historical Dates 
Date Historical Description 
8th -14th century Golden Age of Angkor 
16th-18th century Dark Age-Thai and Viet Nam invasion and the decline of Khmer royal power  
1863 Cambodia becomes a French protectorate 
1953 
Cambodian gains independence from France and becomes a prosperous and fast 
developing state 
1970 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk deposed in a coup led by his Defense Minister, General 
Lon Nol. 
1975 
The Khmer Rouge takes control of Cambodia and time of the Killing Fields 
begins.  
December, 1978 
Viet Nam invades Cambodia and ousts the KR, installing the PRK to administer 
the socialist nation. 
1989 
The PRK is renamed as SOC, with the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. 
Cambodia starts to open its economy on market principles 
1991 
The Paris Peace Accord is signed by the involved parties, permitting the UNTAC 
to arrange and facilitate free and fair elections. 
1992 UNTAC troops arrive 
1993 
The UNTAC-organised election is won by FUNCINPEC. SOC is renamed the 
CPP. The KR rejected the election result. Cambodia had a first Prime Minister 
(Prince Norodom Ranariddh, son of King Sihanouk) and second (Hun Sen). A new 
state constitution was approved and Sihanouk is reinstated as King. 
1997 
Hun Sen stages a coup against Prince Ranariddh. The KR troops are integrated into 
Cambodian armed forces. 
1998 
CPP wins second election. The KR ended after Pol Pot‟s death and the capture of 
the KR General Ta Mok. 
1999 Cambodia joins the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
2003 
CPP wins the third election but political deadlock means almost a year passes 
before a government is formed 
2005 Cambodia becomes a member of World Trade Organisation 
2007 Khmer Rouge Tribunal starts 
2008 CPP wins the majority of the seats in Parliament and forms the government alone.   
Sources: (Poeu, 2001; Tully, 2005; Owen, 2005; deGuzman, 2008; Hughes, 2003, 2008, 2009) 
 
From 1953 to 1970, Cambodia was one of the fastest-developing nations in Southeast 
Asia, exporting primary products26, allocating about 20% of the state budget into the 
education sector and investing in secondary industries 27 (Tully, 2005). However, its 
political neutrality was undermined by the conflict between the capitalist West and 
communist East during the Cold War, and particularly the Viet Nam War. The Prince 
built alliances with Viet Nam and then China rather than the West as a result of a power 
struggle with other internal communist groups. The regime‟s political system became a 
totalitarian democracy as only one party controlled the country and the prince held 
supreme power and suppressed opponents (ibid). Increased corruption led to inequality 
                                            
26  The main primary products for export were rice, fish and fish products, livestock, rubber, maize, 
pepper, cardamom, sugar, soy beans, tobacco, cotton and coffee (Tully, 2005, p.140). 
27 The secondary industries included a major cement plant, jute, textile and cotton mills, sawmills and 
paper and plywood factories and an oil refinery in Sihanoukville (ibid). 
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and injustice while the regime‟s economy could not absorb the large numbers of new 
workers entering from secondary and tertiary education; this caused a political and 
social backlash in the 1970s (Tully, 2005).  
 
Cambodia‟s misfortune returned episodically. As Esternlines (1986, p.95) states: “Lon 
Nol boomed us, Pol Pot killed us and the Vietnamese are starving us”. After Prince 
Sihanouk was deposed in the 1970s, Cambodia was trapped between two larger 
conflicts, internal political chaos, and then later fell into chronic violence and civil war. 
The American-backed government lost control after the withdrawal of American troops 
from Viet Nam; while the Khmer Rouge (KR28) took control the country in April 1975. 
This extremist regime transformed Cambodia into another greater „Dark Age‟ of 
„Killing Fields‟ and „Prisons without Walls‟, comprising no state economic, financial, 
legal or social institutions, no religion, tradition or culture, no currency, no paid work, 
no trade and industry. The cities and towns and infrastructures were abandoned and 
demolished. City dwellers were evacuated to live in rural areas and forced to intensively 
work in agriculture and irrigation and canal systems. Within less than four years it is 
estimated that about two million men, women and children out of an estimated eight 
million died from starvation, privation, exhaustion, diseases, massacres and execution 
(Esterlines, 1986). However, this figure remains controversial as the death toll will 
never be known. 
 
By December 1978, the Vietnamese-backed People‟s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK29) 
took control the country and pushed the Khmer Rouge groups to the Thai-Cambodian 
                                            
28  The Khmer Rouge was officially named Democratic Kampuchea or the National United Front of 
Kampuchea (FUNK) and was created by Prince Sihanouk late in 1970. FUNK‟s senior members 
included Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary or Penn Nouth, Pol Pot or Salut Sor and Nuon Chea. They 
removed Prince Sihanouk from the head of the state. At the beginning of their movement, the 
organisation consisted of 70% Vietnamese troops from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) 
and Vietcong and the rest were Khmer Rouge guerrillas, Sihanouk‟s personal followers, opportunists, 
bandits, and peasants (Esterlines, 1986:85-93).  The Khmer Rouge militants were trained and equipped 
by Viet Nam (Owen, 2005). Their political ideology was based within the fundamental Sino-Soviet 
quarrel which is an extremist political left ideology on human rights and social institutions. 
29
 People‟s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was renamed from Kampuchean National United Front for 
National Salvation (KNUF). The KNUF was form by by former KR militants-Heng Samrin, Chea Sim 
and Hun Sen in late 1978 with financial, technical, equipment and military support from the 
Vietnamese government (Esterlines, 1986; Tully, 2005). Later the PRK that administered the nation 
from 1980 to 1989 was again replaced by the State of Cambodia (SOC). The regime of SOC was ended 
by 1991. Both SOC and PRK had a closely cooperative alliance with the Soviet Union and the 
Vietnamese government between 1980 and 1991 (Gottesman, 2003; Kiernan, 2003).   
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borders. The PRK was a centralised and socialist government and adopted a centrally 
planned economy. Large numbers of Vietnamese troops were in the country until 1989 
to ensure security against the Thai and Chinese-supported KR guerrillas that often 
attacked provinces along the Thai-Cambodia borders (Owen, 2005). Cambodia‟s 
misfortunes continued due to a series of civil wars at the borders and famine crises. The 
population returned to their home-lands and others moved to refugee camps at the 
borders, seeking to emigrate overseas. The PRK had done much to reconstruct the 
country and economy from scratch with limited human resources and support from 
external assistance, particularly the Soviet Union. After the withdrawal of Vietnamese 
troops in 1989 and facing economic stagnation, the government opened up the economy 
through adopting market liberalisation.  
 
In 1991 the Paris Peace Accord was signed by four parties (the SOC, King Sihanouk, 
Son San, and the KR) through a series of meetings and conferences from Bangkok, 
Jakarta, Tokyo, to Paris, initiated by the international community (Kiernan, 2003). 
According to the Paris Agreement:  
 
“Aid would support three transitions:  a shift from war to peace including the 
cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation of the combatants and the 
repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons; the 
transformation of a socialist command economy into a free market system; and 
the movement from an authoritarian regime to a popularity democracy” (Forman 
and Patrick, 2000, p.16).  
 
Later, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) took over the 
country‟s affairs and administration to enable free and fair national elections to be held 
in 1993. Positively, the large amounts of aid given to Cambodia during the period 
helped build social and political stability as well as foster the economic growth for 
development and poverty reduction. However, there were some claims that UNTAC did 
not successfully achieve the goal to make Cambodia “the land of peace” due to ongoing 
conflict and a coup in 1997 (Curtis, 1998; Peou, 2000; Kiernan, 2003) 
 
The coup in 1997 was led by the Cambodian People‟s Party (CPP), which then won 
non-violent elections in 1998. Following the 2003 and 2008 elections the CPP solely 
formed the government. Although there are many issues, the current government has 
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made a lot of progress, promoting political and socio-economic stability, sustainable 
economic growth and development. The detail is explored further in section 4.4. 
 
4.3  Cultural Beliefs and Religion and Civil Society 
  
4.3.1 Cultural Beliefs and Religion 
 
The Khmer culture is strongly based on devoutly religious beliefs in Hinduism and 
Mahayana Buddhism that took root from before the Angkor period until the 13
th
 
Century. Since then, Khmers have practiced Theravada Buddhism, a combination of 
folk religion, superstition and remnants of Hinduism and Sivaism (Tully, 2005, p.6). For 
example, Hindu linkages can be seen in the ritual ceremonies and annual national 
festivals such as the Khmer New Year, Phchum Ben (Buddha‟s Death Day), and Full 
Moon and Water Festivals. Inextricably linked with faith, this gentle religion acts as 
social glue as Theodore De Bary (in Tully, 2005, p.65) claims: 
 
“The [Buddhist] ideal is a society in which each individual respects the other‟s 
personality, an intricate network of warm and happy human relationships: mutual 
respect and affection between parent and child, teacher and student, husband and 
wife, master and servant, friend and friend, each helping each other upwards in 
the scale of being.” 
 
Practically, good karma is determined by doing good things. Therefore, the purpose of 
Khmer life is to achieve a good life, not to accumulate material goods as Khmers 
believe that they will be reincarnated, depending how they live their lives.  
 
In both social and political contexts, Buddhist temples or „wat‟ have played an 
important role in providing education to Khmers and preserving Khmer language and 
culture. Chandler (1991, 1995) observes that religious communities are seen as non-
state and non-family organisations that fight off bandits and organise ritual ceremonies 
or national and cultural festivals. Interestingly, after the establishment of the Buddhist 
Institute by the French in 1930, Buddhist-educated monks created the social movement 
against the French (Tully, 2005). During Prince Sihanouk‟s regime, the Royal 
Monastery, Chhuon Nat, produced the first Khmer dictionary. While cultural beliefs and 
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religion were banned during the KR regime, they survived and have continued to 
develop since the regime‟s collapse.  
 
Under a new Cambodian Constitution approved in 1993, the national motto is “Nation, 
Religion and King”. The national flag with a picture of Angkor Wat symbolises the 
impressive Khmer civilisation whilst the national anthem, featuring the King, the 
ancient temples and Buddhism, bolsters the state‟s liberal ideology. Both flag and 
anthem are part of the “national soul”. As Peou (2001, p.53) notes, “to be Khmer is to 
be Buddhist” as the anthem says angels will intervene and maintain the Kingdom‟s 
prosperity.  
 
The Ministry of Religions and Cults was established to govern and oversee the activities 
of religious organisations to ensure the law and rules of conduct of Cambodia and 
Cambodian religion were followed, and to build Buddhist administrative structures and 
capacity for monks. The well-known monks that are selected by politicians and/or 
involved communities to preside in the village „wat‟ or Buddhist temple have engaged 
in politics (Chaupech Ollier and Winter, 2006). Some have close relationships with 
Prime Minister Hun Sen and other senior government officials. Thus, as Buddhist 
modernisers, the monks are able to mobilise resources from those officials and 
communities to build Buddhist temples and Buddha statues, reflecting the great 
development in the community. At the same time, other religions such as Islam and 
Christianity (represented in particular by the Catholic Church) have also grown. 
Traditionally, Cambodian politicians, officials, businessmen, and ordinary people often 
go to the „wat‟ to seek spiritual support for their careers and success. Cambodian 
politicians have often exploited the Buddhist religion and cultural beliefs to retain their 
popularity and power (ibid). 
 
4.3.2  Civil Society 
  
In history from the „Golden Age‟ to the „Dark Age‟, Tully (2005, p.64) asserts that 
“Cambodia had no civil society, with no stable groups between the family and the state, 
which was often remote from the agglomeration of families that made up the village”. 
The reasons are because the Khmer kings were traditionally treated as gods, legally 
possessing the land, products and people, regulating by divine law, and protecting 
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religion and defending the country from external enemies (Easterlines, 1986). Indeed, 
the population was hugely dependent on state-directed public goods. The society was 
divided into classes such as royalty, state officials, religious groups, peasants or soldier-
farmer-builder groups, and slaves (although slavery was completely eliminated during 
French colonisation). Tully (2005) argues that Cambodians were more passive then their 
neighbours, particularly the Vietnamese and Thais, and probably had no formal 
authority structures at the village scale. 
 
During the protectorate period, the spirit of civil society clearly emerged through a 
series of skirmishes in the 1890s and peaceful protests in the 1920s and 1940s against 
French administration, and suppressions across the country (Tully, 2005). Nagaravatta 
or Angkor Wat Magazine were printed weekly in the Khmer language in 1936, giving 
Khmers their first opportunity to read in their own language about national and 
international politics, particularly the French and Vietnamese communists (Owen, 2005, 
p.364). The growing social movements paved the road to national independence from 
the French in 1953. 
  
Under Prince Sihanouk‟s regime 1953-1970, civil society (mainly Buddhist 
organisations and student and peasant associations) was weak and fragile as the 
authoritarian state was little different from previous regimes (Owen, 2005). The 
political collapse reveals a weak civil society unable to hold the government 
accountable in terms of pro-poor policy and planning, political maturity, competence 
and fighting corruption. Civil society gained the momentum after the coup in 1970 with 
the American-backed government (Meagher, 1998) and INGOs providing humanitarian 
relief for war victims (Mysliwiec, 2004). But, civil society was virtually destroyed in 
the period of 1975 to 1980 due to the prolonged period of civil war and the KR regime. 
Consequently, the regime destroyed the spirit of mutual trust and collective action 
among Khmers associated with Buddhism and Buddhist organisations. For example, in 
order to survive, thousands of people were killed because they were named by others, 
rather than through any wrong doing against the regime‟s rule (Owen, 2005).   
 
Under the PRK/SOC, civil society remained marginalised and had limited activities due 
to the government dictatorship. Human rights and freedom of expression deteriorated 
and this was of concern to the international community (Tully, 2005). Specifically, the 
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famine crisis emerged in those places where the PRK limited the relief effort provided 
by UN agencies and INGOs; but the socialist government saw such actions as the ways 
to feed the KR resistance (Esterlines, 1986). There was no indigenous NGO until 1991. 
Therefore, the INGOs worked closely at the grassroots level but uncomfortably played 
their roles under close investigation and management of the socialist government 
(Mysliwiec, 2004) and they expanded their work to only accessible and safe areas 
(Walker, 2007). This is because their development approaches were contradictory and 
confused, leading to mistrust between both sides. However, the government 
acknowledged the pivotal roles of NGOs in restoration and development, and carrying 
key messages to the outside world about suffering as Cambodia was isolated from the 
Western world (Hun Sen, 2009). 
 
The Cambodian Constitution provides citizens with freedom of expression, the press, 
publication and assembly and Khmer citizens have rights to establish associations and 
political parties (RGC, 1993). However, there is no law regulating civil society 
organisations. After the adoption of the Constitution, the formation of a new coalition 
government and integration of Cambodia into the international community, civil society 
has re-emerged and developed over time through the increase of INGOs, indigenous 
NGOs and associations and religious organisations. This is a remarkable achievement in 
nation-building and democratisation. However, civil society was largely established by 
external resources under donors‟ policies and priorities. Unfortunately, because the 
international community declined to engage and support religious organisations, they 
failed to build partnerships that might have been the catalyst to accelerating and 
achieving development effectiveness and democratisation objectives (Mysliwiec, 2004).  
 
Since 1993, civil society has rapidly grown across the country in diverse sectors, 
identifying values, ideas and norms that often contrast with the state‟s development 
discourse. Through applying Gramsci‟s theoretical framework, “the civil society is an 
arena of contestations in Cambodia” (Landau, 2008, p.249), the arena has become even 
more confrontational and sometimes violent, with the murders of trade union leaders.   
While some consider “the freedom of expression and press law in Cambodia is 
probably one of the most liberal in the world” (Sotharith, 2002, p.34), the Press Law 
1995 allows the RGC to suspend publication, accuse and arrest publishers and editors if 
the publication criticises the government and senior officials and/or endangers „national 
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security‟, „political stability‟ and now „defamation‟ (RGC, 1995). The RGC has often 
used a „culture of impunity and defamation‟ to restrict and silence critics, limit freedom 
of expression and a human rights voice. A number of journalists, editors and even 
members of parliament from opposition parties have increasingly faced law-suits lodged 
by the RGC (Hughes, 2008; Chak, 2009, LICADHO, 2005, 2009a, 2009b, Phnom Penh 
Post, 2009a, 2009b); while the judicial and court systems have not been separated from 
politics. In 2005 the government stopped Global Witness‟s operations in Cambodia due 
to its strong criticism of corruption, human rights and illegal logging in the report of 
„Taking a Cut,‟ „Cambodia‟s Family Trees‟ and „Country for Sale‟ (Global Witness, 
2004, 2007, 2009). Thus, the RGC has often suspected and mistrusted the media and 
advocacy and human rights NGOs that have been seen as anti-government. However, 
less politically outspoken development NGOs have been welcome to work and build 
partnerships with the government. 
 
4.4  Current Political, Socio-Economic and Development Contexts 
 
4.4.1 Political System 
 
From the first to the fourth election, the Cambodian political system has become more 
liberal and pluralistically democratic. A five-year mandate is established after each 
national election. According to the Constitution, the governance structure places the 
King as the head of the state, overarching three separate powers including executive, 
legislative and judiciary (See Figure 4.2). The current King is Samdech Preah 
Boromneath Norodom Sihanony, appointed in 2004 after the retirement of his father, 
King Norodom Sihanouk. The King is not involved in politics and has no absolute 
power but serves as “symbol of unity and eternity of the nation” (Article 8).  
 
The current Prime Minister, Hun Sen, appoints and leads the cabinet of the Council of 
Ministers (COM) that is the RGC, comprising members such as eight Deputy Prime 
Ministers, eight Senior Ministers, seventeen Ministers and State Secretaries 
(CDC/CRDB, 2008i). The Cabinet of COM is a central administration, governing and 
setting the government‟s agenda aimed at attaining policy coordination, reviewing 
proposed laws and ensuring administrative functions. In the government, there are 24 
ministries and a number of state institutions. Each ministry usually has one Minister 
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leading two to four Secretaries of State, four Under Secretaries of State, and one 
Secretary General. The administrative structure is divided into 20 provinces and four 
cities including Phnom Penh, the capital. Each province and municipality consists of 
districts (Srok) and sections (Khan), which are subdivided into communes (Khum) and 
quarters (Sangkat) and then, villages (Phum) and Groups (Krom) that are not part of the 
formal administrative structure. In total there are 183 districts, 1,621 communes and 
13,406 villages (Peou, 2001; Hughes, 2008). The RGC has been run solely by CPP‟s 
political leaders in the last two mandates. The RGC is highly bureaucratic and 
politicised, employing a large number of personnel, particularly high ranking officials 
that have no technocratic credentials and consume a huge government budget and enjoy 
many benefits. Thus, the RGC has a “big head and thin feet” .  
 
Currently, the RGC has implemented decentralisation and deconcentration policies and 
has delegated power to provincial and commune authorities to undertake development 
programmes in order to strengthen the local governments. Commune elections have 
been held since 2002 that allow the local communities to elect their own leaders to 
represent their voice and need. However, the provincial and local governments‟ capacity 
has remained weak in areas of managing their own projects/programmes, revenues and 
expenditures and areas of decision-making.  
 
Legislatively, Cambodia has a National Assembly that is based on a proportional 
representation system and a Senate. CPP won the last election in 2008 and holds 58% of 
the popular vote and 90 out of 123 parliamentary seats, equivalent to a two-thirds 
majority (Hughes, 2009, p.206). The parliament represents the sovereign rights of the 
Cambodian people and is responsible for approving laws and regulations, the national 
budget, state planning, loans, financial contracts, and the creation, modification and 
annulment of tax (Article 90). Members of parliament from opposition parties face 
many challenges defending impunity and defamation charges from the Prime Minister 
and other top government officials (Chak, 2009, LICADHO, 2009a, Phnom Penh Post, 
2009b). The misuse of power and legal abuse is contradictory to the Constitution 
(Article 80) and erodes the political life and democratisation and public confidence. The 
Senate was established after the election in 1998 with an amended constitution in 1999.  
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Figure 4.2: The Political System of the Royal Government of Cambodia 
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With 61 members, the Senate has to review draft laws approved by the National 
Assembly as well as having the right to initiate legislation. The Senate also represents 
the commune/Sangkat councils nationwide through implementation of decentralisation 
and deconcentration policies. 
 
Practically, the Cambodian state is structured by “interlocking pyramids of patron-
client networks” (Heder, 1995, p.425) that maintain the ruler‟s power and provide 
rewards and benefits to loyal subordinates. A key characteristic of Cambodian politics 
might consist of a number of supra-networks formed by sub-networks in which a sub-
network has a patron who is the backer or “Khnang30”, of clients (Kheang, 2006). The 
network is formal and informally built through unequal reciprocity and personal 
relationships (face-to-face). A heterogeneous network of ministries, councils, agencies, 
courts, police and provincial and local administration whose members31 adhere to the 
rules of patronage has been consolidated and managed by CPP (Kheang, 2006, p.3). 
Through this relationship with the patron network and neo-patrimonialism, the power of 
the three main state bodies has been separated and they have been administered by a 
single party, CPP. Therefore, their patron networks have been strengthened over time, 
leading to high corruption32, violation of human rights and social justice, social violence 
and excessive exploitation of natural resources. Consequently, this erodes the 
democratisation process.  
 
4.4.2 Socio-Economic and Development Situation 
 
Since the adoption of a liberal market economic policy, the RGC has made impressive 
progress in accelerating economic gains and social development through a number of 
state sector and thematic reforms. These reforms lie in the successful implementation of 
the two phases of the Five Year Rectangular Strategy (See Figure 4.4) and the National 
                                            
30 Khnang in Khmer terms means backer or back door. 
31 The members or clients of the patron networks, particularly officials, judges, prosecutors and others 
often pay for their post in the government‟s ministries, councils, agencies, provincial and local 
administration, courts and police and others. They need to quickly recoup their investment in a post. In 
doing so, they need to corrupt and take bribes (Kheang, 2006). The ordinary people and private 
businesses are forced to pay bribes for public services undertaken with the officials (Kheang, 2006; 
EIC, 2006) 
32 The corruption in Cambodia in all its forms is hierarchically institutionalised in ways that Cambodians 
characterise as “thum si tam thum; touch si tam touch” (the big eat big and the small eat small) 
(Kheang, 2006, p.3) 
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Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) 2006-2010 and the Cambodian Millennium 
Development Goals (CMDGs). 
 
Cambodia has enjoyed average economic growth of 9.8% over the past decade, and was 
above 10% from 2004-2007 (World Bank, 2009a, p.5).  The drivers of this growth are 
the rapid expansion of four sectors: garments, tourism, construction and agriculture (See 
Table 4.2). Figure 4.3 shows that agriculture remains the most important part of 
Cambodia‟s economy, feeding the population and employing 59% of the population, 
although it contributed only 29% to GDP in 2007 (ibid.). The core basic agricultural 
products for export include crops (mainly rice and rubber), silk, livestock, fish and 
forest products among others. Absorbing 13% of the labour force, the industrial sector 
almost doubled, from 17-30% of GDP between 1998 and 2007, the growth mainly 
generated from textile, construction and mining sub-sectors (ibid). The service sector 
has remained steady, sharing 41% of GDP and providing 27% of employment in 2007 
(ibid) (See Figure 4.3). The engines of service sector growth are tourism, trade, finance, 
real estate, transport and telecommunications. Besides the state‟s policies, security and 
macro-economic and political stability, the Cambodian integration in regional and 
global forums such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) has paved the way for strong economic expansion internally and 
externally. Moreover, Cambodia has used its valuable assets such as forest, fisheries, 
land, water and heritage to generate growth. 
 
Figure 4.3: Cambodia’s Economy: 1993-2007 
 
 
 
Share of GDP (%) 
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Sources: World Bank, 2009a, p.5. 
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Figure 4.4: The Rectangular Strategy of the Royal Government of Cambodia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: CDC/CRDB, 2004e 
 
68 
 
However, economic growth slowed markedly in 2008 due to the impact of the global 
financial crisis, creating an uncertain environment for the above mentioned sectors. 
Externally, there has been less demand and fewer orders of manufactured garments 
from key trading partners such as the US, EU, and other OECD countries, and 
increasingly a freezing of the financial flow for construction and real estate activities 
(World Bank, 2009a). A significant drop of tourist numbers has been caused by trans-
national diseases such „swine flu‟, political instability in Thailand and the cutting of 
personal spending in the developed countries (Hughes, 2009). Internally, growth is 
narrow, with little diversification in export-oriented products and markets, poor 
domestic savings and investments (World Bank, 2009a) and lack of work to combat 
corruption in the public and private sector.  
 
The Cambodian high economic growth includes achievements of key national 
development outcomes in terms of poverty reduction, the improvement of citizens‟ 
livelihoods and education and better health. Cambodia more than doubled income per 
capita from US$285 to US$593 in the decade to 2007 (World Bank, 2009a, p.i). The 
percentage of Cambodians living below the poverty line has dramatically decreased 
from 40-45 in 1993-1994 to 30.1 in 2007 (ibid, 2009a, p.24). According to current 
statistics (See Table 4.2), the RGC has substantially allocated more resources to social 
sectors such as education and rural development, while reducing the government‟s 
military expenditure. The government expenditure on agriculture and transport has also 
risen. Thus, Cambodians are living longer, have better living standards, education and 
health. Specifically, school enrolments and completion from primary to tertiary 
education are higher than in the previous decade. The infant and maternal mortality 
rates have significantly dropped in the same period.  
 
Conversely, there has been a rapid increase in inequality among the urban and rural 
poor in Cambodia, particularly in the face of difficulties such as accessing land titles, 
inflation, climate change and external shocks. The distribution of growth has been 
unequal across the country (World Bank, 2007a, 2007b, 2009a). Many urban and rural 
poor, particularly indigenous people, have faced evictions and issues of land grabbing 
by the state and private sector developers (Amnesty International, 2009; World Bank, 
2009b). As one victim says "If we lose the land, we have lost everything.”  
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Table 4.2: Cambodian Social and Economic Statistics (1998-2007) 
 
Items 1998 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Population, total 12,263,686  13,489,330  13,720,274  13,955,507  14,196,611  14,446,056  
GDP growth (annual %) 5  9  10  13  11  10  
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 251  347  377  419  457  593  
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 46  34  31  32  32  29  
Industry, value added (% of GDP) 17  26  27  26  28  30  
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) 36  40  42  41  41  41  
Tax revenue (% of GDP) ..   8  8  8  8  ..   
Trade (% of GDP) 76  123  135  137  145  138  
Gross savings (% of GDP) 6  15  13  13  16  15  
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) -1  10  9  10  13  13  
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 15  1  4  6  5  6  
Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average) 3744  3973  4016  4092  4103  4056  
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 7  2  2  6  7  10  
Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population) ..   ..   34.8  ..   ..   30   
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) ..   ..   ..   58  59  60  
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) ..   ..   ..   73  72  70  
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000) ..   ..   ..   95  93  91  
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) 67  ..   74  ..   ..   76  
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group) 31  65  76  85  87  85  
School enrollment, primary (% net) 82  ..   ..   ..   90  89  
School enrollment, secondary (% net) 17  25  26  24  31  ..   
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) ..   3  3  4  5  5  
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49) 2  1  1  1  1  1  
Gross national expenditure (% of GDP) 113  110  107  109  107  108  
Health expenditure, public (% of government expenditure) ..   15  16  12  11  ..   
Public spending on education, total (% of government expenditure) 10  ..   ..   ..   ..   12  
Military expenditure (% of central government expenditure) ..   16  16  15  13  ..   
Sources: The World Bank, 2009, Retrieval date 30 August, 2009, http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/ext/DDPQQ/ report.do?method=showReport, the World 
Bank, 2009a. 
70 
 
(BBC, 2009). Thus, those people have fallen back into chronic poverty and they become 
vulnerable. Moreover, some are concerned the financial crisis might increasingly pull 
children back into the workforce as their parents cannot afford the cost of education 
(Phnom Penh Post, 2009c, 2009d). 
 
Additionally, the strong growth over the last decade has been at the expense of natural 
resources such as forests, fisheries, land and water and heritage sites. Recently, 
Cambodia has begun facing the implications of climate change on the economy and 
social development, particularly in the agricultural sector, which suffered a long drought 
in 2009 (Phnom Penh Post, 2009e). Therefore, to minimise the impacts of the global 
financial crisis and to maintain strong growth, the World Bank (2009a, p.i) suggested 
that “Cambodia has three important opportunities: harnessing regional integration; 
managing natural resources in a sustainable way; and investing in its future (through 
agriculture, infrastructure, education, and higher savings).” Additionally, Cambodian 
aid coordination plays a more important role in complementing and reinforcing the 
Cambodian economic and development policies, aiming to directly reduce poverty and 
enhance aid and development effectiveness. 
 
4.4.3 Cambodia’s Aid Dependency and Aid Effectiveness 
 
The strong economic growth and improvement of social development is probably 
associated with aid dependence because aid is a vital source of revenue for Cambodia. 
Cambodia remains one of the most heavily aid-dependent nations among the developing 
world (See Table 4.3). ODA to Cambodia accounted for US$ 672 million in 2007, 
equivalent to 8.4% of Cambodia‟s Gross National Income (GNI) and far exceeding the 
low income country average of 5.2%. Cambodia‟s aid per capita was US$ 46 in 2007, 
far above the low income country average of US$ 31. Cambodia‟s ODA accounted for 
about half of the national budget (OECD, 2008c). 
 
The country aid architecture is historically characterised by high level of fragmentation 
and deconcentration with highly competitive aid among more than 30 bilateral and 
multilateral donors (CDC/CRDB, 2007a). For example, development projects are 
fragmented in health, education and the agriculture and water sectors (ibid). Although 
Cambodia‟s aid predictability now becomes apparent through increased aid 
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disbursement and donors‟ commitment on a three year indicative financial framework 
(See OECD, 2009, p.40), the aid deliveries to most sectors remain rather volatile, 
reflected in three forms: a larger number of donors, a varied financial size of each donor 
and the number of  donor-funded activities (See Figure 4.5). 
 
Table 4.3: Aid Dependency in Developing Countries 
Low Income Countries 
Net ODA (US$ 
million) 
ODA per capita 
(US$) 
ODA as share of 
GNI (%) 
 2000 2007 2000 2007 2000 2007 
Bangladesh 1,172 1,502 8 9 2.4 2.0 
Cambodia 396 672 31 46 10.9 8.4 
Ethiopia 686 2,422 10 31 8.5 12.5 
Guatemala 263 450 23 34 1.4 1.3 
Kenya 510 1,275 16 34 4.1 5.3 
Laos PDR 282 396 54 68 16.9 10.0 
Madagascar 322 892 20 45 8.4 12.2 
Malawi 446 735 38 53 26.1 20.8 
Mongolia 217 228 91 87 20.1 5.9 
Rwanda 321 713 39 73 18.7 21.5 
Tanzania 1,035 2,811 31 70 11.6 17.4 
Viet Nam 1,681 2,497 22 29 5.5 3.7 
Zambia 795 1,045 76 88 25.8 10.5 
Zimbabwe  176 465 14 35 2.5 .. 
Total Low Income Countries 16,632 40,259 15 31 4.6 5.2 
       Source: World Bank, 2009c, p.376-378; World Development Indicators 2009. 
 
The aid coordination in Cambodia has become increasingly challenging due to a large 
number of OECD donors and emerging donors such as China, India and Kuwait. The 
key five principles of the Paris Declaration are a matter of growing debate. Historically, 
Cambodia‟s development cooperation has been donor-driven in all aspects of aid 
mechanisms. Specifically, during the reconstruction period 1992-1997, Cambodia in 
effect lost its sovereignty in the modern sense, as the international community 
dominated the rehabilitation and development processes. Having poor human resources, 
systems and institutions, the Cambodian government largely failed to direct and manage 
its process of reconstruction (Curtis, 1998). Aid is seen as both part of the problem and 
part of the solution to the Cambodia‟s development. For example, external and technical 
assistance can impact on good governance, particularly the rule of law and fighting 
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corruption. Technical cooperation still constitutes a large part of ODA (CDC/CRDB, 
2007a, 2008d) and seems to have substituted for rather than built the capacity of local 
officials (Godfrey et al., 2002). Thus, dependence on aid has a negative impact on 
development. However, grants and aid scale up the voice of citizens and increase the 
demand for government accountability (Ear, 2007a, 2007b). The aid effectiveness and 
country aid coordination processes, particularly related to civil society and NGO 
engagement will be explicitly discussed in section 6.3. 
 
Figure 4.5: Trends in Development Cooperation in Cambodia 
 
Source: CDC/CRDB, 2008d, p.ii. 
 
4.5  Conclusion 
 
Over the centuries Cambodia has experienced both the highest level of civilisation and 
the lowest. Internal and external power struggles within the political economy have 
been the drivers of societal success and failure. This experience provides lessons to 
Cambodia and Cambodians to ensure that such a painful history will not be repeated. 
Future development and prosperity must be Cambodia‟s primary objective. 
Unfortunately, the Cambodian state has always been centralised as supposed to 
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participatory where all power has rested in the hands of one powerful leader. It is often 
the case that civil society has been suppressed by the government and leaders to retain 
their power.   
 
Nevertheless, since the 1991 Paris Peace Accord, Cambodia has enjoyed high economic 
growth and an improvement of living standards. However, Cambodia and Cambodians 
still remain vulnerable to external shocks such as global financial turmoil. Although 
having made impressive developments over the last decade, much needs to be done 
socially and economically in a careful strategic and sustainable manner. The Cambodian 
people also need to be more active and proactive citizens in order to hold their 
government accountable. For being effective in carrying inclusive messages, 
Cambodia‟s NGOs and associations need to cooperate and continually upgrade their 
capacity to build strong collective action and a voice for influencing better policy. 
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Chapter V: The Effectiveness of NGO Coordination 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter addresses the research questions 1 and 2  (See Section 1.3). The discussion 
and results in this chapter are based on a desk review analysis covering the evaluation of 
a number of the NGO Coordination Bodies (NCBs) (See Appendix V and VI). The 
discussion and results also refer to a critical analysis of the field research information 
from semi-structured interviews and participant observation. The participants are quoted 
in the following form: informant GOV 01 for government official; informant DP 02 for 
donors‟ representative; and informant CSO 03 for NGO. This chapter portrays the 
evolution, development and effectiveness of NGO coordination since the fall of the 
Khmer Rouge. It is divided into three main sections. The first section reports on the 
evolution of NGO development and assistance in contribution to Cambodian 
reconstruction and development since the end of the Khmer Rouge regime. The second 
section outlines the institutional operation of the NCBs and provincial NGO Alliances 
(NAs). And the final section assesses the internal and external challenges of NGO 
coordination at both national and provincial levels.   
 
5.2  Evolution of NGO development  
 
5.2.1 The Roles of NGOs in Cambodia’s Reconstruction and Development  
 
After the Khmer Rouge regime ended in 1979, INGOs began their activities and 
operation at the refugee camps along the Cambodian-Thai borders and inside the 
country with the Vietnamese-backed Government. A group of NGOs, Consortium for 
Cambodia, successfully ended the political deadlock in 1979 and was allowed access to 
the country in certain areas by the socialist government (Walker, 2007). With financial 
mobilisation of more than US$ 100 million, the consortium helped the starving 
population through humanitarian activities33. Walker believes that “NGOs today are, if 
                                            
33 The humanitarian activities included an agreed relief program between the NGO consortium and the 
socialist government, mechanisms and options to deliver aid to Cambodia through Phnom Penh‟s ports 
and airport (not cross borders between Thailand), the highest professional standards of codes of 
conduct, meaningful negotiation with the socialist government, cultural sensitivity, security, visa entry, 
press passes for journalists, freedom of travel, imported equipment and facilities for daily 
operation…etc (Walker, 2007, p.136-137). 
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anything, less likely to be able to respond to new crisis as they did in Cambodia” (in the 
1980s) (2007, p.149). Between 1980 and 1991 INGOs worked closely at the grassroots 
level and had a difficult relationship with the socialist government due to mistrust, close 
investigation and control and unreceptive behaviour of the SOC (Mysliwiec, 2004). The 
INGO assistance was relatively small and not able to cope with massive demands and 
needs across the country including the need for building capacity and institutional 
building and other development projects (Hun Sen, 2009). The INGOs painted an image 
of aid politicisation and discrimination and blamed the UN and Western governments 
through their report “Punishing the Poor: the International Isolation of Kampuchea” 
(Mysliwiec, 1988).   
 
From 1991-2001 INGO involvement remained limited. However by 2000, during the 
early stage of liberalisation administered by UNTAC, more than 200 INGOs had been 
founded (ADB, 1999, 2005). INGO growth was driven by the need to rehabilitate 
Cambodia and grow the spirit of democratisation and good governance at national and 
community levels. INGOs are donor-driven, their mission, objectives, and activities 
framed by their funding sources. INGOs have provided basic service delivery on a large 
scale mainly funded by bilateral and multilateral agencies for reconstruction and 
infrastructure development. Their assistance is also given through government 
structures, and building the capacity of government‟s institutions at all levels. They 
have also supported LNGOs and community-based organisations financially and 
technically through creating community development programmes working at the 
village level to fight the basic causes of poverty (Mansfield & MacLeod, 2002). 
Moreover, INGOs have increasingly played roles in research, advocacy and other 
analytical work including a wide range of development issues34.  
  
The first LNGOs were established in 1991 and the number increased from 100 in 1996 
to 400 in 2000 (Downie & Kingsbury, 2001, p.59; Landau, 2008, p.247). The rapid 
growth of LNGOs was driven by a number of forces including a desire to rehabilitate 
the country and improve the livelihoods of the poor and to help with employment, the 
limited capacity of the government to provide universal welfare services, and substantial 
                                            
34  The development issues are monitoring and evaluation of large-scale development activities, aid 
effectiveness, and sector and government budget analysis, countering corruption, human right 
violations, land grabbing, human trafficking and others. 
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support from Western governments and INGOs, seeking “potential partners” (Downie 
& Kingsbury, 2001; Mansfield & MacLeod, 2002). However, few LNGOs were 
probably created by local people‟s organisations, as many LNGOs were established by 
outsiders funded and directed by founders and donors, carrying external philosophies 
rather than those developed for the realistic demands of local people (Mansfield & 
MacLeod, 2002). LNGOs have concentrated on promoting  social development, 
democratic principles, respecting human rights, enhancing the rule of law, good 
governance and fighting corruption through policy, training, public awareness, and 
other related advocacy work by participating directly in the society at all levels. The 
roles of building human capacity and institutional development have also been included 
in their mandates. Indeed, they constantly refer to community relationships and the 
investment of time in building them as one of the most critical elements of their success.  
 
According to informants GOV 02 and GOV 05, there are 1791 NGOs (450 INGOs and 
1341 LNGOs, excluding 989 associations) currently active in Cambodia. These figures 
reveal the strong demand for social and economic services at the grassroots level and 
the active role of NGOs in meeting them, both financially and technically. Specifically, 
since 1991, INGOs and LNGOs have not only contributed financially to rehabilitating 
and developing Cambodia, but have also substantially built capacity, institutional 
arrangements and skilled human resources within and outside the government structure, 
particularly at the provincial, district and community levels (CDC/CRDB, 2004c). Some 
progressive LNGOs and INGOs have increasingly been involved with advocacy work 
and have helped and demanded the government change its attitude and policies. Their 
contribution to Cambodia‟s reconstruction and development and their pivotal roles have 
been widely acknowledged by the government and donors. However, the government 
values the INGOs and LNGOs serving in economic and social development work more 
than those that work in human rights and advocacy, seeing them as non-neutral and 
favouring opposition parties (Clamor, 2001; Kheang, 2006). The human rights and 
advocacy NGOs are accused of using foreign views and exaggerating the reality for 
financial gains from donors (Kheang, 2006). Despite progress to improve working 
relationships between the NGOs and the Cambodian government, many informants 
claimed that a great distance still exists between the government and advocacy and 
human rights NGOs.  
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5.2.2. NGOs’ Status and Disbursement by Province and Sector 
 
Most NGOs, particularly INGOs and big LNGOs, are based in Phnom Penh and in 
some large provinces (See Table 5.1). INGO projects are generally larger than LNGOs. 
According to the CDC/CRDB database, of 30,000 NGO staff, fewer than 10% are 
foreign advisors, experts and volunteers; the rest are Cambodians. This not only brings 
about change and offers social and economic services to reduce poverty and improve 
democracy and good governance, but it also provides job opportunities for Cambodian 
people.  
 
Accurate and comprehensive data on the NGO‟s general status is only available from 
1992 to 2007. The data on NGO disbursement from CDC/CRDB shown in Table 5.1, 
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 is limited and represents a sample of about 45% of LNGOs and 
90% of INGOs in 2006 and 2007 (CDC/CRDB, 2007a, p.15). Between 1992 and 2007, 
disbursement of NGO core funds has averaged more than 8% and reached 10% of the 
total ODA disbursement in 2007 (See Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1).  
 
Figure 5.1: Annual ODA Disbursement: 1992-2007 
 
Sources: CDC/CRDB Database, CDC/CRDB (2000b, 2001b, 2002b, 2004b, 2006a, 2007a, 2008d. p.13 
and 39), September 04, 2009. 
 
The NGO share in total provincial disbursements was 18% (CDC/CRDB, 2008d, p.12). 
Table 5.1 shows that NGOs contributed significant proportions of total ODA 
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disbursement in some provinces such as 46% in Siem Reap35, 36% in each of Takeo and 
Koh Kong, 21% in Kompong Chhnang, and 19% in Kampong Cham. NGOs shared 
about one third of total disbursement in Phnom Penh. Thus, NGO projects have directly 
and indirectly benefited the poor in both rural and urban areas.  
 
Table 5.1: NGO Disbursements (Core-Fund) by Provinces 2006 - 2007 (USD 000s) 
Province 
2006 2007 
ODA 
NGO 
Core 
Funds 
% of 
NGO 
share in 
ODA 
ODA 
NGO 
Core 
Funds 
% of 
NGO 
share in 
ODA 
Banteay Meanchey 15,203 858 5.60% 16,665 1,730 10.40% 
Battambang 21,682 3,408 15.70% 22,235 3,516 15.80% 
Kampong Cham 15,978 2,919 18.30%% 24,148 4,571 18.90% 
Kampong Chhnang 6,198 1,177 19.00% 8,699 1,843 21.20% 
Kampong Speu 9,572 1,110 11.60% 10,822 1,652 15.30% 
Kampong Thom 17,387 940 5.40% 17,562 1,754 10.00% 
Kampot 10,792 789 7.30% 14,001 517 3.70% 
Kandal 26,664 1,332 5.00% 53,796 2,666 5.00% 
Koh Kong 2,148 956 44.5% 4,403 1,576 35.8% 
Kracheh 10,009 373 3.70% 17,987 908 5.00% 
Mondul Kiri 5,277 271 5.10% 8,537 433 5.10% 
Phnom Penh 68,162 15,163 22.20% 70,690 22,339 31.60% 
Preah Vihear 3,928 348 8.80% 5,128 880 17.20% 
Prey Veng 9,747 692 7.10% 17,365 1,707 9.80% 
Pursat 7,204 518 7.20% 8,021 1,173 14.60% 
Ratanak Kiri 2,630 312 11.90% 4,662 404 8.70% 
Siem Reap 37,230 14,339 38.50% 44,078 20,187 45.80% 
Sihanoukville 27,779 306 1.10% 44,186 2,061 4.70% 
Stung Treng 10,831 493 4.60% 7,021 598 8.50% 
Svay Rieng 7,361 502 6.80% 8,253 921 11.20% 
Takeo 7,640 1,925 25.20% 9,498 3,435 36.20% 
Otdar Meanchey 8,519 383 4.50% 11,404 651 5.70% 
Krong Kep 892 124 13.90% 1,937 356 18.40% 
Krong Pailin 4,021 905 22.50% 2,971 134 4.50% 
Nationwide 375,294 22 0.10% 355,532 1,724 0.50% 
 TOTAL 713,241 50,162 7.00% 790,377 77,736
36
 9.80% 
 
                                            
35 Siem Reap is known as the biggest tourist site but is one of the poorest provinces (MOP, 2004). 
36 From 1997 to 2006 the annual NGO disbursement was about $US 50 million. However, the amount of 
NGO disbursement increased to about $US 77 million in 2007. According to field research informants, 
some donors have started to breakdown their financial assistance by regions and countries. In many 
cases, many donors have channelled their funding to NGOs through regional programmes but have not 
clearly classified the financial aid in detail to different countries or regions. Thus, the number of aid 
disbursements has increased. Informant GOV 01 argues that “the total financial budget to the NGO 
sector might be much higher than the current figures.” Many donors have encountered difficulties in 
sorting their financial aid reports to the government. On the other hand, the CDC/CRDB has had 
difficulties in managing NGOs because CDC/CRDB does not have any management mechanism 
toward NGOs. The NGOs register at CDC/CRDB due to the substantial benefit from receiving tax 
exemptions on their imported materials. Currently, the NGO database at CDC/CRDB is under 
construction; but there is a need to make it functional and effective. One question is how to attract 
NGOs to work with the CDC/CRDB and not just to benefit from the tax exemptions from CDC/CRDB.  
Sources: CDC/CRDB (2008d, p.38-39) and CDC/CRDB Database, retrieved date September 04, 2009. 
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As shown in Table 5.2, NGO funds significantly increased from $163.5 million in 2006 
to $183.5 million in 2007. It is apparent that donors channelled funds to NGOs mainly 
in good governance and democracy, agriculture, rural development and multisectoral37, 
culture and arts and gender; while NGO (core-fund) did not target these sectors, but 
concentrated on social sectors such as health, education, community welfare and rural 
development. This means that external funding for NGO service delivery might have 
been cut and shifted to policy and advocacy NGOs. The NGOs have not given priority 
to agriculture through their core-funds as much as donor assistance to this sector in the 
total share of aid (CDC/CDRB, 2008f). This trend has been seen in many African 
nations (Lister and Nyamugasira, 2003; Howell et al., 2008). Therefore, NGO efforts 
may contribute to scale up the poverty reduction in the hope of achieving the CMDGs, 
particularly universal nine-year basic education, improvements in child mortality and 
maternal health, and a reduction in HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases.  
 
Table 5.2: NGO Sector Support 2006-2007 (USD million) 
 
Sector 
2006 Actual 2007 Provisional 
NGO 
Funded by 
Donors 
NGO Core 
Funds 
Total 
NGO 
Funded by 
Donors 
NGO Core 
Funds 
Total 
USD % USD % USD % USD % USD % USD % 
Health 14.3 12.6 28.3 56.5 42.6 9.05 9.5 9.0 36.7 47.2 46.2 25.2 
Education  3.4 3.0 5.2 10.4 8.5 5.2 4.1 3.9 18.3 23.5 22.4 12.2 
Community Welfare 3.0 2.6 7.7 15.3 10.7 6.5 3.6 3.4 10.3 13.3 13.9 7.6 
Rural Development 5.8 5.1 6.7 13.4 12.5 7.7 7.9 7.5 8.5 10.9 16.4 8.9 
Agriculture  7.4 6.5 1.5 2.9 8.8 5.4 17.9 17.0 2.7 3.5 20.7 11.3 
Manufacturing/Trade 1.5 1.4 0.2 0.3 1.7 1.0 6.7 6.3 0.6 0.8 7.3 4.0 
Governance 33.0 29.1 0.0 0.0 33.0 20.2 29.8 28.2 0.0 0.0 29.8 16.2 
Banking/Business 
Services 
7.9 7.0 0.0 0.0 7.9 4.9 1.9 1.8 0.0 0.0 1.9 1.0 
Culture & Arts 1.4 1.2 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.9 1.5 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.8 
Gender 
Mainstreaming 
1.8 1.6 0.0 0.0 1.8 1.1 2.7 2.5 0.0 0.0 2.7 1.5 
Multisectoral 29.1 25.7 0.0 0.0 29.1 17.8 10.9 10.3 0.0 0.0 10.9 5.9 
Other 4.7 4.2 0.6 1.2 5.3 3.3 9.4 8.9 0.6 08 10.0 5.5 
TOTAL 113.3 100 50.2 100 163.5 100 105 100 77.7 100 183.5 100 
Note: 70% of 337 INGOs originally come from US (97), Japan (43), France (40), UK (22), and Australia 
(21) (CDC/CRDB, 2007a, p.15). 
Source: CDC/CRDB Database, CDC/CRDB (2008d, p.13), September 04, 2009. 
                                            
37 „Multisectoral‟ is a combination of agriculture, rural development and water and sanitation 
(CDC/CRDB, 2008a). 
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In summary, many donors38 are now more interested in providing funds through NGOs, 
reflecting the important roles of NGOs and their effectiveness, transparency and 
accountability according to field research informants. This contradicts the concerns of 
NGOs regarding the loss of funding in terms of the Paris Declaration agenda discussed 
in section 2.4.2. NGOs in Cambodia heavily rely on external aid and they are financed 
to do particular projects based on the donors‟ mandates and priorities. There is no 
government budget available for LNGOs and public donations and charity are very 
limited.  
 
It is argued that channelling official assistance through NGOs whose projects are small 
and medium-sized in Cambodia may lead to aid effectiveness challenges in term of 
alignment and ownership and a higher level of fragmentation (Menocal et al., 2007). 
Therefore, there have been calls for NGOs to strengthen their coordination and 
effectiveness (CDC/CRDB, 2000a; Downie & Kingsbury, 2001; Mansfield & 
MacLeod, 2002; ADB, 2005; Kheang 2007b; World Bank, 2006). The NGO 
coordination is comprehensively discussed in the section 5.3. 
 
5.3  NGO Coordination in Cambodia 
 
5.3.1 Development of NGO Coordination Bodies (NCBs)  
 
As noticed by Bennett (1994, 2000), the concept of NGO coordination is often applied 
in the context of fragile states such as Cambodia in the 1980s. A group of INGOs, called 
Consortium for Cambodia39 successfully delivered relief programmes to deal with the 
famine crisis after the end of the Khmer Rouge regime. The PRK government realised 
and accepted that the strength and credibility of NGOs lay in their autonomy and 
integrity (Walker, 2007, p.147). Thus, a genuine working relationship between the 
                                            
38 In late 2007, the World Bank Cambodia Office launched a new program to “Enhance Capacity on 
Social Accountability” over three years due to the realisation of slow progress of the government 
performance in the governance sector (World Bank, 2008a, 2008b). This project will provide a grant to 
non-state institutions of $4.5 million out of $20 million in three years (ibid). This development program 
will help build capacity of non-state actors and the Cambodian government to become accountable, 
transparent, and participatory. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has also funded and worked 
closely with a number of NGOs in Cambodia (ADB, 2007).  
39 The Consortium for Cambodia comprised a core group NGO coalition that had been formed during the 
mid-1960s with representatives from the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and other 
major voluntary agencies including Oxfam, Catholic Relief Service and the Lutheran World Federation, 
which represented the World Council of Churches (Walker, 2007, p.137).  
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Consortium and the government emerged in the 1980s, allowing the members to deliver 
humanitarian aid to starving Cambodians.  
 
In 1991, a small number of national NCBs were established by groups of INGOs and 
LNGOs and associations, intending to coordinate NGO projects, share information and 
do advocacy work; while the number of INGOs and LNGOs dramatically increased to 
absorb the financial assistance to Cambodia.  This is because the existing transitional 
government of Cambodia had very limited capacity to handle large amounts of funds 
due to a lack of human resources, unreliable government financial and administrative 
systems, and ineffective aid coordination mechanisms.  
 
As noted in 2.3.1 above, NCBs are formal NGO membership organisations. They are 
formally registered with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation 
(MFAIC) and Ministry of Interior (MOI). Their mandates and roles are uniquely 
distinctive. For example, Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC) takes a more 
representational and protocol role in regards to common issues, cooperation and NGO 
best practice concerning the entire civil society. The NGO Forum on Cambodia 
(NGOF) targets development, economic, environmental, land and livelihood issues. 
Medicam, NGO Education Partnership (NEP), Action Committee for Human Rights 
(CHRAC) and End Child Prostitution, Abuse and Trafficking in Cambodia (ECPAT-
Cambodia) emphasise health, education, human rights and child rights, respectively. 
NCBs are basically located in the cities and work in partnership with other powerful and 
strong INGOs and LNGOs. Most have access to good communication systems such as 
telephone, fax, email and internet and modern office facilities. The executive directors 
and staff of these NGOs have more knowledge of development, management, 
operational and administrative work than LNGOs, with most holding at least bachelor‟s 
degrees (See Appendix V).  
 
a) The Roles of NGO Coordination Bodies (NCBs) 
 
The developing roles of NCBs in the Cambodian context have been accompanied by a 
reborn civil society and an influx of aid into Cambodia. Their advantages are translated 
into a different view by their members, non members, government and donors. Their 
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overarching role is to strengthen civil society organisations. Similar to Bennett‟s 
observation (2000), NGO coordination in the Cambodian context aims at: 
1. Sharing information between national and community levels 
2. Building a strong NGO collective voice and representativeness 
3. Minimising project replication and waste 
4. Enhancing NGO professionalism and institutional effectiveness through NGO 
self-regulation 
5. Influencing policies and strategies of the Cambodian government and donors 
6. Participating in country aid coordination process and  
7. Identifying NGO partners for the government, donors and INGOs.  
 
In the case of information sharing, it can be done in two forms through their monthly 
members meeting. NCBs share the updated information about government policies, 
strategies and other necessary regulations with their members, while receiving 
information from the NGO community on a diverse range of issues. Both NCBs and 
members learn from each other and use that information to devise new approaches for 
helping the poor. Informant DP 05 mentions that:  
 
“What Medicam does in the health sector for example…it probably has the best 
information from the across the country on how people are spending money on 
medical treatment, which is very important because that is a huge part of 
households‟ budgets in poor households across Cambodia.” 
 
This approach encourages members to strengthen their advocacy of evidence-based 
policy; thus, members become active and proactive. The more active members are, the 
stronger capacity NCBs have.  
 
Based on qualitative and quantitative information from the grassroots generated from 
the monthly member meetings and special events40, NCBs produce useful advocacy 
documents for the Cambodian government and donors in quarterly and annual meetings 
such as the TWGs, GDCC and CDCF, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
                                            
40The monthly member meetings and special events are the forums that allow NCBs and members and/or 
non-members to participate and to discuss the common issues and development issues by sectors, and 
endorse the common view that is consequently called collective voice.  
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NCBs can inform the government and donors about the real situation across the country 
in the hope of achieving inclusive policy and strategy and better outcomes for the poor.  
 
NCBs have continually supported and built the capacity of members and non-members 
through training courses41 and evidence-based research articles about different issues. 
Some courses are freely offered and others charge fees. For example, the Cooperation 
Committee for Cambodia has developed the NGO Good Practice Project (NGO-GPP) 
comprising The Code of Ethical Principles and Minimum Standards for NGO and NGO 
Voluntary Certificate System. With support from donors, the CCC has offered training 
courses42 on “NGO Good Governance, Professionalism and Accountability” free of 
charge to members and non-members nationwide. The process of NGO GPP is fairly 
and acceptably conducted through desk review and field assessment by NGO working 
groups
43
, the Code Compliance Committee44 and capacity building. All informants of 
this study acknowledged that the NGO GPP is a good local initiative for Cambodians.  
This action consequently builds trust and social capital of the entire civil society, 
particularly among NGOs and NGOs, the Cambodian government and donors.  
 
b) Organisational and Management Structure and Governance Systems 
 
The organisational and management structure of each NCB is slightly different due to 
their different mandates and organisational history (Bennett, 2000). Most NCBs have a 
clear and formal organisational structure, permanent staff, clear mission, vision and 
objectives, five year strategic plan, and/or by-laws (See Appendix V). The 
                                            
41 The training courses provided by NCBs: 1) CCC: Training courses on NGO Good Governance, 
Professionalism and Accountability for senior and management staff of LNGOs/INGOs and to be 
conducted in different provinces from 2009-2010 within six round (CCC, 2009), basic courses and 
community level courses (Non-members need to pay training fees); 2). Medicam provides training 
according to the needs of NGO members such as primary health care, HIV/AIDS counselling, 
monitoring and evaluation, and more (www.medicam-cambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 
2009) 3). NEP provides education policy training (www.nepcambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 
September, 2009).  
42 The courses are conducted in six rounds of four days. The courses cover four topics: 1). Organisational 
Policies and Board Development, 2). Effective Human Resource Management, Sound Financial and 
Administrative Management, 3). Monitoring and Evaluation, and 4). Organisational Strategic Planning  
(CCC, 2009:2). 
43 The NGO Code Working Group is voluntary to assess the NGOs that apply for the NGO Voluntary 
Certificate System. There are 12 members of the Working Group (CCC, 2008c). 
44 The NGO Code Compliance Committee is also voluntary to assess NGOs that apply for the NGO 
Voluntary Certificate System. There are 8 members of the NGO Code Compliance Committee (CCC, 
2008c). 
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organisational structure consists of organisational members 45, associate members46, a 
Board of Directors or Management Committee47, Secretariat, Executive Director and 
library (See Figure 5.2). The Secretariat and Executive Director of each NCB play an 
important role in running the operation and interacting with members and other actors. 
An Executive Director is elected by members of the Management Committee. A 
General Assembly is usually conducted annually with all members. Their libraries have 
a wide range of resources, which are often open to the public, particularly the CCC and 
Medicam. Staff meetings are also conducted monthly to assess and follow up their 
activities.  
 
Figure 5.2: Structure of NGO Coordination Bodies (NCBs) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
Sources: CCC (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b), NGOF (2005, 2006, 2007a, 
2008a, 2008b), Medicam (www.medicam-cambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009); 
NEP (2005, 2006, 2008); Chrac (www.chrac.org/eng, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009); 
ECPAT (2006, 2007, 2008) and information from field research from March-June, 2009. 
 
Generally, their organisational structure is hierarchal although they have decentralised 
work with NGOs in provinces through their working groups, sub-networking groups, 
sector working groups or their provincial offices. Their coordination work is often ad-
hoc and unsystematic. For example, the well-known NCBs such as the CCC and NGOF 
do not have provincial offices. The monthly members meetings are usually conducted in 
                                            
45 INGOs and LNGOs and/or associations have a right to vote and elect members of the Management 
Committee or Board of Directors (See Appendix V). 
46 Individual members and associate members are just observers and have no rights to vote or elect 
members of the Management Committee or Board of Directors (See Appendix V). 
47 The Management Committee or Board of Directors have a membership of around five to seven based 
on the size of NCBs. The Committee oversees the five year strategic plan, budget, memberships, the 
executive director‟s work and others. The members of The Management Committee or Board of 
Directors meet at least four times a year (See Appendix V). 
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the capital. As will be discussed, fieldwork observation reveals that their network and 
coordination work have remained loose.  
 
NCBs have good governance systems such as auditing, financial reporting and annual 
reports. However, only a few NCBs such as the CCC, NGOF, Medicam and NEP have 
implemented the NGO GPP. The CCC, NGOF, and Medicam have a high profile at the 
international and national levels while the rest have well-known brands at the national 
level. The Medicam and CHRAC the have highest profile at the community level as 
they have provincial offices. The rest have a lower profile due to poor regular 
communication and no provincial offices (See Appendix V). Therefore, their capacity 
varies and is judged by their institutional capacity, staff capacity and skills, funding 
availability and governance systems (See Appendix V).  
 
c) Members and Membership Fees 
 
There is a membership process initiated by NCBs, particularly the CCC, NGOF, 
Medicam and NEP. The members are tied by bylaws and have to pay a membership fee 
to NCBs. They must apply for membership through filling in an application form and 
submitting this with other required documents 48   to NCBs, indicating which sub-
working group they want to participate in. The process of registration can take at least 
one to two months before being approved by the NCBs‟ management committee. 
Currently, only four NCBs have large members: the CCC, which has 110 members, the 
NGOF with 83 members, Medicam with 131 members and NEP with 79 members. The 
CHRAC and EPACT have 21 and 27 respectively, without having a membership 
agreement. The NCBs‟ members are required to undertake minimum participation and 
some mandatory tasks 49 . There is “free open membership without any tension and 
                                            
48 The relevant documents include: 1). a request letter to NCBs, 2). legal registration document with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the Ministry of Interior or even the 
MOU with the sector ministry, 3). Organisational backgrounds, description and programme and project 
description such as office, beneficiaries, annual budget, governance system, reporting and auditing…etc 
(CCC 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b; NGOF,2005, 2006, 2007a, 2008a 2008b; 
Medicam (www.medicam-cambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009); NEP, 2005, 2006, 
2008); and information from field research from March-June, 2009). 
49 Some mandatory tasks are 1) right to vote in every election for positions on committees and on every 
issue placed before quorum meetings of the members; 2). eligible to stand for election or be appointed 
to positions on NCB management committees; 3) right to observe at any and all NCB meetings with the 
exception of Executive Committee meetings 4) right to raise issues, provide comment, and offer 
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competition” between NCBs as informant CSO 01 and 02 address. For example, 23% 
and 18% of CCC‟s members belong to NGOF and Medicam, respectively (See 
Appendix VI). The NCBs only represent their members and not the whole NGO 
community. NCBs generate income (membership fees) from members. They use the 
membership income and donor funding to cover the cost of administration, staff 
salaries, and other projects for building the collective voice, conducting studies and 
research, providing training courses for member capacity building. The membership fee 
of NCBs varies and is calculated in different ways50.  
 
5.3.2 Development of NGO Alliances (NAs) 
 
There are provincial NGO alliances (NAs), formed by a number of INGOs and LNGOs, 
although the exact number of NAs in Cambodia is not known. There are three different 
kinds of NAs: formal NA51, semi-formal NA52, and informal NA53. Basically, most of 
the NAs are semi-formal NGO networks. However, a sub-decree approved by the MOI 
for legal registration of local NGOs and associations does not cover how an NGO 
network/alliance should be established and does not require registration with the 
Ministry (informant CSO 09).  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
recommendations on all matters relevant to the activities and operation of the NCBs (CCC, 2008b, 
NGOF, 2007a, NEP, 2005, informant CSO 02). 
50 The NEP charges each LNGO only US$30 and each INGO only US$120 per year without considering 
their annual budget. The NGOF‟s membership charges range from $10 to $300 per year based on the 
member‟s overall budget. However, those LNGOs that are committed to be active members may 
request NGOF‟s management committee for a waiver of the membership fee. The CCC calculates 
membership fees based on 0.00225 multiplied by the member‟s annual budget. The CCC‟s observers 
are asked to pay only $55 a month. Medicam has three ways of charging its members. The members 
that have an annual budget over $1,350,000 a year pay a membership fee of $3,000 per year. The 
members with annual budgets ranged between $35,000 and $1,349,999 are asked to pay the same 
membership fee calculated like the CCC (0.00225 multiplied by the annual budget) and members that 
have an annual budget less than $34,999 are charged only $55 a year. The observers or individuals pay 
only $77 per month. However, the membership fee comprises a small part of the NCBs‟ annual budget. 
For example, the CCC received only about 18% of its annual budget from membership fees; the NGOF 
got less than 1% of its budget in 2008 (See Appendix VI). Thus, the NCBs are largely reliant on the 
donors‟ funds as informant CSO 01 and 02 mention.  
51 The formal NGO alliance, like NCBs, is a formal organisation registered with the MOI or MFAIC in 
Cambodia. 
52  The semi-informal NGO alliance is an informal organisation whose members are formal NGO 
organisations registered with the MOI or MFAIC but the network does not register with any ministries. 
53  The informal NGO alliance is an informal organisation. Neither the network organisation nor its 
members are formal organisations, nor do they register with any ministries.  
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a) Organisational and Management Structure 
 
After NAs are established, members join together and appoint a number of NGOs to 
participate in the NAs‟ executive committee. In the first meeting, one NGO will be 
asked to voluntarily chair the NA for a certain period agreed among members. The 
management style of NAs varies in different provinces based on the working 
relationship among members. The selection of the NAs‟ chairman can be conducted in 
the form of voluntary commitment and rotation among the members. Some NAs consist 
of sub-groups by sector such as health, education, environment, natural resource 
management, micro-finance, gender or rural development and human rights. 
 
According to the interviews with provincial LNGO informants there is no formal 
structure of NAs, including no permanent office, secretariat, support staff, financial 
support from donors, strategic plan and activities, by-laws, and/or clear vision, mission 
or objectives. NAs often have poor communication systems such as phone and internet, 
particularly in the provinces where public and private services are limited and 
expensive.  
 
NAs play a different role in each province and community based on their capacity, 
which is basically that of each NAs‟ chairman. The chairman uses the financial resource 
and staff of their own NGO to run the NA. The chairman usually does little more than 
maintain a directory including the addresses, contact numbers, number of NGOs and 
NGO projects in a province. An NA can only share the up-to-date information they have 
to each other during monthly meetings. The NAs‟ effort is prioritised lower than that of 
the chairman‟s own NGO‟s activities. Thus, maintaining an effective provincial NGO 
alliance is more difficult than operating an NGO (informant CSO 09). 
 
Four provincial NGO informants claimed that there is no financial and technical support 
to set up an effective NA and secretariat. Donors have little or no interest in financing 
NAs‟ projects and activities. However, many donor informants thought that NAs in 
provinces should be strengthened. Informant DP 08 stresses that “there is a need to 
strengthen the NGO coordination at the provincial level because many NGOs at the 
provincial level are not being involved in the aid coordination process and at the 
national level.” The LNGO informants also agree that they have limited capacity, 
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particularly in project design and development and in the use of English (informant 
CSO 10) to be able to write a good proposal for donor funding. 
 
b) Membership and Fees 
 
Members of NAs are voluntary. Obviously, not all NGOs in the province participate in 
the network due to “workloads, a lack of financial resources and staff” (informant CSO 
07). Other reasons might be a lack of interest and/or less awareness of NGO 
coordination. Thus, there is no membership agreement and fee to support a secretariat, 
staff and activities. LNGOs are small and their budgets are not sustainable, backed by 
donor‟s funding. They are not able to pay any contribution. Thus there is no 
membership fee for NAs. 
 
c) Provincial NGO Self-Regulation  
 
The provincial NGOs (particularly NGO staff and executive directors) might have 
limited knowledge on their NGO operation, NGO self-regulation, management and 
administration. They have poor governance systems including financial systems, and 
activities reporting through their annual report. For instance, informant CSO 07 
illustrates that: 
 
“Some LNGOs have policies, some have boards of directors and some 
haven‟t…even though our organisation has not had all points following the NGO-
GPP. For example, we implement gender projects but we have not finalised the 
gender policy yet.”  
 
Indeed, the provincial NGOs have limited awareness of NGO minimum operational and 
ethical codes and the NGO voluntary Certification System developed by the CCC. From 
observing the seminar, LNGOs have different ideas about how this system should be 
applied, particularly the difference between large NGOs and small provincial NGOs.  
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d) Provincial NGO Coordination Efforts 
 
As most of the key informants point out, many provincial NGOs lack an awareness of 
NGO coordination and the benefit of a solid collective voice for their common 
challenging issues. It has been very difficult to make a wider constituency on common 
issues to be expressed to provincial government and authority. Informant CSO 09 
emphasises: 
 
“members of the network are busy with their work… the provincial NGOs are 
small and have a small number and it is difficult to foster the coordination efforts 
and advocacy on common interests and issues…we are less active than NGOs in 
Phnom Penh, particularly the CCC and NGO Forum.”  
 
Sometimes members cannot devote time to join NAs‟ regular meetings. In addition to 
this, the chairman would rather spend time on his/her own NGO operation than maintain 
NA‟s action plans/activities and share useful information to members. For instance, 
informant CSO 07 stresses that “I don‟t have time to follow up these sub-networks in 
the province.” 
 
Communication among NA‟s members and between NAs and NCBs has proven 
difficult due to limited knowledge and understanding as well as poor access to email 
and the internet. Sometimes they contact each other in cases where they face problems 
and they need help. The same mistakes appear on both sides; informant CSO 07 
exemplifies that “LNGOs don‟t often make the regular working relationship with the 
NGOs at the national level.” Another example was revealed during the discussion at the 
provincial NGO seminar where nine members of the provincial NA that participated in 
one meeting at the national level did not convey updated information to other provincial 
NGOs. This indicates poor provincial NGO coordination. NAs have poor advocacy 
capacity to address common and certain issues to provincial government and authority. 
They have little or no research ability to build capacity of their members. Their 
representation might be limited and/or non-existent.  
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5.4  Cultural and Political Challenges to NGO Coordination 
 
Based on desk review analysis and narrative analysis, the NGO coordination in 
Cambodia, particularly NCBs, has faced a number of challenges including cultural 
challenges, an unfriendly political environment and institutional challenges (See 
Appendix V). These causes have resulted in a) absence of collective voice, b) slow 
implementation of the NGO-GPP, c) fragmentation and duplication of NGO projects, 
and d) poor working relationship with the Cambodian government. Consequently, 
Cambodia‟s NGO sector and civil society remain immature and weak although it has 
been improved since the 1990s. 
 
5.4.1 Cultural Challenges 
 
The cultural barriers to coordination and partnership include a lack of trust, hesitation 
and fear of losing face, high bureaucracy and patron-client relationship and immature 
and weak NGOs and other institutions. Lack of trust is a big problem in Cambodia. The 
spirit of unity and collective action was destroyed during the Khmer Rouge period and 
the long conflicts, leading to mistrust among Cambodian people. Many hesitate to be 
critical of others or to offer help to others because “practically there is not a culture to 
coordinate among them and to work together” (informant DP 10). Some people are 
active, free riders and some others do not listen and accept others‟ ideas for 
improvement. Moreover, as part of Asian culture and Khmer culture, questioning is 
uncommon or „silence is golden.‟ Questioning can be interpreted as a way of accusing, 
challenging and looking down on someone (Bradely, 2005, p.36). Therefore, people 
become passive. In connection with questioning, a concept of „losing face‟ is another 
barrier preventing people from communicating with each other because they do not 
want to look lost and unaware of any specific issue. Hence, they could agree on 
something without making a genuine commitment.  
 
As noticed in chapter four, the institutions of the democratic state and the civil society, 
particularly NGOs are immature with a scarcity of financial and human resources 
caused by wars and internal conflicts. The culture of patron-client relationship practice 
has taken root in those institutions (See section 4.4.1). Thus, they are highly 
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bureaucratic leading to ineffective cooperation, partnership and coordination in their 
operation. 
 
5.4.2  Political Challenges 
 
The working relationship between NGOs, particularly NCBs/NAs, and the Cambodian 
government has been very good on the overall scale. This achievement reflects the 
strong and constructive NGO engagement in the aid coordination processes although 
their space for policy influencing remains limited. Generally, according to the 
government reports in 2007 there is more engagement between NGOs and the 
government, which can be considered a healthy development given the clear roles of 
NGOs during the NSDP Mid-term Review (CDC/CRDB, 2008d). In this engagement 
the government places most emphasis on development NGOs; while advocacy and 
human rights NGOs‟ engagement seems not to be welcome. For example, the provincial 
authorities prevent the human rights and advocacy activists of NGOs from doing field 
investigation and getting information from affected people in areas where there is a 
dispute and human rights are violated (Informant CSO 08, Phnom Penh Post, 2009f). 
Sometimes, human right activists face lawsuits for disinformation and incitement on 
certain issues during their work in provinces (Phnom Penh Post, 2009g). There is 
mistrust between NGOs and the government: informant CSO 09 mentions that “we 
don‟t have any trust that the government that will have the willingness to approve the 
new NGO law to protect civil society organisations.”  
 
Some government, donor and NGO informants agreed that some NGOs are involved 
with politics. For example, informant GOV 04 also mentions that “Some NGOs act as 
the opposition parties against the government and they don‟t have constructive idea to 
contribute to the development of Cambodia.” The government seems to silence critics 
and challenge freedom of expression, but as informant CSO 09 expresses “ not all 
issues related to politics…it is about human rights and expression of information and 
idea to the public.” Some NGOs, particularly LNGOs, are suspected to have gone off 
track as agents of development, damaging the NGOs‟ image. For example, informant 
GOV 05 indicates that: “14 LNGOs are operating their activities that are involved with 
politics and dishonesty to the local people and communities.” 
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Some LNGO leaders are very aligned with the political parties, particularly the 
opposition parties and/or those using foreign ideologies. Some NGOs have no intention 
to work with the government (informant CSO 07). Informant CSO 05 claims that:  
 
“it was just so negative; it was just criticism and negativity flowing each way.  There 
was no listening to each other, so there is very challenging between the civil society, 
the government and the private sector.”  
 
Sometimes NGOs can be highlighted as political allies by others for their personal 
benefits; thus, NGOs need to inform local authority about their activities (informant 
CSO 07). In some cases, their critics say their inputs are similar to the opposition 
(informant CSO 02). The challenge and difficulties come from confusion and mistrust 
of each other and people that are powerful or untouchable (informant CSO 08). It has 
been argued that NGOs bypass the government systems. Except for strong sector 
ministries such as the MOH and the MOEYS, other ministries have poor leadership and 
corruption (Informant CSO 06). This makes it difficult for NGOs/NCBs to collaborate 
with them.  
 
Although the NGO‟s engagement in the policy arena has widened, NGOs claim that 
their inputs have not been integrated into the government‟s policy documents. So far, no 
forum and direct dialogue has been organised between NGOs and the Cambodian 
government.  In the case of formulation of the new NGO and Civil Society Organisation 
law, both government and NGOs failed to reach a consensus. The government 
complains that civil society, particularly NGOs, could not provide their collective 
position on the draft of a new law (Informant GOV 04); while NGOs blamed the 
government that they were not invited as stakeholders in the drafting law process. The 
mutual accountability between NGOs and the RGC is still missing (Informant DP 06). 
That is a mistake from both sides.  
 
Practically, LNGOs need to register with the MOI54; INGOs must register with the 
MFAIC, and might require registration and cooperation agreements with particular line 
                                            
54 The Ministry of Interior (MOI) has limited capacity to administer and manage LNGOs across the 
country. The MOI only records the number of LNGOs and associations but does not know how many 
LNGOs are active or dead. The MOI is preparing the draft law on NGO and association and set up the 
committee for discussion. Thus, the process is underway. The MOI has one NGO Department 
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ministries they work with. The formal registration with the ministries is conducted 
through signing the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Then, INGOs and LNGOs 
must provide their annual activities and financial reports to the MFAIC and MOI at the 
end of every fiscal year. They also need to send their reports to CDC/CRDB (See 
Appendix VII) that manages the external assistance to Cambodia including NGOs. 
There is no single government institution that is solely in charge of managing and 
administering NGOs. Indeed, the MFAIC, MOI and CDC/CRDB all require NGOs to 
send quarterly and annual reports. The line ministries might impose other regulations 
and procedures for NGOs to follow in order to get work done smoothly. This leads to 
conflict and confusion over the roles of government institutions in the registration of 
LNGOs and INGOs and assessment of their performance reports. Many NGOs might 
not know which ministries they should approach to start new projects. The local 
governments and authorities also require LNGOs report to them according to many 
NGO informants. NGOs have many responsibilities to write different reports and follow 
different processes and procedures required by the national and local government 
institutions, and their donors. Obviously, some government and NGO informants think 
that LNGOs seem not to take their responsibilities seriously to report to the government 
and provincial authorities. For example, informant GOV 07 claims:  
 
“Only 20% of them have sent the annual report to the ministry because the NGOs 
and associations are confused about the process of reporting. In the MOU, they need 
to send the annual report to ministry of interior and make a copy to the provincial 
government where they are based. Because there is no legal framework and only 
MOU, the ministry cannot force them to report to us on the regular basis.” 
 
5.5  Institutional Challenges to NGO Coordination 
 
At the heart of NGO coordination issues are the institutional challenges of NCBs and 
NGOs in Cambodia. The institutional challenges are mainly the limited capacity of the 
NGO sector, including the coordination bodies. This will be analysed in the form of 
                                                                                                                                
overseeing and managing LNGO registration. However, the department has limited human and 
financial resources to work effectively, particularly to manage and maintain the LNGO database. Thus, 
with the structure from national, provincial, district to commune levels the ministry has not set 
restricted standards, particularly reporting (informant GOV 05). The local governments and authorities 
still do not know how many LNGOs operate in their regions.  
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limited capacity of NCBs and NGOs and problems of slow mobilisation impacting on 
the NGO coordination process. 
 
5.5.1 Limited Capacity of NCBs and NGOs 
 
NCBs face five key challenges: institutional management and structure, financial 
resources, fragmentation, collective voice, and slow implementation of the NGO Good 
Practice Project (NGO-GPP). Their challenges are also strongly associated with the 
limited capacity of NGOs as discussed below. 
 
a) Institutional Management and Structure 
 
Few NCBs, except for the CCC, NGOF and Medicam, have clear membership criteria, 
annual reports, by-laws, or long-term and medium strategic plans. Their organisational 
structure and management are hierarchical and evaluations are rare.  
 
Most NCBs have limited capacity to work closely with LNGO members and non-
members in provinces. They do not have provincial offices; thus, many members are 
based in Phnom Penh. Although they have decentralised work by sector through their 
working groups in recent years, particularly 2009, the monthly member and general 
assembly meetings are usually held in Phnom Penh. They rarely conduct seminars or 
meetings with members and NGOs in the provinces to directly scale up the capacity of 
LNGO members and non-members, where it is most needed. Poor communication 
between NCBs, NAs and LNGOs in provinces is widely accepted by informants. From 
the supply side, informant CSO 07 argues that: “the information from national level is 
limited and is rarely conducted and when the CCC conducts the seminar it was not so 
clear as well because the CCC just briefly explained and not in details.” Similarly from 
the demand side, the NCBs‟ capacity “to coordinate and to absorb the contents at the 
community level” remains weak (Informant CSO 01). 
 
Most NCBs are understaffed and have difficulty in attracting and retaining good staff or 
matching the salaries paid by other institutions. For instance, the CCC and NGOF are 
recruiting new staff to replace staff lost in 2007 and 2008 (CCC, 2007a, 2008a; NGOF, 
2008). In some cases their coordination and advocacy rely greatly on external assistance 
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such as external advisors and volunteer advisors or internees. They need more qualified 
staff in information technology, policy analysis, advocacy and aid effectiveness. Indeed, 
informant CSO 01 gives the example  that “the person who is in charge in the process 
is only me and Mr. A who works for NGO B and his boss is less aware of aid 
effectiveness.”  
 
b) Finances 
 
Few NCBs have fundraising development skills to get more financial resources to 
implement their projects. Based on the current foreign assistance climate and financial 
crisis, NCBs and NGOs face shrinking financial resources (the Cambodia Daily, 2009a). 
Thus, NCBs need to diversify their sources of funds away from donors and membership 
fees. Also, donors have paid less attention to the coordination work among NGOs but 
have instead channelled funds to specific sectors mentioned in section 5.2.2. Most of the 
NCBs‟ projects/activities are under-resourced, both in budget and labour. For example, 
the implementation of the NGO GPP has been relatively slow in the last four years 
because “it is still limited in resources” (informant CSO 05). 
 
c) Fragmentation  
 
Generally, one NGO carries out a number of activities in more than one sector. A 
number of informants from the government, development partners and NGOs realise 
that most of NGOs have similar or overlapping mandates and competition for donor 
funding is very intense. In terms of micro vision, informant GOV 01 states that “it leads 
to duplication, overlapped activities and wastage of resources on transaction and 
administrative cost […] because NGOs compete with each other for funding.” 
Replication can be minimised if NGOs build a strong partnership with each other where 
they are based. As noted, the spirit of coordination and partnership among NGOs is new 
for Cambodians. Many people remain unaware of the importance of coordination and 
partnership building among their groups. Thus, the NGOs are “very immature and often 
very ineffective” (Informant CSO 05) in working together. 
  
Fragmentation and duplication among NGOs‟ projects/activities raise huge concerns for 
NGOs and other actors. Informant DP 10 said “their activities are very fragmented”. 
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Consequently, the impact of their projects/activities is reduced. Informant CSO 01 
accepted the fact that “we do not have a clear-cut mechanism to avoid duplication 
projects in the NGO community.” It is a very difficult job to make sure that the NGOs 
projects/activities are concentrated, coherent and coordinated. The approach of 
„avoiding project replication‟ might exist only in theory rather than in practice due to 
the current social, political, institutional, and cultural context in the country. 
 
d) Collective Voice 
 
Further, most NCBs face a key challenge in mobilising their constituencies. NCBs have 
no authority to interfere in the internal work of any members. They must respect 
different interests, different views of members on specific issues and diversities of 
membership in the NGO community. In the NCB regular meetings, members might not 
participate every time (informant CSO 04) or may be passive participants and do not 
provide any useful and substantial comments. Thus, the objective of the meetings might 
not be achieved. For instance, informant CSO 03 says “sometimes they don‟t send a key 
person who is able to make any decision to participate in the meeting.” The staff have 
no absolute rights to make any decisions on behalf of their executive directors. They 
just listen without expressing ideas on common issues because they are not aware of or 
do not understand information raised at the previous meeting. Moreover, NGO 
members, particularly LNGOs, are not often keen in searching for and learning about 
new types of knowledge; informant CSO 05 stresses that “very seldom Cambodian 
NGOs are interested in good research-based policy, independent research-based 
evidence in their policies.” Indeed, an NGO membership organisation that is strong 
depends on the active participation of its members. Specifically, informant DP 05 
suggests that: 
 
 “…any coordinating body like that is as good as its members and the way to get 
better quality from coordinating bodies is to encourage the active involvement of 
members they get their strength from…that is a circular thing.” 
 
Clearly collective voice is a key issue for NGO coordination as informant CSO 01 
accepts that: 
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“The difficulty we are facing now is the mobilisation of collective voice because 
the level of understanding of NGO members and level of their engagement remain 
limited. Therefore, agreeing on the common issues from all members is a big 
challenge”  
 
A number of informants strongly stressed that the NGO community, particularly NCBs, 
have not mobilised a single collective voice on certain issues, particularly a new NGO 
law. NCBs and NGOs have different ideas on common issues such as a process of 
drafting a new NGO law by the Cambodian government. Also, the way they work with 
their relevant stakeholders is different, shaped by their financial sources or sometimes 
foreign ideologies. Few advocacy NGOs and human rights NGOs are members of the 
NCBs engaging with the government. Many human rights NGOs are not the members 
of any NCBs. Their view on human rights issues was observed in the provincial NGO 
seminar. For example, some NCBs have jointly organised a number of workshops in 
provinces to gather collective views on the NGO law from LNGOs. Their joint NGO 
statement on NGO law has not yet been released to the government and the public. 
However, the human rights networks released  to the newspapers and news websites 
their statements concerning  the issues of substance and the process of drafting the new 
NGO law (the Cambodia Daily, 2009b; CHRAC, 2008). Informant CSO 05 says of 
NGOs that:  
 
“they have no collective voice and many NGOs do not want a collective 
voice…they are not interested in coordination and in an effective collective voice.” 
 
Additionally, many non-members of NCBs that are not invited to participate in the 
NGO coordination processes might have some good ideas and views on some specific 
issues concerning NGOs‟ operations. Their input is not included in the NGO joint 
statements and other documents integrated and compiled by NCBs. Coordination work 
and mobilising the collective voice is a very challenging job.  
 
e) Implementation of the NGO Good Practice Project (NGO-GPP) 
 
Given the country‟s short-term experience in democracy, the relatively rapid growth of 
NGOs reveals the infancy and immaturity of NGOs in Cambodia, particularly LNGOs 
since 1991. Based on the strong concerns over NGO effectiveness, in 2004 the 
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Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC) initiated the Code of Ethical Principles 
and Minimum Standards for NGO and NGO Certificate55,comprising 25 points with 
indicators of each point (CCC, 2004, 2008c). The NGO Voluntary Certificate System is 
renewed every three years (ibid). It is very much a locally based initiative. All 
informants in this study applaud the great initiative that helps to build the effectiveness 
and governance of the NGO sector. However, NGO-GPP progress is very slow as few 
NGOs have received NGO certificates. There are a number of reasons including the 
nature of the growing and immature NGOs, limited financial resources and time, and a 
lack of awareness.  
 
Firstly, NGOs are often weak institutions led by strong executive directors who were 
basically educated overseas with strong foreign ideologies. Based on the discussion in 
the workshop in one province, there is confusion over the implementation of NGO self-
regulation and the new NGO law proposed by the government. The NGO community 
should seriously consider the political and cultural context and the roles of the 
government and civil society. Despite NGOs being non-governmental, non-political, 
non religious  and not-for-profit entities, the government intends to regulate and 
coordinate NGOs working in Cambodia. Moreover, NGOs need to have their own self-
regulation to become strong institutions. 
 
Secondly, the implementation of the NGO-GPP is always associated with the human 
and financial resources and time required to upgrade the level of understanding among 
staff and implement changes. Specifically, the CCC has a limited budget to extend the 
programme and provide self-regulation training for NGOs, particularly provincial 
LNGOs. For example, informant CSO 05 stresses that “it is still limited in resources… 
the number of NGOs that have reached compliance, and there is not enough awareness 
of it.” The adoption of the NGO-GPP consumes time and resources to follow the 
process through 25 points. For instance, informant CSO 10 argues that “We are not well 
prepared to follow all criteria of NGO best practice…I think that is not easy to get an 
NGO certificate and we need to have some resources and capable staff to do this job.” 
                                            
55 The purpose of this project is to build effectiveness and governance over the entire NGO community in 
Cambodia. The project is supported by Australia, Spain, and INGOs such as ActionAid International, 
and Concern World Wide. The project will also lead to the establishment of a voluntary NGO 
certification system based on compliance with the Code of Ethical Principles and Minimum Standards 
for NGOs in Cambodia. Now it is in the second phase. (CCC, 2004, 2008a). 
99 
 
In some cases, NGOs might give up the implementation of the process due to the 
complications and other issues (informant GOV 02).  
 
Finally, although the NGO-GPP project commenced in 2004, few NGOs have received 
a certificate, revealing the low awareness and understanding of the NGO-GPP. The 
CCC currently provides a capacity development programme
56
 to LNGOs to promote 
awareness and understanding of the NGO-GPP nationwide. Not many LNGOs are 
interested in joining the training programme and committing themselves to pursue best 
practice for their own good. They basically concentrate on their own activities and 
organisation.  For example, informant CSO 07 mentions:  
 
“I have tried to convince LNGOs to join the training freely offered by CCC…there 
are several NGOs interested but many are so busy and not able to join the training 
and prepare the documents to implement NGO-GPP.”  
 
5.5.2 Slow Mobilisation of NCB Members 
 
In the last decade, the NCBs have made slow progress in expanding their membership 
and collective voice.  They do not have the clear strategic approach of a business 
marketing strategy to attract either existing or new international and local NGOs. 
According to the desk review (See Appendix VI), about a quarter of the total NGOs 
(46% of total INGOs and 16% of total LNGOs) in Cambodia are members of the NCBs 
at the national level. Hence, most NGOs in Cambodia are not members of an NCB and 
NCBs are not fully representative. Informant CSO 01 mentions “we don‟t have a 
collective voice of NGO representatives in Cambodia.” Thus, the issues are a lack of 
awareness of NGO coordination, a lack of interest, time constraint and scarcity of 
financial resources.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
56 The programme consists of six rounds of training courses in provinces, commencing 25 May, 2009 to 
08 April, 2010. The training courses are conducted in four days by CCC staff and are free of charge to 
LNGOs. The programme‟s curriculum includes organisation policies and board development, effective 
human resource management, sound financial and administrative management, monitoring and 
evaluation, and organisational strategic planning (CCC, 2009). 
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a) A lack of Awareness  
 
Most informants from the Cambodian government, donors and NGOs in this study 
agreed that awareness of NGO coordination, cooperation and partnership is very 
limited. The concept of coordination, partnership and coalition is very new for 
Cambodia and Cambodians. Social capital grows very slowly in Cambodia. Although 
the level of education has increased in the last decade, the number of people that have a 
higher education is miniscule (World Bank, 2009a). At the provincial NGO seminar, 
many were passive participants and did not express and share ideas and information or 
did not trust other participants as they do not know them well enough. It reveals that the 
capacity of NGO staff in provinces is low; it is difficult to attract skilled staff to work 
outside the capital due poor rural infrastructure and social interaction. 
 
In terms of external causes, many NGO staff (LNGOs) have not been well trained as 
development practitioners. They have limited access to information and training in a 
number of skills, particularly the importance of NGO coordination, partnership and 
alliance. For example, during the provincial NGO seminar many LNGO participants did 
not know clearly the roles of NCBs and how they work to improve the effectiveness of 
the NGO sector and boost the NGO reputation with government and donors. LNGO 
informants indicate that NCBs rarely conduct workshops and events to build the 
capacity of LNGOs in provinces. Therefore, the provincial NGOs are weak and their 
staff have a limited level of understanding of their roles, activities, their operations, and 
the partnership and coordination required to achieve the NGOs‟ common goals, values 
and a collective voice.  
 
Individual benefits win out over the common interest and benefit of the entire NGO 
sector. Many NGOs, particularly LNGOs, think that they should receive substantial 
benefits from NCBs when they join. For example, informant CSO 06 points out that “I 
don‟t want to join because I don‟t know what benefit I have from joining these 
organisations.” Some LNGOs seek funding from NCBs due to the tough funding 
competition in Cambodia, yet NCBs are not able to provide funds to their members as 
they are not funding bodies (Informant CSO 02). In other cases, members might 
withdraw their membership when they think they do not benefit from NCBs (Informant 
CSO 02). 
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b) Lack of Interest 
 
According to many informants, a lack of interest in becoming members of the NCBs is a 
common issue among Cambodian NGOs. Informant CSO 07, who is very 
knowledgeable and clearly understood the process of NGO alliances, expresses that “we 
are not interested and concerned about this.” Some of the reasons for the lack of 
interest include “competition, territoriality, duplication, confusion, voice, and incredible 
demand of the Cambodian government and other Cambodian NGOs…because of 
conflicting interests and different systems and agendas” (Informant CSO 05). Other 
members might not express any ideas on the common issues if they think that there 
might be negative consequences (Informant CSO 04). Many NGOs desire to work 
independently as they want to maintain their autonomy. Thus, these factors prevent 
them from being part of NCBs. 
 
c) Time Constraint 
 
As Stremlau (1987) and Bennett (2000) observe, participating in the coordination 
process consumes the time of members. Members of NCBs are required to participate in 
the monthly members meeting and to be active and share information to others 
members. However, NGOs are tied up with their daily operations, upward and 
downward accountability with their donors and communities and social accountability 
with the government and local authorities. NGOs are very concerned about their 
funding sources and survival. Accountably and transparently, they spend more time in 
writing proposals and different reports with different fiscal years to donors and INGOs 
(according to most informants). Also, they allocate time with communities they serve 
and collect information from them. Therefore, they do not have much time to learn 
about and search out new approaches and to think about common issues. In some cases, 
they feel that they might not be active members and could not contribute to the NCBs‟ 
meetings as much as they would like. For example, LNGOs that have limited 
knowledge of advocacy work and are situated in remote provinces cannot afford to 
spend time travelling to the city to participate in the NCBs‟ meeting due poor 
infrastructure and transport. For example, informant CSO 08 mentions that “we are 
based in this province and very far away from Phnom Penh city.” Thus, they would 
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rather concentrate on  work to accomplish their organisation‟s goals, and search for 
future funding.  
 
d) Scarcity of Financial Resources 
 
Coordination work also consumes financial resources as Streamlau (1978) and Bennett 
(2000) argue. NGO members need to pay membership fees to NCBs. However, NGOs, 
particularly LNGOs, might only have the budget to implement their projects and 
activities, and not money for membership fees. The key informants of this study agreed 
that there is increasing competition among NGOs in Cambodia. NGOs, especially 
LNGOs, receive small and insufficient budgets from their donors with many conditions 
and requirements. Specifically, informant CSO 09 argues that 
 
 “Sometimes we think that it is almost unacceptable and we don‟t have 
choice…annually we  compete strongly with each other for funding…that is a great 
challenge.”  
 
Many NGOs, particularly LNGOs, have no expense items besides the items agreed 
under the MOU signed with their donors for specific activities. They cannot afford to 
pay for annual membership fees. For example, informant CSO 02 indicates that  
 
“NGOs face difficulty in joining NGO umbrellas…due to lack of closer 
relationships, shortage of financial resources… Some NGOs still cannot afford to 
pay the membership fee.”  
 
Existing members of NCBs, mostly INGOs accounting for 45% of total INGOs, have 
sufficient funds to pay membership fees. Some have joined more than one NCB as they 
target different sectors. However, only 16% of all LNGOs join NCBs and the rest might 
not have the resources to be members (See Appendix VI). Thus, membership fees might 
limit NGOs, particularly LNGOs in joining NCBs. 
 
Long distances and poor communication make it difficult for LNGOs based in remote 
provinces to establish working relationships. Although they may understand and they 
are aware of the NGO coordination, they cannot be active members. They are not often 
able to actively participate because executive directors or assigned staff cannot afford 
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travelling costs57 to participate in the NCBs‟ meetings. Therefore, they are likely to cut 
costs on other activities such as cooperation and put more resources into core 
plan/activities.  
 
Cambodia‟s physical infrastructure is slowly developing after two decades of war and 
internal conflicts. Except for mobile phones, communication facilities like landline 
telephones and internet access in the provinces are unreliable, poor quality and 
expensive for LNGOs to invest in. This makes it difficult for them to access updated 
information about coordination efforts, partnership and development.  
 
5.6 A Weak Systematic NGO Coordination Processes 
 
Respondents indicate that there is a weak systematic NGO coordination process in place 
in Cambodia. This is the result of the limited capacity of NCBs, NAs and their members 
and poor partnership between them. It is a common issue caused by limited resources. 
Moreover, NCBs and NGOs are heavily dependent on external assistance due to a lack 
of alternative income such as strong membership fees. The current NGO coordination 
process is often done only at the national level through forming specific meetings with 
powerful INGO and LNGO members of NCBs. The process is also done on an ad hoc 
basis between the national and the provincial levels. The coordination work often takes 
a long time to achieve a goal with a series of meetings. For example, the process of 
formulation of a joint NGO statement on certain issues is firstly developed at the 
national level. The joint NGO statement is signed by participating NGOs in Phnom 
Penh and then NGOs in provinces are later asked to look at a joint NGO statement for 
endorsement. This is „a top down approach‟ that is well structured and organised. 
However this approach does not empower LNGO participants to express their views on 
certain issues. It can lead to ineffectiveness. For instance, during a provincial seminar, 
some LNGOs expressed the concerns on wording and some meanings of the statement 
and they wanted to revise parts of it. There was a lot of confusion in the meeting and 
many LNGOs were hesitant to sign the agreement and some of them felt that they had 
no absolute right to make the decision. Moreover, this approach is contradictory to what 
NGOs including executive directors and staff are familiar with: the „bottom-up 
                                            
57
 Travelling costs might include transport costs, accommodation and per-diem expenses.  
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approach‟. LNGOs use this approach to carry out their activities and gather factual 
information for advocacy work from the local community because they empower people 
to speak and express their concerns. LNGOs are the real implementers and they have 
more accurate local, factual information than NCBs and NGOs at the national level.  
 
Furthermore, NGO members, particularly LNGOs, are not enthusiastic about building 
the connection and partnership between the national and local levels. For instance, 
informant CSO 07 strongly stresses that 
 
“we always complain about the government but we have not done very well in 
terms of NGO coordination among ourselves…NGOs in provinces try to survive by 
themselves and LNGOs don‟t often make the regular working relationship with the 
NGOs at the national level. They have all made the same mistake in this case.” 
 
5.7  Conclusion 
 
NGOs have been the key actors in rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of 
Cambodia since the fall of the Khmer Rouge. Specifically, NGO coordination roles 
have been successfully pursued by NGOs, particularly NCBs. Due to the rapid growth 
of INGOs and LNGOs in the country, there is a rising concern over their effectiveness 
and NGO coordination efforts between the national and provincial levels. Their 
challenges are weak institutions, slow mobilisation of NGO members, and a weak 
systematic NGO coordination, resulting in no collective voice, slow implementation of 
NGO GPP, fragmentation and replication of NGO projects/activities and poor working 
relationships with the Cambodian government. NCBs need to play stronger roles in 
building the image of the NGO community and promoting NGO professionalism; if 
they did this, NGOs would find it easier to  attract more funds from donors and gain 
more political space from the government for advocacy and policy influencing. NCBs 
need to build the capacity of their own organisations as well as members, and in 
particular strengthen provincial NGO coordination. At the same time, donors need to 
provide support to keep this concept alive while the government and authorities can 
enable a friendly environment for NCBs and particularly NAs to grow.  
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Chapter VI: NGO Coordination Efforts and the Changing Aid Environment  
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter further explores research questions 1 and 3 (See Section 1.3), describing 
how NGOs/NGO representatives played their roles and engaged in the aid structures in 
Cambodia before and after the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness as well as the 
Accra Agenda for Action. There are two main sections in this chapter. The first section 
portrays international aid jointly financed by the donors and INGOs and their roles and 
involvement in unstructured aid coordination between 1991 and 2004. The second 
section discusses the positions, roles and responsibility of the NGO representatives in 
the current aid coordination mechanisms developed after 2004.  
 
6.2  The NGO Coordination Efforts and the Aid Architecture: 1991-2004 
 
NGOs played a critical role after the Paris Peace Accord in 1991 and the arrival of 
UNTAC in 1992. Donors channelled funds through NGOs, particularly INGOs to 
provide basic service deliveries to the poor. In 1992, the Ministerial Conference for 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia (MCRRC
58
) was held in Japan to 
discuss how to aid Cambodia, and it established the International Committee for 
Rehabilitation of Cambodia (ICORC) based on the Tokyo Declaration on Rehabilitation 
and Reconstruction of Cambodia (Peou and Yamada, 2000). The ICORC was a 
consultative body for donors to provide Cambodia with financial and technical 
resources for social and economic recovery and to respect Cambodia‟s sovereignty, 
priorities and institutional and absorptive capacity (ibid). The ICORC and the 
Declaration formed an aid framework for Cambodian reconstruction and placed 
emphasis on reconstruction issues59 (Tith, 1998). Due to the lack of a government aid 
                                            
58 The MCRRC was hosted by the Government of Japan on June 21-22, 1992 and co-chaired by Japan 
and UNDP. The conference comprised bilateral and multilateral donors, the Cambodian government 
(note that the SOC was not legitimate before the first national election  held in 1993), and the NGO 
representatives including the Cambodian Development Research Institute, International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) and International Organisation for Immigration (IOM) (Peou and Yamada, 2000; 
Peou, 2000; CDC/CRDB, 2006j, CCC, 2007a). 
59 The development of reconstruction issues were the provision of basic needs: security, health care, 
housing, education and training, and transportation as well as the restoration of Cambodia's existing 
infrastructure and public utilities (Tith, 1998). 
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coordination body, the ICORC60 served as a body for coordinating the medium and 
long-term official assistance to Cambodia (Peou and Yamada, 2000). The roles of NGO 
representatives and NCBs were apparent in sharing information (on humanitarian needs 
and reconstruction) with the government. The ICORC meetings were held from 1993 to 
1995 switching locations between Japan and Paris (See Figure 6.1). Reliable national 
statistics61 were not available for donors to build need-oriented aid projects and policies 
(Peou and Yamada, 2000). Many INGOs were acting as both donors and implementer, 
having as much influence as donors when they financially and technically supported aid 
reconstruction and coordination, particularly in health and education. The Cambodian 
government was marginalised in its own national development.  
 
The development aid to Cambodia was relatively small between 1991 and 1994 as it 
was delayed by several factors (Forman and Patrick, 2000). Those factors were a lack of 
understanding of socio-economic and cultural contexts and political conditions, 
uncertainty of the transitional situation, donors‟ ownership of projects, a lack of donor 
harmonisation and country aid coordination mechanism, insufficient local human 
resources and weak government structures and systems (ibid). Indeed, most donors‟ and 
INGO‟s staff were dominated by foreigners who could not understand the language and 
the Cambodian socio-economic and cultural contexts (Mysliwiec, 2004). Specifically, 
there was less consultation on projects (including project design, implementation and 
monitoring and evaluation) among NGOs, the Cambodian government, donors and 
communities (ibid). This was because NGOs lacked expertise and institutional capacity 
to handle aid deliveries and sometimes clashed with donors‟ development philosophies 
(Peou and Yamada, 2000). NGOs were also part of the problem in hindering aid 
disbursement as NGOs‟ budgets were underspent (Peou and Yamada, 2000). There was 
no or very little mutual accountability between donors and the Cambodian government 
and between donors and NGOs. Many donors and INGOs implemented their projects 
                                            
60 The ICORC was expected to provide the forum for all stakeholders to coordinate and share all 
information among themselves and with the Cambodian government and authorities. The ICORC was 
also expected to encourage an enabling environment for the Government of Cambodia to develop and 
facilitate its planning and aid requirement and priorities, to be financed by donors and NGOs. The 
donors and NGOs consulted and advised the Cambodian counterparts on development priorities and 
requirements for setting their committed aid levels and priorities for Cambodia. The ICORC was to 
provide the Cambodian government with an opportunity to develop an institutional economic and 
social planning and aid management capacity necessary for the successful implementation of the 
reconstruction programmes (Peou and Yamada, 2000, p.71). 
61 The national statistics include the national account, human development index, consumer price index, 
budgetary and employment statistics and others (ibid). 
107 
 
largely bypassing government structures (CDC/CRDB, 2000a; Mysliwiec, 2004). This 
impeded the harmonisation efforts between donors and INGOs. Therefore, within the 
context of fragmented and duplicated aid efforts, aid competition with high related 
impacts on some sectors (the sectors reflected the donor‟s identity, profile and 
territoriality), the weak capacity of NCBs and their duplication roles, NGO coordination 
efforts were weak. This consequently contributed to weakness of the NGO sector, 
including a decline in reaching the poor, donor-driven, incoherent projects, a lack of 
local participation in the process of decision making, absence of legal framework and 
professional deficit (ADB, 1999). 
 
There were no national plans to guide development assistance until 1994, when the new 
Cambodian government, with co-prime ministers from the first national election, 
announced the National Programmes for Reconstruction and Development of 
Cambodia, and the plan was approved by the National Assembly. The Royal 
Government of Cambodia (RGC) established the Cambodian Rehabilitation and 
Development Board at the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC/CRDB62) 
in 1994 as the national aid coordinator acting as focal point between donors, line 
ministries and NGOs (CDC/CRDB, 2006c) (See Appendix VIII). With support from the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) through the Aid Coordination and 
Management Programme63, the CDC/CRDB was able to gradually fulfil its mandates 
and functions, to initiate an aid management framework with the consensus of line 
ministries, to allocate external assistance to priority sectors through policy dialogue with 
donors and to initially build government-donor partnerships (ibid). The aid management 
                                            
62 This new government institution lacked competent and skilled staff and institutional knowledge to 
effectively perform its roles and functions. The staff were seconded from other line ministries and their 
professional backgrounds varied. At an early stage, the staff lacked English language skills and special 
skills in managing and administering projects and programmes. The aid coordination work was very 
reliant on long-term external advisors based at CDC/CRDB. 
63 The Aid Coordination and Management Programme consists of three phases. The first two phases 
1995-2000 and 2001-2005 were solely supported by UNDP. The third phase of the programme namely 
the Multi- Support Programme for Aid Coordination and Management 2005-2010, was financed by 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and UNDP. The programme has provided a 
quality and quantity of (long-term and short-term) aid advisory services, technical manpower, logistical 
support and other services to strengthen the institutional capacity of CDC/CRDB to perform and 
operate its mandates and functions (CDC/CRDB, 2005a, 2007d). The programme also aims at helping 
the CDC/CRDB in establishing an aid management framework through enhancing partnerships and 
coordination with key relevant line ministries, improving external assistance mobilisation, and 
programming, monitoring and evaluating development cooperation (ibid). Moreover, it has assisted the 
CDC/CRDB to effectively locate aid resources for prioritised sectors through policy debate with DPs 
and to  develop government-donor partnerships (ibid). 
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framework or Operational Framework for Development Cooperation Partnerships 
mainly emphasised the trust and partnership 64  building and joint development 
responsibilities between the RGC and donors (CDC/CRDB, 2000a, 2001a). 
 
Between 1996 and 2001, the ICORC was replaced by Consultative Group (CG) 
meetings that were convened in Paris and Tokyo and were co-chaired by the host donors 
and the World Bank (See Figure 6.1). During this period the country aid mechanisms 
and structures were moving away from „donor-ship‟ to „government ownership‟ 
(CDC/CRDB, 2001a). These efforts occurred in a transitional period enabling the 
CRDB to take some ownership and leadership in aid coordination to strengthen its 
performance and mandates. However, the mechanisms were weak and remained driven 
by donors (CDC/CRDB, 2004c). The government‟s policies and strategies65 were often 
written by foreign advisors through donors‟ technical assistance66 (Peou and Yamada, 
2000; CDC/CRDB, 2001b; Godfrey et al. 2002; Mysliewic, 2004). NGO representatives 
participated in the CG meeting and circulated documents and contributed to providing 
inputs to national and sector policies and NGO disbursement (See Table 6.1). They 
maintained their roles and positions in the CG meetings such as the ICORC, acting as 
donors and aid recipients and having equal influence on the side of donors. 
                                            
64 Achievements of Operational Framework for Development Cooperation Partnerships have included (i) 
establishing a partnership focal point within Government; (ii) securing broad-based Government 
acceptance and establishment of procedures/guidelines for national-level partnerships; (iii) securing 
broad-based donor acceptance and establishment of procedures/guidelines for government-donor 
partnerships; (iv) arriving  at a general agreement on the operational framework; and (v) starting  pilot 
implementation programmes (CDC/CRDB, 2001a, 2002a, 2004e).   
65 The key government documents during that period were the first Socio-Economic Development Plan, 
1996-2000 (SEDP-I). That was followed by a 2nd Socio-Economic Development Plan, 2001-2005 
(SEDP-II) and a Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), Operational Framework for Development 
Cooperation Partnerships,  A New Development Cooperation Partnership Paradigm for Cambodia, the 
CG position papers, and Development Cooperation Reports (CDC/CRDB, 2000a, 2001a, and 2001b). 
66 Technical assistance (TA) has formed a large part of total ODA to Cambodia. The TA has both positive 
and negative impact on development and aid practice. Positively, the TA builds the capacity of the 
Cambodian government officials and NGO staff through overseas/in country training, studies and 
workshops. The TA can be replaced by the developed strong capacity of local staff in one place 
(Godfrey et al., 2002; Mysliewiec, 2004). However, there are problems where the TA takes place and it 
is translated into a different practice by team leaders, local staff and senior management. For example, a 
team leader often considers their role as manager rather than facilitator and trainer. Senior government 
officials prefer the TA experts or advisors to do tasks such as writing official letters, speeches, reports, 
laws, and advising the ministers, rather than developing capacity locally to do the job (Godfrey et al., 
2002). The senior government officials prefer the TA as a means to have a better working environment 
such as the provision of materials and equipment (CDC/CRDB, 2004c). Government officials seek 
opportunities to work in TA projects, getting benefits including salary supplements (CDC/CRDB, 
2004c), gaining more knowledge for their future career, training overseas by obtaining per-diem and 
travelling costs (my observation from working in CDC/CRDB). This practice undermines good aid 
practice  and the capacity building of the government in the long-term . 
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Figure 6.1: Transformative Processes of Aid Coordination 
 
 
 
 
Note: * the 1st ICORC meeting was chaired by France and Facilitated by UNDP 
          ** the 1st CG meeting was co-chaired by Japan and the World Bank 
 
NGO representatives attended some of the Government-Donor-NGO sector working 
group meetings, particularly in the health and education sectors where NGO 
representatives/NCBs are active and many LNGOs and INGOs have worked. 
Specifically, the NGO Education Partnership (NEP) was created with strong support 
from the RGC and donors, and was the outcome of Education Sector Working Group 
meetings to coordinate NGO activities
67
 (CDC/CRDB, 2001a). The NEP was invited to 
regularly attend the Working Group, and jointly and independently appraise and review 
the education documents
68
 (ibid).  
 
The government urged donors and NGOs to build their systematic capacity to accelerate 
the process. The government also complained that donor and NGOs continued to carry 
out their projects using their parallel systems and avoiding the government systems 
((CDC/CRDB, 2000a, 2001a, Godfrey et al. 2002). This leads to high transaction costs 
and low accountability.  For example, NGOs consumed more than 50% of the total 
technical assistance provided by donors (CDC/CRDB, 2004a, 2004c, 2004d). 
                                            
67 During that period, the perceived missions, mandates and priorities of education sector NGOs were 
fragmented and diverse, and achieving a shared and common view of the role of NGO partners was still 
embryonic (CDC/CRDB, 2001, p.9). 
68 The documents that resulted from key milestones in the partnership development process were 1) the 
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MOEYS)/Donor/NGO Statement of Intent; 2) the formulation 
of an initial policy, strategy and financing paper: Equity, Quality and Efficiency in Education Financing; 
3) the Education Strategic Analysis; 4) the Education Strategic Plan 2001-2005; 5) New Principles for 
Education Partnership;  6) agreed joint MOEYS/donor/NGO guidelines for review and appraisal of the 
ESP and the Education Sector Support Programme (ESSP) 2001–2005 (CDC/CRDB, 2001a, p.7). 
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Table 6.1: Summary of NGO Engagement (Position, Inputs and Issues) Analysis in Aid Coordination Mechanisms 
Aid Coordination Forums NGO Representatives’ Position NGO Inputs 
National/Policy Level 
(Joint NGO Statement) 
Sector/Technical level 
Ministerial Conference for 
Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction of Cambodia 
(MCRRC)-1992 
 Acting as donors and aid 
recipients 
(implementers/executive 
agencies) 
 Equal influence as donors 
 Financial and technical support on aid 
reconstruction and  coordination 
 Financial and technical support on aid 
reconstruction and  coordination, particularly 
in health and education sectors 
1st -3rd  International 
Committee for Rehabilitation 
of Cambodia (ICORC) 
Meeting: 1993-1995 
 
 Acting as donors and aid 
recipients 
(implementers/executive 
agencies) 
 Equal influence as donors 
 Financial and technical support on aid 
reconstruction and coordination and 
development 
 NGO Pledging statement (13 sector group 
papers) 
 Absorptive capacity 
 Rural Poverty Alleviation 
 Financial and technical support in social 
development sectors, particularly health sector 
 Improving the level of understanding of the 
people about democratisation and human 
rights, particularly in rural areas 
1st -5th Consultative Group 
Meeting (CG): 1996-2001 
 
 Acting as donors and aid 
recipients 
(implementers/executive 
agencies) 
 Equal influence as donors 
 Representing civil society  in 
CG, semi-annual policy 
dialogue and Government-
Donor sector working group 
meetings, particularly in health 
and education, gender, mine 
action (Medicam and Educam) 
 Spreading joint NGO statement on 
„Towards Genuine Partnership‟ NGO 
Strategies for development in Cambodia 
1996-2000 (11 sector group papers) in CG 
meeting and other focus such as rural 
political stability, human resource 
development, human rights, rule of law and 
good governance 
 Producing two case studies on aid 
coordination conducted by Medicam and 
Educam) 
 Many NGOs based in Phnom Penh and 
some provinces have provided their 
operational and budget records to 
CDC/CRDB for NGO Disbursement. 
 Aid Coordination (two case studies conducted 
by Medicam and Educam) 
 Contributing to conduct two case studies for 
improvement of good practice in aid 
coordination and development cooperation 
 Constructing policy in implementing sector 
reforms such as health, education, gender, 
mine actions (Medicam, Educam and other 
NGOs) 
6th-8th Consultative Group 
Meeting (CG):2002-2006 
 
 Acting more as aid recipients 
(implementers/executive 
agencies) and advocates and 
watchdogs 
 Less influence and not an equal 
partner at the table 
 Representing civil society in the 
 Circulating joint NGO statement on good 
governance, rule of law, rural livelihoods, 
agriculture and natural resource management 
in CG meetings 
 Providing inputs for national policy formation 
such as National Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(NPRS), National Strategic Development Plan 
 Contributing to policy formulation for 
implementing sector reforms such as health, 
education, gender, mine actions, 
decentralisation and deconcentration, 
agriculture, forestry and environment and 
others 
 Overseeing and evaluating the implementation 
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Aid Coordination Forums NGO Representatives’ Position NGO Inputs 
National/Policy Level 
(Joint NGO Statement) 
Sector/Technical level 
CG, GDCC and some of 18 
TWGs meetings 
 Controversial roles 
(stakeholders, partners, 
observers and/or resources) 
(NSDP) and Cambodian Millennium 
Development Goals (CMDGs) 
 Many NGOs based in Phnom Penh and some 
provinces have provided their operational and 
budget records to CDC/CRDB for NGO 
Disbursement. 
 
of sector reforms such as human rights and 
gender, legal and judicial reform, anti-
corruption, land encroachment  
1st -2nd Cambodia 
Development Cooperation 
Forum (CDCF): 2007-2008 
 
 Acting more as aid recipients 
(implementers/executive 
agencies) and advocates and 
watchdogs 
 Representing civil society in the 
CDCF, GDCC and 15 out of 19 
TWGs meetings 
 Proposing five roles as 
government partners and 
stakeholders but having little 
influence and power at the table 
 
 Releasing joint NGO statement focusing on 
natural and human resource management, 
monitoring and evaluation of the 
implementation of NSDP, good governance, 
enhancement of agriculture sector and private 
sector development, environment for the 
Implementation of the Rectangular Strategy 
 Continually providing NGO disbursement 
data and information for NGO database to 
CDC/CRDB 
 Monitoring and evaluating the implementation 
of aid effectiveness agenda such as action plan 
H-A-R and JMIs and NSDP. 
 Overseeing the national budget monitoring 
and public revenue carried out by NGOF 
 Monitoring public expenditures by sector, 
particularly health and education by Medicam 
and NEP 
 Providing public oversight including 
commune monitoring committees, citizen 
rating report and parliamentary monitoring 
and corruption studies by NGOs 
Sources: Peou and Yamada, 2000; Peou, 2000; Nagasu, 2004; CDC/CRDB,  2000a, 2001a, 2002a, 2002c, 2004a, 2004c, 2004e, 2006b, 2006c, 2006f, 2006g, 2006h, 2006i, 
2007a, 2008d, 2008f, 2009b; MOP, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005; CCC, 2007a; Hun, 2009; World Bank, 2009d. 
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These claims were clearly addressed in two studies commissioned by the government, 
namely (i) Capacity Building Practices of Cambodia‟s Development Partners69and (ii) 
Practices and Lessons Learned in the Management of Development Cooperation
70
. 
NGOs and NCBs contributed to the first study through gathering and analysing data 
from 77 participating NGOs. This reveals that NGOs and NCBs tended to improve aid 
coordination in Cambodia. 
From 2002 to 2004 the aid coordination processes were more driven by the government 
as the CG meetings were held in Phnom Penh and co-chaired by the World Bank and 
the government. This progress was the outcome of the partnership building71 among the 
government, donors and NGOs. The aid coordination processes were restructured by the 
government through Prime Minister Hun Sen giving permission and direction in 
September 2004. The restructured processes comprise three key forums: the 
Consultative Group meeting that later was renamed the Cambodian Development 
Cooperation Forum (CDCF 72 ), the Government-Donor Coordination Committee 
(GDCC
73
), and the Joint Government-Donor Technical Working Group (TWGs
74
). This 
                                            
69 Capacity building practices of Cambodia‟s development partners including NGOs provides factual and 
detailed analytical information on expenditures on five capacity building activities, including the 
number and costs of deploying national and international advisor/consultants to support the 
implementation of the programme and/or to fill capacity gaps in Cambodia (CRDB/CDC, 2004b). 
Based on this study, the action plan resulting from the discussions between Council for Administration 
of Cambodia with development partners has been implemented (CRDB, 2007a, 2007b). 
70 The Practices and Lessons Learned in the Management of Development Cooperation paper documents 
lessons from experiences in jointly formulating, reviewing and implementing sector and cross-sector 
programmes/projects and programme-based approaches (PBA)/Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps) in 
the Education, Health, Local Governance, and Public Finance Sector (CRDB/CDC, 2004a). 
71 The partnership building was strengthened through implementation of A New Development 
Cooperation Partnership Paradigm for Cambodia, covering five principles and seven strategic 
implementation considerations. The five principles are a) a common vision and shared objectives; b) 
agreed governance and accountability structures; c) harmonised strategic management and operational 
capacities; d) learning and adaptation capacities; and e) building and maintaining trust (CDC/CRDB, 
2004a, 2004e). The seven strategic implementation considerations are a) ownership, commitment and 
shared resources; b) flexible partnership modalities; c) starting gradually, getting priorities right and 
using pilots; d) identifying and differentiating partner roles; e) developing national (in-country) 
coordination capacities; f) strengthening external donor capacities for aid management and coordination; 
and g) implications for good governance and administrative reform (CDC/CRDB, 2004c, p.3-4). It also 
provided structure for conceptual understanding and implementation options for building partnership 
with development partners to achieve the Cambodian development goals (CMDGs). 
72
 Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF) chaired by the Royal Government of Cambodia 
has been transformed from the Consultative Group (CG) meeting held in 2007. The CDCF is a high 
level policy forum where government (ministers), civil society organisations (NGOs) and head 
delegations of donor agencies annually discuss and agree an agenda for development assistance and 
cooperation to Cambodia (CDC/CRDB, 2006c, 2006f, 2006g). 
73 The Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC) is chaired by the Senior Minister of the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and the First Vice-Chairman of CDC with co-facilitators 
from the World Bank and UNDP. The membership of GDCC includes ministers and heads of 
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aims at building partnership enhancement among the government, donors and NGOs in 
carrying out and evaluating the government‟s sector reforms. The NGO representatives‟ 
participation in the CG meetings continued and extended in the GDCC meeting to 
include members of some of 18 TWGs including health, education, gender issues and 
decentralisation and deconcentration (CDC/CDRB, 2004a). However, the involvement 
of NGO representatives in other TWGs was invisible as it was just the early stage of 
development of the new aid coordination mechanisms. Indeed, their involvement 
seemed unclear as NGO representatives can be invited to be part of the TWGs when 
necessary (ibid). Although NGO representatives were placed on the side of donors, their 
roles and position were more aid recipients with less influence, and they were unequal 
partners in the forums. However, they played more active roles as advocates and 
watchdogs through releasing the Joint NGO Statement and provided inputs for policy 
formulation and oversight of the implementation of sector reforms (see Table 6.1).  
 
6.3  The Roles of NGO Representatives in the Current Cambodia Aid 
Coordination Mechanisms 2005-2009 
 
6.3.1 NGOs and Aid Effectiveness Agenda 
 
a) The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
 
As mentioned, the development of the Cambodian aid coordination mechanisms follows 
the standards and best practice guided by the OECD‟s guidelines and procedures. The 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness that was signed by development partners (DPs) 
and country governments was put into force in 2005. The declaration principles are a 
means to improve aid coordination and management. After restructuring the in-country 
aid coordination mechanism, the RGC localised the declaration into „the Declaration by 
                                                                                                                                
government agencies, ambassadors or heads of diplomatic missions, and country representatives of 
multilateral institutions. The GDCC meeting is a quarterly forum to provide policy guidance, to identify 
priorities, and to resolve issues raised by the TWGs. The GDCC secretariat is located in CRDB/CDC 
under the daily management of the Secretary General (ibid). 
74 The joint government-donor technical working groups (TWGs): There were 18 TWGs in 2005; one 
more TWG was additionally established, the total reaching 19 TWGs (See Appendix IV). The quarterly 
TWG meetings are chaired by a senior Royal Government official to bring about national ownership on 
their respective sector and represented by lead donor coordinators or facilitators. One or two donors are 
chosen to be facilitator or co-facilitators in the TWG. Their roles and tasks are to identify, prioritise and 
sequence their activities through formulating their own action plan to coordinate external support with 
an agreed set of priorities based on perceived need, available resources and existing capacity (ibid). 
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the Royal Government of Cambodia and Development Partners on Enhancing Aid 
Effectiveness‟ in late 2006, supported by 14 donors 75  (CDC/CRDB, 2006h). The 
outcome of the Cambodian declaration was RGC‟s Action Plan on Harmonisation, 
Alignment and Results: 2006-2010 (Action Plan H-A-R), covering 12 indicators and a 
number of activities with milestones and baselines (See CDC/CRDB, 2007b).  
 
The RGC has continually developed and updated the Action Plan that is jointly 
reviewed and assessed by stakeholders annually. The RGC's Strategic Framework for 
Development Cooperation Management76, the National Operational Guidelines for grant 
assistance
77
 and the Standard Operating Procedures for loan assistance78 were approved 
and implemented by the RGC and DPs. Cambodia has been chosen for OECD‟s Aid 
Effectiveness Survey79 based on the rapid development of the government‟s ownership 
and leadership in coordinating and managing development cooperation in 2006 and 
2008 (action plans, working groups and review processes) to guide implementation and 
evaluation of aid. The Cambodian aid effectiveness plans have brought about substantial 
positive changes with growing government ownership and leadership.  
 
Conversely, as discussed in section 2.4, the NGO engagement in the PD was not 
apparent because NGO representatives were not signatories of the Cambodia declaration 
                                            
75 14 donors are ADB, Australia, Canada, Denmark, the European Union, France, Germany, Japan, New 
Zealand, Sweden, the UNDP, the UK, the US and the World Bank (CDC/CRDB, 2006h). 
76 RGC‟s Strategic Framework for Development Cooperation Management aims to improve aid 
effectiveness to maximise its benefits for the people of Cambodia through strengthened national 
systems and procedures, and aid coordination and resource mobilisation mechanisms that are based on 
principles of Cambodian leadership, ownership, and mutual accountability to achieve RGC‟s 
Rectangular Strategy‟s goals, and the priorities of the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) to 
reduce poverty and to achieve CMDGs (CRDB/CDC, 2006c, p.7) 
77 National Operational Guidelines for Development Cooperation: Grant Assistance is developed to set 
out policies and operational procedures for planning and management of the implementation of 
development cooperation activities. It is based on concepts embodied in the OECD/DAC Good 
Practices Papers and best over the last decade (CRDB/CDC, 2006j). 
78 Standard Operating Procedures for loan assistance (SOP) were approved by the RGC and supported by 
donors, particularly the World Bank and the ADB, aiming to effectively and efficiently manage and 
administer loan projects and clarify the government institutional roles, responsibilities, accountability 
and procedures between the relevant government institutions and staff. The other objectives of the SOP 
are to maximise the social and economic outcomes and minimise negative impacts of external loan 
projects/programmes for the benefits of the Cambodian people in the framework of the country 
ownership (MEF, 2005).  
79 The OECD‟s Aid Effectiveness Survey was conducted and managed by the OECD/ Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and it was co-chaired by Viet Nam 
and the UK with support from Austria, Cambodia, Canada, European Commission, France, Germany, 
Ghana, Mali, Nicaragua, Norway, Senegal, South Africa, UNDP, United States and World Bank. There 
were also 23 partner countries and 23 bilateral donors and several multilateral institutions participating 
in the progress report for the Accra High Level Forum in 2008 (CDC/CRDB, 2006b).  
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nor even observers and not involved with the Action Plan H-A-R  (NGOF, 2008b). 
Indeed, NGO representatives‟ roles have not been clarified at policy or technical levels. 
 
b) Accra Agenda for Action 
 
As noted in section 2.4, the AAA provides the global framework to extend the 
participation and engagement of NGO representatives in inclusive policy dialogue on 
development and aid effectiveness at the global and country levels. The AAA seeks an 
improvement of NGO coordination efforts with government programmes, enhancement 
of NGO accountability and outcomes and acceleration of NGO information sharing with 
the government. Thus, the role of NGO representatives must be as „central players‟ and 
„development actors in their own right‟ under the AAA (OECD, 2008b). However, the 
commitments and promises, particularly at paragraph 20 in the AAA, have not been 
transformed into action at the country level and it is too early to judge interaction 
among the government and donors toward NGO representatives‟ roles and political 
space.  
 
The NGO representatives‟ roles at both political and technical levels have remained 
under-discussed due to the absence of a genuine dialogue between the Cambodian 
government and NGO representatives. Their roles and political space are not  
sufficiently clear. These issues will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
6.3.2 NGO Coordination Processes and Engagement at National Level 
 
NGO coordination in the aid processes has been conducted since 1992 and it has 
evolved over time. Most field research informants in this study believe that the presence 
of NGO representatives in the aid coordination process is very important and necessary. 
Yet only three NGO representatives attended the last Cambodian Development 
Cooperation Forum (CDCF) (out of 239 participants 137 were from government and 98 
from donors) (CDC/CRDB, 2008i). 
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Figure 6.2: Structure of the Cambodian Aid Coordination Mechanisms
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And seven NGO representatives (out of 147  participants: 71 from government and 69 
from donors) participated in the last Government-Donor Coordination Committee 
(GDCC) (CDC/CRDB, 2009b) while a number of NGO representatives participated in 
15 TWGs (See Box 6.1 and Appendix III).  
 
The Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC), NGO Forum (NGOF) and Medicam 
are the three key NGO representatives at the CDCF and GDCC meetings. Annually, 
CCC, NGO Forum and Medicam select capable and competent members to participate 
in the meetings to be representatives for civil society. NGO representatives/NGOs have 
their own process to gather and coordinate information from all parts of Cambodia to 
produce the NGO Position Paper and Joint NGO statements. NGO reports on the 
thematic issues and sectors are also widely distributed to different stakeholders before 
and during the meetings of the CDCF and GDCC. They have made impressive progress 
in recent years, particularly at the last CDCF meeting.  
 
NGO representatives use their own 34 working groups across the sectors and thematic 
issues (Informant CSO 01). The CCC, NGOF, Medicam and NEP organise workshops 
separately to gather information and build a collective voice from members and non-
NGOs. They call for NGO alliances by sectors and provinces to collect information on 
certain thematic issues and send it to the national level. Then they compile the 
information into one paper. The executive summary of the NGO paper reflects the key 
issues related to the CDCF‟s and GDCC‟s agenda. The final draft of the executive 
summary is shared back to NGOs for feedback before publication and circulation. 
NGOs work collectively among their groups and they work separately from the 
government and donors.  
 
The roles of NGOs have changed slightly due to the direction and movement of the 
global aid system, particularly donors‟ policies and priorities in giving aid to developing 
countries such as Cambodia. Since the adoption of the Paris Declaration on aid 
effectiveness, the donors‟ systems and structures have also developed. The donors aim 
to strengthen public services and governance systems of the recipient governments. The 
change in role of civil society as service providers is apparent when its funding shrinks 
due to the global financial crisis and a change in donors‟ priorities, and improvement in 
public services (See section 5.2). Their role is just temporary where the government 
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public services and systems are weak and unreliable and the public services do not reach 
the poor and vulnerable groups. 
 
However, their roles as watchdogs and advocates are more important now. Many donors 
have set their own policy toward improving good governance, democratisation and 
human rights (See section 5.2). Therefore, the available funds for these sectors becomes 
wider and donors mostly channel the resources to NGOs to do the job. Within the new 
aid structure, NGO representatives carry out the watchdog and scrutinising functions for 
enhancing democratic ownership and social accountability as Fleming et al, (2007), 
Schmidjell et al (2009) and Wood and Valot, (2009) claim. Interestingly, during the 
second CDCF meeting the NGO representatives proposed five key roles for the 
NGOs/CSOs to both donors and the government (Sin, 2008). The roles are: 
a) Meaningfully engaging in formulating national plans, strategies and policies 
responsive to the need and voice of Cambodians 
b) Contributing to monitoring implementation of the plans and policies 
c) Acting as complementary service providers in areas where the public systems 
can not reach the poor and vulnerable 
d) Essentially building and strengthening evidence-based policy influencing and  
e) Helping and encouraging Cambodians to actively participate in enhancing 
transparency, accountability and good governance and in implementing the 
country aid effectiveness agenda (ibid).  
 
Reflecting on this proposal, there are some good signs of NGO engagement in the 
preparation and formulation of the second National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) 
(CDC/CRDB, 2009b). It is believed that the NGO inputs will lead to an inclusive NSDP 
II. Many informants applaud the constructive preparation work and contribution of 
NGO representatives in the CDCF, acknowledging that they have produced good 
research and evidence-based documents. 
 
The participation of NGOs in the aid coordination processes benefits the NGO 
community and the poor in a number of ways. Firstly, the NGO representatives/NGOs 
can inform policymakers on development impacts and progress, experienced by the 
poor and vulnerable communities and observed by the numerous and diverse NGOs 
working with them. As noted, the NGO representatives have collected accurate and up-
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to-date information at the community level from all parts of Cambodia and integrated 
the information into a single document. The government and donors were impressed by 
the quality of the work that NGOs have put into the second CDCF. As mentioned in 
section 5.3.1, the availability of qualitative and quantitative information and technical 
expertise from the NGO community is able to shape the policy decisions and make 
development efforts more responsive to the need of the poor and vulnerable groups. 
With regards to the aid disbursement, the annual disbursement provided by NGOs to the 
CDC/CRDB has placed their assistance to Cambodia on both national and international 
maps. Informant DP 10 mentions that “the NGO disbursement helps to better 
understand what NGOs are doing and to what sector they contribute.” This reflects the 
historical record of their performance, effectiveness and transparency as the 
International Aid Transparency Initiative proposes. 
 
6.3.3 NGO Coordination Processes and Engagement at Sector Level 
 
NGO representatives request and/or are invited to participate in the 15 TWGs where 
NGOs are active and provide assistance/services and/or contribute to the work of the 
TWGs (CDC/CRDB, 2006c, 2006f, 2006g). However, the number of NGO 
representatives in TWGs varies across the TWGs. Participation might be decided by the 
chairmen of the TWGs and facilitators and/or proposed  NGO representatives. For 
example, Medicam and CCC are the only NGOs to have representatives participating in 
the TWGs on health and partnership and harmonisation. The NGOF has representation 
in the TWGs on public financial management, forestry and environment, land, and 
planning and poverty reduction. However, there are five NGO representatives appointed 
by the NEP in the TWG on education and two NGO representatives
80
 in the TWG on 
planning and poverty reduction.  
 
The request of NGO representatives to become members of the TWG on legal and 
judicial reform was rejected by the council of legal and judicial reform and the council 
of ministers. There is no NGO representative in other three TWGs such as Infrastructure 
and Regional Integration, Public Administration Reform and Private Sector 
Development. For example informant CSO 02 argues that:  
                                            
80
  The two NGO representatives are the NGOF and Cambodian Development Research Institute.  
 120 
Box 6.1: NGO Representatives in 15  
Out of 19 TWGs 
 
1. Agriculture and Water 
11. Partnership & 
Harmonisation  
2. Education  
12. Planning & Poverty 
Reduction  
3. Fisheries  
13. Public Financial 
Management  
4. Forestry and 
Environment  
14. Rural Water Supply, 
Sanitation and 
Hygiene  
5. Food Security and 
Nutrition  
15. Decentralization & 
De-concentration  
6. Gender  
16. Legal and Judicial 
Reform  
7. Health  
17. Infrastructure and 
Regional Integration  
8. Mine Action 
18. Private Sector  
Development  
9. HIV/AIDS 
19. Public Administration 
Reform  
10. Land        
 
 
 “some exclusions come from NGOs themselves and some come from the government. 
Sometimes, there is no NGO working in the sector. Therefore, the NGO 
representatives‟ ability and capability to participate in the forums remain limited. 
Moreover, the capacity of NGO representatives is still low and they have limited 
experience in the process and staff capacity; so it is difficult to participate….and 
some NGOs have no experience at all in the aid coordination process with the 
government and donors.” 
 
NGO representatives/NGOs share a wide 
range of information among the stakeholders 
about the status of the government reforms 
by sector, donors‟ support of the reforms, 
progress reports and evaluation. For example, 
Medicam and NEP issue monthly newsletters 
reporting on the progress of the government 
and NGO activities in both health and 
education sectors. This directs and helps the 
independent operation of NGOs. 
 
Conversely, making the 19 TWGs function effectively and efficiently is a challenge 
because government officials, particularly CRDB staff, have limited capacity, skills, 
knowledge and experience to support the processes. Indeed, the sector ministries‟ staff 
are not aware of the clear objectives of TWGs and need support and guidance from the 
CDC/CRDB. According to Cox (2006) and some informants, a third of the 19 TWGs 
have functioned well, another third have started making progress, but the rest have gone 
off track and not been able to develop their respective TWG action plans or activities.  
 
According to informants‟ responses, NGO representatives tend to have a strong 
engagement and make a constructive contribution to TWGs such as health, education, 
HIV/AIDS, fisheries, gender, decentralisation and deconcentration, rural water supply, 
sanitation and hygiene and mine action. Some NGO representatives discuss among their 
groups in the sector what they can contribute and provide comments before attending 
the TWG meetings. For example, informant DP 10 states that: 
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“there is an NGO representative participating in the TWG on mine action, and 
before the TWG meeting the NGOs meet together to discuss and see what they can 
contribute. There is a good level of preparation from the NGO side.” 
 
The strong engagement of the NGO representatives is apparent where the TWGs  
function well. However, problems for NGO representatives in other TWGs that have 
limited capacity will be discussed in the next section. Compared with the policy level, 
the NGO voice generally tends to be apparent at the sector level. For example the AE 
report reveals that: 
 
“A number of TWGs acknowledge the positive role of civil society, especially when 
related to socio-economic issues (rural water, HIV/AIDS). Many other TWGs, and 
most development partners, see a more high-profile role for civil society, primarily in 
its capacity as sector experts and as representatives of wider interests (CDC/CRDB, 
2008d, p.22).” 
 
In summary, the combination of NGO involvement at both the policy and sector levels 
marks a healthy attitude and paves a constructive path towards development and aid 
effectiveness with the Cambodian government. 
 
6.3.4 The NGO Coordination Challenges in the Aid Mechanisms 
 
NGO representatives in the aid coordination processes have also encountered a number 
of challenges in the three main forums. These challenges are the unclear position of the 
NGO representatives, limited space for policy dialogue, limited engagement capacity of 
the NGO representatives and insufficient motivation and support from the RGC and 
DPs. 
 
a) Position of NGO Representatives  
 
There is controversy over the roles of NGO representatives in the CDCF and GDCC. 
Some informants said NGO representatives are not equal partners and just observers at 
both CDCF and GDCC meetings because there is no single collective voice from the 
NGO community. On the other hand, the government is not interested in making more 
space for them to have dialogue while the CDCF and GDCC‟s agenda items are very 
 122 
formal and political, well organised and restricted as Bird and Caravani (2009) stress. 
The government controls the processes as a means to gain full ownership and leadership. 
For example, informant DP 11 stressed that “The government does not like being told 
what to do and being criticised and it makes the meeting really awful. This is the 
approach that donors take.” Some informants see the roles of NGO representatives as 
on the side of the donors. However, a number of government officials in this study see 
their roles as stakeholders because they contribute by presenting joint NGO statements 
in the CDCF and circulating joint NGO Position Papers at both the CDCF and GDCC 
meetings.  
 
At the TWG level, the roles of NGO representatives vary based on the status and 
functional efficiency of the TWGs. Again, their roles remain uncertain and blurred 
among NGO representatives and the sector ministries and lead donor facilitators in each 
TWG. Their roles as stakeholders become clear when they actively engage, 
substantially contribute and build strong partnerships with the sector ministries. For 
example, informant DP 08 claims that “there seems to be more progress where  NGOs 
can contribute with DANIDA81 to pool funds into the common basket.” However, they 
are less active or even inactive in some TWGs and their working relationships with the 
sector ministries are often poor and/or confrontational. Informant DP 11 argues that: 
 
“They need to find carefully what their role is when they have the opportunity. There 
is an important role for the TWG on Public Financial Reform, Public Administration 
Reform, and Legal and Judicial Reform. And I don‟t think they play their roles more 
effectively in the TWGs. I also think maybe there is the opportunity to engage with 
civil society later.”  
 
NGO representatives need to be clear themselves whether they are observers and/or 
stakeholders in the aid coordination processes (informant GOV 02). Informant CSO 01 
mentions that “we are just the observers and we are not the equal partners…in the CG 
processes we were equal partners.” Other NGO informants have the same views 
because they think they have an opportunity to take part in the processes but the 
environment does not allow them to speak out, particularly in the GDCC and some 
TWG meetings. Conversely, informant CSO 05 suggests that “good NGOs should be 
                                            
81DANIDA is Danish International Development Agency. 
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resources; they should be able to effectively communicate the views and needs of the 
disadvantaged in communities.” 
 
In summary, the core problems are caused by the lack of clarity of NGO roles and 
responsibilities in the aid management framework and the absence of  real and genuine 
dialogue among NGOs, the government and donors on the roles and positions of NGO 
representatives in the three main forums. This conflicts with the AAA approach that 
clearly identifies CSOs/NGOs as central players and development actors. Thus, 
reinforcing the aid management framework and conducting genuine Government-NGO 
dialogue is necessary. NGO representatives have not widely discussed with their groups 
their roles in those processes and they do not have a clear coordination goal or systems 
in different TWGs as the government and donors have (this is discussed in the next 
section). 
 
b) Limited Space for Policy Dialogue 
 
 Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF) 
 
The NGO space for policy dialogue remains limited according to the common views of 
donor and NGO informants in this study. This situation is similar to other countries in 
Asia and Africa claimed by Mundy et al. (2008), Alemu (2009), Bird and Caravani 
(2009) and Mwega (2009). There are a number of reasons. The CDCF process that is at 
the highest level of policy dialogue is well structured and organised by the government, 
emphasising the dialogue and affairs between the government and donors but not NGOs. 
The dialogue covers reviewing development progress made during the year including 
Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMIs) and the NSDP and CMDGs implementation; 
prioritising and endorsing new priorities and the Action Plan H-A-R and the multi-year 
indicative financial framework (aid pledge) (CDC/CRDB, 2006f). Another reason for 
limited NGO involvement is that NGO representatives were not signatories of the 
Cambodian Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. They have not been involved in the 
Action Plan H-A-R. Moreover, in the CDCF meeting NGOs cannot provide the multi-
year indicative financial framework in three year terms as donors do. Characteristically, 
they often seek annual funding from donors and there are no sustainable basket funds 
for them, leading to tough funding competition in the entire NGO sector. Both the 
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government and donors actually behave in a very diplomatic way. Everyone tries to 
make the situation more relaxing and comfortable (informant DP 05). The CDCF is 
political and might be associated with international relations, not only aid. Indeed, the 
government wants to look good for donors and donors express positive views on the 
development and progress. However, the NGO inputs stated in the NGO joint statement 
and position paper have never been discussed.. Sometimes NGO representatives see 
their views and inputs as accepted at the meeting but rarely integrated in the national 
policy documents (Informant CSO 02). There is no feedback from the government. The 
NGO representatives only have a very limited time to speak within the two day meeting 
as the agenda items are full of discussion issues raised by the RGC and DPs. 
 
 Government-Donor Coordination Committee Meeting (GDCC) 
 
The GDCC is currently held twice a year, aiming to discuss development issues and 
priorities including the NSDP and CMDGs, and follow up JMIs and promote the 
implementation of the Paris Declaration. The NGO space and participation are 
characteristically shortened although the joint NGO statement and position paper are 
circulated. The issues result from the nature and characteristics of the process, NGO 
representatives, the government and donors. The GDCC has been seen as „a hostile 
forum‟ with the donors „ganging up‟ against the government (Informant DP 11). The 
seating allocated to NGOs has limited their actual participation at the GDCC (Informant 
DP 10) and the GDCC format primarily focuses on the affairs between donors and the 
government. NGO representatives have not had space to discuss issues that are more 
relevant to them. They become lost or confused. Therefore, they could not determine 
what action should be undertaken for constructive contribution. 
  
A number of NGO informants accept that their capacity to have strong advocacy among 
the NGO community is still weak and NCBs need to have strong inputs from their 
members. For example, “the aid effectiveness agenda is too complicated and too 
isolated from NGO sector” (informant CSO 01). Furthermore, informant DP 11 claims 
that “I would describe the initial contribution of NGOs in the GDCC to be very 
limited… I would say they make no progress.” On the other hand, informant GOV 01 
argues that “NGOs don‟t need to argue with the government. The government often 
pays attention to the NGO‟s statement. Indeed, the NGO‟s recommendations are quite 
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common and similar to the government commitments.” Nevertheless, based on my 
observation in the GDCC meeting in April, 2009, NGO representatives have almost no 
space to express their concerns on the agenda and issues raised by the government and 
donors. Thus, NGO representatives have not spoken up (Field research observation and 
Informant DP 03).  
 
 Joint Government-Donor Technical Working Group Meeting (TWG) 
 
The NGO engagement in the TWGs varies due to the varying capacities of some sector 
ministries, a lack of donor support and limited capacity of the NGO representatives in 
some TWGs such as land, partnership and harmonisation, food security and nutrition, 
agriculture and water, decentralisation and deconcentration and forestry and 
environment.  
 
The GDCC and TWG guidelines set by the government did not provide precise details 
about the roles and responsibilities of NGO representatives in the TWGs. The 
leadership of some TWGs has been relatively weak, making TWGs weak and/or 
dysfunctional. Sometimes the government limits their space and they can only act as 
observers (informant DP 01). In another case, the government has no willingness to 
listen to what NGO representatives say (Informant DP 06). Similarly, informant CSO 
05 claims that: 
 
“we would like to make a strong contribution on the substance on the finding around 
planning for the poverty reduction and planning and the discussion between the 
donors and the government in the TWG […] So our participation has been very 
limited because they are not interested in the process. We think it should be a good 
process. What we used to do is to feed our valuable policy research findings into the 
discussion of poverty reduction strategy and planning and it is very limited and I am 
so frustrated about it.”   
 
In the TWG framework, the communication and information sharing differ based on the 
leadership of the sector ministries. As mentioned above, some TWGs are better 
functioning than others. Some donors and NGO informants claim that information 
sharing in the TWGs is a key problem. I Informant CSO 05 stresses that “often the 
quality of documents is poor and they are received very late, so it‟s hard to consult with 
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our constituencies, with each other and/or with others in the TWG. I think there should 
be information disclosure beforehand.” This issue creates an unfriendly environment 
for NGO representatives to make significant contributions due to lack of timely 
information.  
 
A number of NGO representatives in some TWGs have not understood their 
responsibilities at the technical level because the TWGs are the forums for designing, 
planning, formulating sector strategies and policies, budgeting, implementing and 
evaluating the development projects/programmes by sector. Sometimes, “doing 
advocacy work is a challenge and difficult with the government and if NGO 
representatives are very aggressive with the government it becomes confrontational” 
(informant CSO 02). In terms of the limited space for policy dialogue, the controversial 
issue that has been often raised by the donors, government and NGOs is using donors as 
mediators for policy change influenced by NGOs. Some donor and NGO informants 
agree with this concept and channel, as informant CSO 07 argues that “it is a peaceful 
advocacy.” Some others view it as a bad and ineffective approach. Nevertheless, using 
donors as „puppets‟ for policy influencing creates „a bad relationship‟ between NGOs 
and the government (informant DP 11).  
 
c) Limited Capacity of NGO Representatives 
 
Many informants agree and share the same view as AGCS (2007a), Mundy et al (2008) 
and Bird and Caravani (2009), that most NGO representatives/NGOs have limited 
capacity to participate in the aid processes particularly the TWGs. Specifically, NGO 
representatives in some TWGs have not substantially contributed to the dialogue and 
meetings (Informant DP 01). In some cases, NGO representatives hesitate to speak up 
due to being afraid of difficulties, sensitivity, danger and destruction in the working 
relationship with the government (informant DP 03).  
 
Most informants also argue that many NGOs, particularly LNGOs, are unaware of 
Cambodian aid effectiveness and the Paris Declaration. Clearly, NGO representatives 
have not had capable staff who are knowledgeable in aid effectiveness and processes as 
noted in section 5.4.2. For example, informant DP 11 argues that “some NGOs send 
someone very junior who has low capacity to participate…because we see some young 
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NGO officers come in…and they have nothing to say…it is very serious and not good 
for the future when they represent poorly and the government thinks it is pathetic.” 
Many of them do not have a macro approach at the sector level (informant DP 01). 
Some informants are also concerned about the low level of understanding of NGO 
representatives in the way the government works. Thus, NGOs/NGO representatives are 
not diplomatic enough to build trust and work with the government in a better way 
(informant DP 10). Another example is given by informant GOV 04: “if NGOs want to 
add something in the policy documents then they need to make communication with or 
contact with the sector ministries or institutions they work with.” Some NGO 
informants do not know even the process whereby NCBs and NGO alliances work 
together to represent the NGO community in the new aid coordination mechanisms. 
This is a weakness of NCBs, that they do not inform the NGO community about their 
work. 
 
According to provincial NGO seminar observation and informants, many LNGOs in 
provinces have not been involved with the aid coordination processes and they have no 
knowledge about the aid effectiveness agenda. Specifically, in the provincial NGO 
seminar the NCB staff only presented the original concept of the Paris Declaration but 
not the Cambodian Declaration. Their explanation was very brief and unclear and the 
LNGO participants were not familiar with the concept. The opportunity for the 
provincial NGOs/NGO alliances to participate might be not available although there is a 
sub-TWG structure in some sectors at provincial level. The provincial sector 
departments might not clearly know the role of NGO alliances. Everything is very new 
and complicated for everyone to handle. However, everyone still has the opportunity to 
explore and share views and information for fruitful development.  
 
There is an absence of a strong systematic NGO coordination process within the aid 
coordination mechanisms as the government (the CDC/CRDB) and donors have (the 
World Bank Cambodia Office). NGO representatives have not had a proper secretariat 
set up to coordinate all information from NGO representatives participating in different 
TWGs. Currently, the information and coordination work among NGO representatives 
at the national level is loose. For example, informant CSO 02 mentions that “I am not 
sure whether NGO representatives share the information with others…for NEP…it is 
only necessary that we disclose the information to our members and we post it on the 
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website.” Due to the weak systematic NGO coordination processes, the dialogue among 
the NGOs and NCBs and provincial NAs has not been constantly conducted as 
mentioned in section 5.6. They have worked on the ad-hoc approach one and three 
months before the CDCF and GDCC, respectively, when they need to make a case and 
participate in the CDCF and GDCC meetings. 
 
d) Insufficient Motivation and Support from the Government and Donors 
 
Some informants agree that the government, particularly the CDC/CRDB, and donors 
have failed to take seriously enough the aid coordination processes to build the capacity 
of civil society organisations/ NGOs. The government and donors have not made any 
progress to educate CSOs/NGOs about Cambodian aid effectiveness and the Paris 
Declaration. It is also the government‟s job to expand the NGO space in the aid 
processes. For example, clarifying roles and responsibilities of the NGO representatives 
in the three key forums is  vital. This includes sharing information, engaging with 
dialogue and building trust between the government and NGOs. For example, informant 
GOV 02 mentions that “at the national level the CDC/CRDB has not distributed the 
Cambodian Declaration on Aid Effectiveness signed by 14 donors and the government 
to NGO community.” The government aid coordination and the capacity of the 
CDC/CRDB and sector ministries remains limited and fragile and staff‟s capacity in 
those institutions is limited; particularly the CDC/CRDB, which is understaffed 
(CDC/CRDB, 2007d, 2008f).  
 
As Mundy et al. (2008), Wood and Valot (2009), Bird and Caravani (2009), and 
Schmidjell et al. (2009) claim, many informants agreed that the development partners 
have not done very well in financing NGO representatives to enhance  coordination 
work, particularly the provincial NGO alliances. But they have rather funded NGOs to 
do a particular job as mentioned in section 5.2.2. Characteristically, the NGO 
representatives‟ roles are not to implement PBAs or SWAps as they are small 
institutions with limited staff and resources (informant DP 01). 
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6.4  Conclusion 
 
Generally, NGOs played significant roles as donors in reconstruction and rehabilitation 
of Cambodia in the early 1990s due to poor government aid coordination mechanisms. 
NGO representatives were invited to participate in a range of meetings from ICORC to 
CG and other sector working groups on the side of donors because NGOs were seen as 
donors. Their roles were as open and equal as donors‟. Since then aid coordination 
structures have been strengthened under government leadership, moving closer to global 
concepts such as the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action. Many informants 
report that some INGOs and big LNGOs have a few components of the Paris 
Declaration such as alignment, harmonisation, mutual accountability and managing for 
results in their agendas and strategies.  
 
NGO representatives proposed five key roles in the last CDCF meeting. Indeed, many 
informants applaud the convincing and constructive preparation and contribution of 
NGO representatives in the GDCC and CDCF; they have produced well researched and 
evidence-based documents. However, NGO representatives in the aid coordination 
processes have also encountered a number of challenges in the three main forums. 
These challenges are the unclear position of NGO representatives, limited space for 
policy dialogue, limited capacity of NGO representatives and insufficient motivation 
and support from the government and donors. The NGO roles and space for policy 
dialogue have become narrowed although a number of NGO representatives have 
participated in the CDCF, GDCC and 15 TWGs. However, the NGO voice tends to be 
more apparent at the sector than policy level. NGO representatives and NGOs are not 
well educated and/or aware of the Cambodian aid effectiveness agenda and mechanisms. 
The core problems are caused by unclear stated roles and responsibilities of NGO 
representatives in the aid management framework and a lack of real or genuine dialogue 
among NGOs, the government and donors on the roles and positions of NGO 
representatives in the three main forums. Also, NGO representatives have not widely 
discussed with their groups their roles in those processes and they do not have a clear 
coordination in the different TWGs as the government and donors have. 
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Chapter VII: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
This thesis has examined how NGO coordination among national and provincial NGOs 
is contributing to development, poverty reduction and aid effectiveness in Cambodia. 
This chapter provides summary points about how NGO coordination efforts have 
developed and the strengths and weaknesses of current approaches. It also highlights 
how NGOs/NGO representatives participate in aid architectures such as the CDCF, 
GDCC and TWGs. It concludes with recommendations for policymakers to improve the 
country‟s aid effectiveness. 
 
7.2  NGO Coordination Processes: Outcomes and Challenges 
 
7.2.1  Internal NGO Coordination Outcomes 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, NGOs are one of the key development agents, 
contributing to rehabilitating and building the nation and society with the Cambodian 
government and helping the poor since the collapse of the Khmer Rouge. Early on 
NGOs, particularly the Consortium for Cambodia, ended the political deadlock with the 
socialist government and provided humanitarian relief to the starving population in 
certain accessible areas. In the early 1990s Cambodia was liberalised and administered 
by UNTAC to build peace, security and social, economic and political stability through 
formalisation of the first free and fair national election. Since then, NGOs have 
dramatically increased in number to financially and technically reconstruct the fragile 
Cambodian state and spread ideas of democratisation, human rights and good 
governance nationwide. NGOs have operated in diverse sectors in two cities and 22 
provinces to pursue the CMDGs and inclusive development. Specifically, NGOs have 
increased their disbursement in recent years, magnifying their strong contribution to 
Cambodian development and the aid system. One of key findings is that many donors 
have continually financed NGOs, reflecting their important roles in providing large 
public services and advocacy and building strong civil society and democratisation. 
This is contradictory to what NGOs‟ fear about losing their funds in terms of the Paris 
Declaration agenda (Lister and Nyamugasira, 2003; Howell et al., 2008). Instead NGOs 
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in Cambodia are heavily donor-driven as government budget is unavailable and public 
donations and charities are very limited. However it is argued that channelling official 
assistance through NGOs whose projects are small and medium-sized in Cambodia may 
lead to aid effectiveness challenges in term of alignment, ownership, accountability and 
a higher level of duplication and fragmentation, particularly in the health and education 
sectors. Thus, there have been calls from government, donors, NGOs and academics for 
NGOs to strengthen their coordination and effectiveness. 
 
NGO coordination efforts have become qualitatively and quantitatively apparent despite 
many NGOs in Cambodia being in their infancy. NGO coordination has been organised 
through national NGO coordination bodies (NCBs) like the CCC and NGOF and sector 
NCBs such as Medicam, NEP, CHRAC and others. The NCBs seem to follow the 
standards suggested by Bennett (1994, 2000) although they have distinctive roles and 
mandates accompanied by a reborn civil society and the influx of aid into Cambodia. 
Field research informants claim that NGO coordination in the Cambodian context aims 
to 1) share information between national and community levels; 2) build a strong NGO 
collective voice and representation; 3) minimise project replication and waste; 4) 
strengthen NGO professionalism and institutional effectiveness through NGO self-
regulation and capacity building; 5) influence government and donor strategies and 
policies; 6) participate in country aid coordination processes and 7) identify NGO 
partners for the government, donors and INGOs. Thus, their overarching role is to 
continually enhance and improve civil society organisations through meetings and 
information sharing. 
 
The NCBs are situated in Phnom Penh and work in partnership with the government, 
donors and other powerful INGOs and LNGOs. They are formal organisations, 
registered at the MOI and/or MFAIC and other sector ministries. They have formal 
organisational structure, secretariat, permanent staff, clear mission, vision and 
objectives, five year strategic plan and/or by-laws, good governance systems, large 
members, membership fees and strong fund-raising capacity. Most NCBs have access to 
good communication systems and modern office facilities. The executive directors and 
staff of the NCBs have more knowledge on development, management, operational and 
administrative work than the provincial NGO alliances (NAs), with most holding 
bachelor‟s degrees. Thus, national NGO coordination is apparent. Conversely, the NAs 
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that are informal organisations without legal registration have no possibilities to set up 
as effective NAs with secretariats. They have limited staff with varying levels of 
competence, no membership fees and insufficient or no financial and technical support 
from donors. The provincial NGOs have limited awareness of NGO coordination and 
poor operational and management knowledge, leading to poor provincial NGO 
coordination. 
 
7.2.2  NGO Coordination Constraints 
 
Based on a desk review, narrative analysis and discussion in the previous chapters, it 
can be concluded that the internal NGO coordination efforts have sought positive 
change. The NCBs have achieved some degree of information sharing, collective action 
on some certain issues for influencing government policies and strategies at the national 
and sector levels, continual capacity building of NGO members, and implementation of 
NGO self-regulation and the increasing participation in the country‟s aid coordination 
mechanisms. NGO coordination is fairly well understood by NGOs based in the city, by 
donors and the Cambodian government. However, the NCBs have not made strong 
progress in some  issues such as developing a collective voice, NGO self-regulation and 
effectiveness and coordination of NGO projects. This lack of progress is caused by (i) 
cultural and political challenges (ii) institutional challenges to NGO coordination and 
(iii) poor NGO coordination between national and provincial levels.  
 
A. Cultural and Political Challenges 
 
Culture has had a strong impact on the evolution of NGO coordination in Cambodia. 
The cultural roadblocks to coordination efforts include a lack of trust, hesitation and 
fear of losing face, high bureaucracy with patron-client relationships and immature and 
weak NGOs and other institutions. For example, mistrust is a big problem in Cambodia 
due to the destruction of social unity and collective action during the time of the Khmer 
Rouge. This important cultural linkage has not been noted by Fowler (1992), Streamlau 
(1978), Bennett (1994, 2000), Robinson et al. (2000), Roberts et al. (2005) and Demars 
(2005). 
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The results of this study also found that an unfriendly political environment directly or 
indirectly distorts the NGO coordination efforts. The working relationship with the 
government and the NGOs has been considered to be steady in overall terms. However, 
the government seems to value development NGOs rather than advocacy and human 
rights NGOs. The lower level of freedom of expression, high corruption, weak legal and 
judicial systems, and poor capacity of some government ministries and institutions, 
limits the diverse advocacy efforts of NGOs aiming to bring about social justice, social 
accountability and to allow the voice of vulnerable and affected citizens to be heard. 
Some informants claim that both the government and NGOs, particularly advocacy and 
human rights NGOs, behave destructively. This leads to mistrust and a huge mutual 
accountability gap as there is no genuine dialogue regularly conducted between them.  
 
B. Institutional Challenges 
 
At the heart of NGO coordination issues are institutional challenges, mainly the limited 
capacity of the NGO sector, including the coordination bodies. The institutional 
challenges were analysed in the forms of the limited capacity of NCBs and NGOs and 
slow mobilisation problems. Thus, the NGO coordination efforts and NGO sector are 
relatively loose and weak although progress has been made since the 1990s. 
 
 Limited Capacity of NCBs and NGOs 
 
The limited capacity of NCBs includes weak institutional management and structure, 
limited financial resources, fragmentation, a weak collective voice, and slow 
implementation of the NGO Good Practice Project (NGO-GPP). Their challenges 
reflect the associated limited capacity of NGOs. 
 
Firstly, the NCB organisational structure and management are hierarchical and 
evaluations are rare. Most NCBs have limited capacity to work closely with and build 
capacity among LNGO members and non-members in provinces due to limited 
resources and a lack of provincial offices. Thus, NGO professionalism is deficient, 
particularly in provinces. The NCBs seem to be understaffed and have difficulty in 
attracting and retaining competent staff. In some cases their coordination and advocacy 
rely greatly on outside technical assistance such as external and volunteer advisors or 
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internees. Secondly, most of the NCBs‟ projects/activities are under-resourced, in both 
budget and skilled staff. Informants realise that many NGOs have similar or overlapping 
mandates and that competition for donor funding is very intense. Thirdly, the existing 
NGO coordination system cannot minimise project replications and fragmentation in the 
NGO sector; thus, their activities remain very fragmented, particularly in the health and 
education sectors. Consequently the impact of their projects/activities is reduced. 
Therefore, the approach of „avoiding replication‟ might exist only in theory rather than 
in practice due to the current local context. 
 
Fourthly, an NGO membership body that is strong depends on the active participation 
of members. However, some members of the NCBs are active and some are passive due 
to a limited capacity of good research-based policy officers. The NCBs have no 
authority to interfere in the internal work of any members. The NCBs should respect 
different interests and views of members on specific issues and recognise the diversity 
of members. There are different views between the development NGOs and human 
rights NGOs on the NGO law that is currently being discussed by the government. 
Thus, doing coordination work and mobilising the collective voice is a very challenging 
job. Finally, the progress of the NGO-GPP implemented by the CCC is very slow due to 
the nature of growing but immature NGOs, limited financial and human resources for 
implementation and a lack of awareness and understanding. Indeed, LNGOs have poor 
administrative and management knowledge which is a key requirement for improving  
coordination efforts.   
 
 Slow Expansion of NCBs’ Members 
 
In the last decade, the NCBs have slowly made progress in expanding their membership 
and their members‟ collective voice. This clearly reflects what Bennett (2000, p.171) 
claims: “everyone is for coordination, but no-one wishes to be coordinated, at least not 
just now;” but the precise details of the problems are not explicitly discussed. In the 
Cambodian context, about a quarter of the total NGOs (46% of total INGOs and 16% of 
total LNGOs) are members of NCBs at the national level. Hence, many NGOs in 
Cambodia are not members of an NCB and NCBs are not fully representative. 
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The shortage of membership is the result of a lack of awareness of NGO coordination, a 
lack of interest, time constraints and a scarcity of financial resources. Firstly, most 
government, donor and NGO informants in this study agreed that the awareness of 
NGO coordination is very limited; yet this awareness is something Robinson et al., 
(2000) suggest is vital. The awareness issue is caused by untrained NGO staff as 
development practitioners, different expectations of NGOs in becoming NCBs‟ 
members and seeking funding sources, and NGO concentration on self-interest rather 
than common interests. Secondly, a lack of interest to become members of NCBs is 
common issue among Cambodian NGOs. The key factors of the issue are competition, 
territoriality, duplications, confusion, voice, conflicting interests, concerns about 
autonomy and negative consequences, and the incredible demand of the Cambodian 
government and other Cambodian NGOs. Finally, as Stremlau (1987) and Bennett 
(2000) observe, doing and participating in coordination processes are resource- and 
time-consuming. The members need to pay annual membership fees and actively 
participate in the NCBs‟ monthly meeting. Only big and powerful INGOs and LNGOs 
are able to pay the membership fees, the rest struggle to compete for funding which 
comes with conditions and requirements attached, and they do not have budget for the 
fees. Specifically, LNGOs based in provinces cannot afford travelling costs to 
participate in the NCBs‟ meetings. Even if they can afford the cost, they might not be 
active members and devote their time for the meetings as they are tied up with 
accountabilities with donors, government and local authorities and communities.  
 
C. Poor Coordination between National and Provincial Levels 
 
A third significant constraint is the weakness of systematic NGO coordination processes 
between national and provincial levels. Stremlau (1978) suggests building a strong 
connection between different types of NCBs and other networks but does not clearly 
specify what measures should be taken. It is a common issue caused by limited 
resources for both the NCBs and NAs. Specifically, donors in Cambodia are not 
interested in providing funds for NGO coordination, particularly at the provincial level. 
The current partnership and coordination of the NCBs and NAs are weak and 
ineffective. Current NGO coordination process is often done only at the national level 
through forming specific meetings with powerful INGO and LNGO members of the 
NCBs. The process is characteristically more top down rather than participatory, and 
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also done on an ad-hoc approach between the national and provincial levels. LNGOs are 
not enthusiastic about building the coordination and partnership between national and 
community levels. This leads to ineffectiveness. 
 
7.3  NGO Coordination in the Aid Coordination Mechanisms 
 
Considering the objective of this study, NGO roles have evolved over the last two 
decades. Early on, NGOs (particularly INGOs) and NGO representatives acted as both 
executive agencies and donors, contributing to Cambodian reconstruction and 
development. Between 1991 and 2004, their space for political intervention was similar 
to that of donors. In the early 1990s NGOs (especially INGOs) were part of the problem 
in terms of late aid disbursement, poor harmonisation and little accountability among 
the Cambodian government, donors and INGOs. Since then, their strong progress has 
included increasing annual NGO aid disbursement to about $US 50 million and actively 
participating in the CG meetings and other sector/thematic working groups such as 
health and education. After restructuring the aid coordination mechanisms in late 2004, 
the country aid processes have been strengthened with the adoption within Cambodia of 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD).  
 
However, NGO representatives are not signatories nor even observers of the Cambodian 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Also, NGO representatives have had no involvement 
in the Action Plan H-A-R, covering 12 indicators and a number of activities with 
milestones and baselines. This seems to isolate NGO representatives. The Accra 
Agenda for Action (AAA) seeks an improvement of NGO coordination efforts within 
the government programmes, enhancement of NGO accountability and outcomes and 
acceleration of NGO information sharing with the government (OECD, 2008b). 
However, the AAA has not provided any specific aid engagement framework globally 
or nationally that would allow NGOs to fully participate in the processes. According to 
the aid effectiveness report (CDC/CRDB, 2008d), the implementation of the Action 
Plan H-A-R during the last three years has made little progress, endangering the aid 
processes and commitments made. The PD and AAA seem to have become highly 
ambitious with many desired actions but limited timeframes and resources against the 
actual plan. The aid processes are associated with mixed issues including politics of aid, 
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diplomatic procedures and trade-off relationships between individual donors and 
Cambodia.  
 
The Cambodian aid coordination mechanisms comprise the annual Cambodia 
Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF), the semi-annual Government-Donor 
Coordination Committee (GDCC), and the 19 quarterly Joint Technical Working 
Groups (TWGs). The processes have paradoxically become complex and cumbersome 
with new approaches and a high demand of knowledge and flexibility. According to the 
discussion and narrative analysis, NGO representatives have fairly engaged in the 
processes such as CDCF, GDCC and 15 out of 19 TWGs. Many informants report that 
some INGOs and big LNGOs have a few components of the Cambodia declaration such 
as alignment, harmonisation, mutual accountability and managing for results in their 
agendas and strategies. NGO representatives made strong commitments and 
engagements in the forums through claiming five key roles in the processes in the last 
CDCF meeting in 2008. The key roles are (i) meaningful engagement in inclusive 
national plan, strategy and policy formulation; (ii) monitoring of national plan, strategy 
and policy implementation; (iii) continual provision of complementary social services to 
the poor; (iv) essential invention and enhancement of evidence-based policy influencing 
and (v) participation and implementation of the country aid effectiveness agenda. 
Indeed, many informants applaud the convincing and constructive preparation and 
contribution of NGO representatives in the CDCF and GDCC, acknowledging that they 
have produced well researched and evidence-based documents. The NGO voice 
generally tends to be more apparent at the sector level than policy level. NGO 
involvement both at the policy and sector levels marks healthy attitudes and paves 
constructive paths towards development and aid effectiveness with the Cambodian 
government. 
 
Alongside their apparent successes, NGO representatives have also encountered a 
number of challenges in the three main forums. These challenges are the unclear 
position of NGO representatives, limited space for policy dialogue, limited capacity of 
NGO representatives and insufficient motivation and support from the RGC and DPs. 
Firstly, the NGO representatives‟ positions are controversial. Some informants believe 
sometimes they should be stakeholders, sometimes observers and others as resources. 
The core problems are caused by unclear roles and responsibilities of NGO 
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representatives in the aid management framework and a lack of real or genuine dialogue 
among NGOs, the government and donors on the roles and positions of NGO 
representatives in the three forums. NGO representatives have not widely discussed 
with their groups their roles in those processes and they do not have clear coordination 
in the different TWGs as the government and donors have. 
 
Secondly, the NGO roles and space for policy dialogue have become narrowed although 
a number of NGO representatives have participated in the CDCF, GDCC and TWGs. 
This situation is similar to other countries in Asia and Africa claimed by Mundy et al. 
(2008), Alemu (2009), Bird and Caravani (2009) and Mwega (2009). In the CDCF and 
GDCC, their inputs have never been discussed on the table. In the CDCF, they have 
limited time to speak as the agenda items are full of discussion issues raised by the 
government and donors while in the GDCC there is no space for them to raise issues. 
 
Thirdly, many informants agree and share the same view as AGCS (2007a), Mundy et 
al (2008) and Bird and Caravani (2009), that most NGO representatives/NGOs have 
limited capacity to participate in the aid processes particularly the TWGs. Sometimes, 
they have not understood the political arts and ways governments work and neither have 
the government officials. The awareness of the Cambodian aid effectiveness agenda and 
mechanisms is very low among NGOs, and the government and donors have failed to 
spread out the country aid effectiveness and processes to the NGO community. Finally, 
the development partners have not done very well in financing NGO representatives to 
enhance the coordination work, particularly the provincial NGO alliances. 
 
The common issues in the new aid structures are more about processes than seeking 
constructive outcomes. There are so many mechanisms and working groups, meetings, 
and demands on the government officials, donors and NGOs. Every one ends up being 
very superficial and makes little progress. The government, donors and some powerful 
NGOs often spend money on very expensive international consultants for the detailed 
work (informant CSO 05). Thus, NGO representatives often struggle to keep up or 
make a high quality contribution.  
 
It is too early to conclude that the NGO coordination in aid coordination processes has 
made a significant contribution to improving the country aid effectiveness as the 
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CDC/CRDB‟s report (2008d, p.22) reveals that “The sustained effort at establishing 
policy frameworks and creating an aid architecture comprising TWGs, the GDCC and 
the CDCF has not yet produced the anticipated results in terms of effective aid delivery 
and improved development impact.” This analysis shows that the development partners 
have failed to recognise the importance of NGO coordination or to support and build the 
capacity of NCBs and NAs, particularly in the aid effectiveness agenda. The 
commitments in both the Paris and Accra documents must be translated into action and 
implemented within the local context of aid mechanisms with sufficient resources and 
time to allow the  achievement of  a high aid impact on development.  
 
7.4  The Opportunity for NGO Coordination Improvement 
 
There are many challenges to NGO coordination. However, these obstacles can be 
partly overcome through the following recommendations: 
 
1. Strengthen systematic NGO coordination processes between national and 
provincial levels. A regular participatory NGO meeting at both the national and 
provincial levels should be conducted at least twice a year. Some NCBs such as the 
CCC, NGOF and NEP should mobilise resources and/or establish branch offices in 
key provinces that have large number of NGOs to support the activities. The 
success of a Tanzanian NCB reveals strong national and local NGO coordination 
through its decentralised offices (Mundy et al., 2008). Thus, the awareness of  
NGO coordination can be spread out across provinces and cities and the 
membership mobilisation can increase. Moreover, the implementation of NGO-
GPP can also be accelerated. Therefore, the qualitative and quantitative 
information exchange and experience can be regularly conducted and the capacity 
building of LNGOs can be gradually upgraded. Thereby, a strong NGO collective 
voice can be achieved. The systematic NGO coordination processes can also be 
used as a tool to conduct monitoring and evaluation of NGO impacts on society to 
enhance their service deliveries and policy advocacy at all levels. 
 
2. Establish systematic coordination among NGO representatives in the CDCF, 
GDCC and 15 TWGs. NGO representatives, particularly in 15 TWGs, need to set 
up one secretariat to network among themselves to share information and 
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experiences of the way they work with the sector ministries and donors. Thus, 
NGO representatives can understand their respective roles to increase political 
space in the different forums through participatory discussion. Also, they can 
understand the arts of political and diplomatic affairs between the government 
ministries and donors; thereby, they can enhance their constructive and meaningful 
engagement in the aid coordination processes. 
 
3. Continually build the capacity of NCBs, NAs and NGOs. NCBs need to play 
more important roles in continually upgrading their own organisations, NAs and 
LNGOs, because capacity building is a long process and it needs to be done over 
time, particularly that related to NGO self-regulation, development and aid 
effectiveness through the enhancing NGO coordination processes. Diversifying the 
NCBs‟ incomes is necessary to support these activities. Approaching different 
donors about the importance of NGO coordination is essential. Consequently, 
NGO professionalism can be gradually developed to bolster NGO image at local, 
national and international levels. Thereby, the impacts of NGO projects/activities 
can be maximised. 
 
4. Seek a regular genuine dialogue between government and NGOs. The NGO 
community, particularly the NCBs, should seek the opportunity and approach the 
government to have a regular genuine dialogue on certain issues such as NGO law, 
freedom of expression and their roles and political space in the three key forums. 
This will pave the way for constructive development and partnership for 
Cambodia. Specifically, NGO representatives need to distinguish and clearly 
understand that they could provide comments and recommendations at both policy 
and technical levels. Some informants suggest that the dialogue might find or 
change the format of the meetings and aid coordination framework where NGOs 
can participate and make the process more effective. The framework should 
contain the specific roles and responsibilities of NGO representatives at the CDCF, 
GDCC and TWGs, based on decisions made by the government and NGOs in the 
dialogue. 
 
5. Gain government’s political will and financial and technical support from 
donors. The government‟s aid coordination mechanisms are required to be 
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strengthened in relation to NGO coordination processes. The government and line 
ministries, particularly the CDC/CRDB, should open more space for NGOs/NGO 
representatives to engage in the forums. Furthermore, the government and donors 
need to build the NGOs‟ capacity about the aid coordination mechanisms and 
country aid effectiveness. It is vital that donors focus their attention and priority to 
technically and financially improve the NGO coordination in Cambodia. 
 
7.4  Future Research 
 
As noted, NGO research is largely conducted by case studies (Bebbington, 2004). 
Research has only been conducted in the field of NGO coordination during the 
humanitarian emergencies and/or aftermaths of wars such as in Cambodia, Ethiopia and 
Afghanistan and natural disasters such as in Aceh caused by the tsunami in December 
2004. However, NGO coordination in the normal non-war context and inter-agency 
coordination, particularly the aid coordination processes at the global, country and 
sector levels have so far received little attention from academics (Bebbington, 2004; 
Lewis, 2006a). NGO coordination is the key instrument in aiding effective advocacy 
work at the global, regional, country and sector levels, especially in the new aid 
structures such as the Paris Declaration on AE and AAA. The lessons learnt about NGO 
coordination and NGO involvements at policy and technical levels in aid architectures 
in different countries are necessary to improve international development cooperation. 
Thus, the NGO coordination and inter-agency coordination at the country and sector 
levels should be further scrutinised by academics, bearing in mind NGOs‟ increasing 
roles, importance and tensions in the new aid structures. 
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Appendix I: The International NGOs Coordination Bodies (NCBs)  and INGOs 
Networks 
 
1. The US-based Interaction or InterAction: The US-based Interaction or 
InterAction, founded in 1984, is the largest coalition of U.S.-based international 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) focused on the world‟s poor and most 
vulnerable people. InterAction‟s 175 members work in every developing 
country. Members meet people halfway in expanding opportunities and 
supporting gender equality in education, health care, agriculture, small business, 
and other areas.  The U.S. public shows its support for this work through 
contributions to InterAction members totalling around $6 billion annually 
(http://www.interaction.org, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).  
 
2. The Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies (VOICE), 
established in 2001, is a network representing 85 European non governmental 
organisations (NGOs) active in humanitarian aid worldwide. Unlike its 
members, VOICE is not operational. It is seeking to involve its members in 
information, training, advocacy and lobbying. VOICE is the main NGO 
interlocutor with the European Union on emergency aid, relief, rehabilitation 
and disaster preparedness. 91% of VOICE members have a framework 
partnership agreement with EC DG Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). 
(http://www.ngovoice.org, retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
 
3. The European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development (CONCORD), 
founded in 2003, is the European confederation representing, through its 40 
members, over 1800 European NGOs for relief and international development. 
The main objective of the Confederation is to enhance the impact of European 
development NGOs vis-à-vis the European Institutions by combining expertise 
and accountability. (http://www.concordeurope.org, retrieved date 27 July, 
2009). 
 
4. The New Zealand Council for International Development (CID), founded in 
1985, works to achieve effective high quality international development 
programmes which focus on the alleviation and eradication of poverty. It works 
to enhance the capacity and participation of member agencies, the NZ 
Government and other sectors of the NZ community. The CID has 90 members 
that include most of New Zealand's major non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) that work in aid and development (www.cid.org.nz, retrieved date 28 
July, 2009). 
 
5. The Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), was formed in 
1965 to 'create a vehicle to enable government to relate to the NGO community 
more easily'. ACFID is an independent national association of Australian NGOs 
working in the field of international aid and development. Their NGO members 
are more than 70 in 2008 (http://www.acfid.asn.au, retrieved date 28 July, 2009). 
 
6. The Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC) established in 
1968, seeks to end global poverty, and to promote social justice and human 
dignity for all. It comprises about 100 Canadian voluntary sector organisations 
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working to end global poverty. (http://www.ccic.ca/e/home/index.shtml, 
retrieved date 28 July, 2009). 
 
7. BOND (British Overseas NGOs for Development), founded in 1993, is the UK 
membership body for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in 
international development. Established in 1993, BOND now has over 340 
member organisations, from large organisations with a worldwide presence to 
smaller, more specialist organisations working in specific regions or with 
specific groups of people. (http://www.bond.org.uk/index.php, retrieved date 27 
July, 2009). 
 
8. EUROPARC, founded in 1973, is now recognised around the world as a 
professional organisation for European protected areas. EUROPARC has 500 
member organisations in 39 European countries. Together they are responsible 
for the management of more than 400 protected areas across the continent. 
EUROPARC provides them with a forum to share professional experience, 
collaborate on technical projects and progress common aims 
(http://www.europarc.org, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).  
 
9. EURONGOs, founded in 1996, is a European network of non-governmental 
organisations that cooperate in the field of sexual and reproductive health and 
rights, population and development. EURONGOs currently has 31 full members 
in 19 EU member states and seven associated members from Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand (http://www.eurongos.org, retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
 
10. AIDS Action Europe (AAE), created in 2004, is a partnership of more than 230 
AIDS-related non-governmental organisations from 44 European and Central 
Asian countries. Its mission is to unite civil society to work towards a more 
effective response to the HIV epidemic in Europe. AAE strives for better 
protection of human rights and universal access to prevention, treatment, care 
and support. AAE works towards a reduction of health inequalities in Europe 
focusing on key vulnerable populations in Central and Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia. (http://www.aidsactioneurope.org, retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
 
11. CCFD is an association comprising 28 movements and services of the Catholic 
Church. It has a permanent staff of 170 based in Paris and in various regions of 
France who work to fulfill CCFD objectives. CCFD was founded in 1961 by 
movements and services of the Church in order to mobilise Christians in the 
fight against hunger. CCFD also boasts a network of 15,000 volunteers spread 
across 99 diocesan committees and 1500 local teams. 
(http://www.ccfd.asso.fr/ewb_pages/, retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
 
12. EURODAD (European Network on Debt and Development), founded in 1990, is 
a network of 59 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from 18 European 
countries working on issues related to debt, development finance and poverty 
reduction. The Eurodad network offers a platform for exploring issues, 
collecting intelligence and ideas, and undertaking collective advocacy. 
(http://www.eurodad.org/aboutus/, retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
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13. IUCN, the International Union for Conservation of Nature, helps find pragmatic 
solutions to pressing environment and development challenges. It supports 
scientific research, manages field projects all over the world and brings 
governments, non-government organisations, United Nations agencies, 
companies and local communities together to develop and implement policy, 
laws and best practice. IUCN is the world‟s oldest and largest global 
environmental network - a democratic membership union with more than 1,000 
government and NGO member organisations, and almost 11,000 volunteer 
scientists in more than 160 countries. IUCN‟s work is supported by over 1,000 
professional staff in 60 offices and hundreds of partners in public, NGO and 
private sectors around the world. (http://www.iucn.org/about/, retrieved date 27 
July, 2009). 
 
14. The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), founded in 1962, is a 
global network that brings together humanitarian and human rights NGOs as an 
advocacy alliance for humanitarian action. Focusing on humanitarian and 
refugee policy issues, ICVA draws upon the work of its members at the field 
level and brings their experiences to international decision-making forums. 
ICVA has over 75 member agencies around the world working in the fields of 
humanitarian relief, human rights, and development. (www.icva.ch, retrieved 
date 27 July, 2009). 
 
15. The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), created in 1972, 
is an alliance for voluntary action of currently nine major international 
humanitarian organisations and networks including Care International, Caritas 
International, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Save the 
Children Alliance, Lutheran World Federation, Oxfam, World Council of 
Churches/ACT and World Vision International. 
(http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/IASC/pageloader.aspx?page=content-about-
schr, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).   
 
16. The International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease (IUATLD), 
created in 1920, is a membership organisation that brings innovation, expertise, 
solutions and support to address health challenges in low- and middle-income 
populations. The Union has its headquarters in Paris and regional and country 
offices serving the Africa, Asia Pacific, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, 
North America and South-East Asia regions (www.theunion.org, retrieved date 
26 July, 2009).. 
 
17. The World Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (WANGO) is an 
international organisation uniting NGOs worldwide in the cause of advancing 
peace and global wellbeing. WANGO helps to provide the mechanism and 
support needed for NGOs to connect, partner, share, inspire, and multiply their 
contributions. Initiated in 2000 by a handful of international NGOs, WANGO is  
committed to the ideals of universal peace, justice, and wellbeing in over 140 
countries (http://www.wango.org, retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
 
18. The Conference of NGOs in Consultative Relationship with the United Nations 
(CONGO), founded in 1948, is an independent, international, non-profit 
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membership association of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with more 
than 500 members worldwide. Its role in conceiving forms of NGO participation 
in UN world conferences and its advocacy on behalf of NGOs at UN 
Headquarters highlight CONGO's chief objectives: to ensure that NGOs be 
present when governments discuss issues of global concern at the United 
Nations and to facilitate NGO discussions on such issues. 
(http://www.ngocongo.org, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).   
 
19. The Child Rights Information Networks (CRIN), established in 1995, is a global 
network coordinating information and promoting action on child rights. More 
than 2,000 member organisations in 150 countries and tens of thousands more 
activists from across the world rely on CRIN for research and information 
(www.crin.rog, retrieved date 27 July, 2009) 
 
20. CIVICUS, founded in 1991, is the World Alliance for Citizen Participation. 
CIVICUS is an international alliance of members and partners which constitute 
an influential network of organisations at the local, national, regional and 
international levels, and span the spectrum of civil society including: civil 
society networks and organisations; trade unions; faith-based networks; 
professional associations; NGO capacity-development organisations; 
philanthropic foundations and other funding bodies; businesses; and social 
responsibility programmes. CIVICUS is an international alliance dedicated to 
strengthening citizen action and civil society throughout the world.  CIVICUS 
currently has more than 450 members in 110 countries (http://www.civicus.org, 
retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
 
21.  The Network of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), founded in 1990, is a 
dynamic civil society, influencing policies and actions at all levels to safeguard 
the global environment and promote sustainable development. GEF has 650 
members across the world (http://www.gefngo.org, retrieved date 27 July, 
2009).  
 
22. The Coalition for International Criminal Court (CICC), founded in 1995, works 
in partnership to strengthen international cooperation with the ICC; ensure that 
the Court is fair, effective and independent; make justice both visible and 
universal; and advance stronger national laws that deliver justice to victims of 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. CICC has 2,500 
organisations around the world (http://www.iccnow.org, retrieved date 27 July, 
2009). 
 
23.  The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), 
founded in 1919, is the world's largest humanitarian network. The Movement is 
neutral and impartial, and provides protection and assistance to people affected 
by disasters and conflicts. The Movement is made up of almost 97 million 
volunteers, supporters, and staff in 186 countries (www.ifrc.org, retrieved date 
27 July, 2009). 
 
24. The Reality of Aid project is the only major North/South international non-
governmental initiative focusing exclusively on analysis and lobbying for 
poverty eradication policies and practices in the international aid regime. It 
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brings together more than 40 civil society networks working in the field of 
international cooperation in the 22 donor countries, in Asia, the Americas and 
Africa. The project builds independent assessment of aid policies and practices, 
accompanied by constructive dialogue with policy makers at national and 
international levels. The Reality of Aid project aims to contribute to more 
effective international aid and development cooperation strategies to eliminate 
poverty, based on principles of North/South solidarity and equity. 
(http://www.realityofaid.org/index.php, retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
 
25. The Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC) is a non-profit, 
non-partisan networking NGO founded in 1987 by a group of NGO leaders who 
saw the need to better coordinate activities in Japanese society and facilitate 
communication with overseas groups. At present, JANIC has 84 NGO members 
and is governed by a Board of Trustees, with a secretary general and a pool of 
14 staff. (www.janic.org/en, retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
 
26. Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA) is a pan-African non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) providing effective humanitarian assistance to alleviate 
human suffering, building on the strength of African people to solve African 
problems. Founded in 1994 in response to the Rwandan genocide, it has 
supported more than 10 million people in 16 African countries to regain their 
health, dignity and wellbeing. (www.africahumanitarianaction.org, retrieved 
date 27 July, 2009). 
 
27. Tanzania Social and Economic Trust-TASOET was established by the 
representatives from several individual NGOs and CBOs 1998, and officially 
registered in October, 2000 under the Trustees™ Incorporation Ordinance 
CAP.375 of the United Republic of Tanzania Law. (http://www.angonet-tz.org, 
retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
 
28. Environment and Development Action in the Third World (ENDA-TM) is an 
international non-profit organisation based in Dakar, Senegal. Founded in 1972, 
ENDA is an association of autonomous entities co-ordinated by an Executive 
Secretariat. ENDA has worldwide representation. (http://www.enda.sn/english/ 
org.htm, retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
 
29. The Asia Pacific Research Network (APRN) was established in 1998 as a result 
of networking including a number of conferences in 1997, where the objective to 
channel and focus the efforts of NGO research towards supporting the need for 
information, education and advocacy of grassroots organisations was recognised 
by a number of key Asian research organisations or non-government 
organisations with established research departments. With the goal to develop at 
least one NGO in each target Asian country that can become a research-
information provider by introducing data banking and research as a general 
service, the APRN was formally established in a conference. The APRN also set 
as one of its objectives the identification of common strategies in research-
information work and the development of a common research agenda in support 
of the members'' respective social movements. Since 1999, the APRN has grown 
to 37 research organisations in 17 countries in Asia and the Pacific. 
(www.aprnet.org, retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
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30. The All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) is a fellowship of Christian 
churches in Africa that accounts for over 120 million Christians across the 
continent. AACC is the largest association of Protestant, Anglican, Orthodox 
and Indigenous churches in Africa and is a member of the worldwide 
ecumenical network. AACC has 173 members in 40 African countries. 
(www.aacc-ceta.org/en, retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
 
31. Care International 
 
 Global size: approximately $550 million in 2000; 12 member agencies plus 
CARE International (London); 14,500 staff, of which 90 percent are locally 
hired (2009). The United States government provides about half the global 
budget; much of the rest comes from other government and multilateral 
agencies. 
 Founded: 1945 as a US organisation: Cooperative Agency for Relief 
Everywhere, initially providing relief to refugees and others after WWII; later 
broadened to relief/welfare in the South, then to development. It executes many 
projects for government and donor agencies. Members (and percent contribution 
to total income): the United States (79%), Canada (15%), Australia, Austria, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, and Norway. 
 International structure: CARE works as a single organisation; each programme 
in the South is managed by one of the ten CAREs as lead agency. 
 Working with 55 million disadvantaged people each year in almost 70 poor 
countries (2008).  (http://www.care.org, retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
 
32. World Vision International 
 
 Global size: $2.2 billion; works with more than 100 million people in 98 
countries (2007). 
 Founded: 1950 in the US by an evangelist. 
 Members (and percent contribution to total income): the US (68%), Canada 
(12%), the UK (6%), others (14%). 
 International structure: Since the late 1980s the programme officers have sat on 
the WVI council, which meets every three years. The board (which meets 
regularly and is more powerful) has some Southern representation. WVI 
maintains strong control over all partners. (http://www.worldvision.org, 
retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
 
33. Save the Children International 
 
 Global size: $361 million (2007); 26 members; reaching 66 million children in 
50 countries including the US; 6,000 staff. 
 Founded: 1919 in the UK in response to WWI. 
 Members: the US and the UK are largest (both had incomes of approximately 
$140 million in 2000). Save the Children-US is over 50 percent US-government 
funded, Save the Children-UK is about 60 percent privately funded. 
 International Structure: it is both the largest and most informal INGO network. 
The International Save the Children Alliance (ISCA) was established in 1988 
and until recently served mostly information and coordination roles; in the mid-
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1990s a secretariat was established in London. (http://www.savethechildren.org, 
retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
 
34. Oxfam International 
 
 Global size: $504 million (1999); 13 members; works with 3,000 local partner 
organisations in 170 countries (2007). 
 Founded: 1942 in the UK (as Oxford Committee for Famine Relief) to bring 
relief to Greek citizens suffering as a result of the Allies‟ war effort. It started to 
establish Oxfams in other countries in the 1970s but soon decided that these 
should be independent. 
 Members: the UK, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, Quebec, the US, Hong Kong, and Germany. 
 International structure: Until the early 1990s, Oxfam International was a very 
loose network, though Oxfam UK coordinated relief programmes for all 
Oxfams. In 1992 the agencies decided to strengthen Oxfam International for 
advocacy and to explore programme harmonisation. A secretariat with CEO was 
established in Oxford with sub-offices for advocacy in Washington, Geneva, and 
Brussels. (http://www.oxfam.org, retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
 
35. Plan International 
 
 Global size: $595 million (2007); 15 member, 80 percent of income from child 
sponsorship; serving more than 1.5 million children and 9 million people in 49 
countries 
 Founded: 1937 as Foster Parent Plan to help children victims of the Spanish civil 
war. Plan works in 42 programme countries. 
 Member (and percent contribution to total income): Netherlands (25%), 
Germany (11%), the US (14%), Japan (9%), the UK (11%), Canada (10%), 
Norway (7%), Belgium, Australia, and six others. 
 International structure: A corporate HQ, initially in the United States, now in the 
UK, is responsible for all programme work. All national Plans are fund-raisers.  
 Total staff is 5,859 (5,358 in programme countries, 422 in national organisations 
and 79 at HQ). (www.plan-international.org, retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
 
36. Medecins Sans Frontieres or Doctors without Borders International 
 
 Global size: 569 million EURO (2006); six full members; 19 support members 
(and Medecins Sans Frontieres International based in Brussels). 
 Founded: in France during Biafran war (in response to the Red Cross not being 
allowed to provide relief without government approval). Medecins Sans 
Frontieres maintains distance from all governments and emphasises its “witness” 
role. It has 2,500 volunteer doctors and nurses in 60-70 countries at any given 
time; 25,000 staff. 
 International structure: Full sections were set up from 1981 to 1985 in Belgium, 
Switzerland, Netherlands, Spain and Luxembourg. Then only support offices 
formed (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the US, and the UK). Full members share the 
same charter, act independently, but are loosely coordinated by Medecins Sans 
Frontieres International. (http://www.msf.org, retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
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37. WWF International 
 
 Global size: $663 million (2006-2007); five million members; 3,300 staff. 
 International structure: Network of largely independent national conservation 
organisations, mostly Northern based (though there are WWF in some larger 
Southern countries); serviced by a large Swiss secretariat (WWF-I). To diversify 
and expand the Southern voice, for the last five years WWF has included 
programme offices in the deliberating processes, though these have less weight. 
The largest offices (WWF-US, WWF-NL, and WWF-I) dominate decision 
making. (http://www.wwf.org, retrieved date 27 July, 2009). 
 
38. Association of Protestant Development Agencies in Europe (APRODEV) 
International 
 
 Global size: 720 million EURO (2007); about 40 percent private, and the rest 
from the European Union and other official sources. 
 Members: 18 Protestant church-based NGOs; having 342 groups of churches in 
100 countries world wide. 
 International structure: Very loose association with a small secretariat in 
Brussels, largely for making joint statements on policy issues and liaison with 
World Council of Churches. (http://www.eed.de/en.home/en.2002.eed, retrieved 
date 27 July, 2009). 
 
39. International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity (CIDSE) 
International 
 
 Global size: $905 million (2000) for 7,781 projects (32 percent Africa). 
 Member: 16 Catholic church-based NGOs in Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the UK) and one in 
Quebec. 
 International structure: Very loose network. (http://www.cidse.org, retrieved 
date 27 July, 2009) 
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Appendix II:  
 
List of Policy Documents produced by the Royal Government of Cambodia 
 
No. Title Ministries/Agencies Year 
1.  A New Development Cooperation Partnership 
Paradigm for Cambodia  
CDC/CRDB 2000 
2.  Development Cooperation Report CDC/CRDB 2000 
3.  Advances in Implementing a New Partnership 
Paradigm in Cambodia 
CDC/CRDB 2001 
4.  Development Cooperation Report CDC/CRDB 2001 
5.  Building Partnership for Development An Update CDC/CRDB 2002 
6.  Development Cooperation Report CDC/CRDB 2002 
7.  Socio-Economic Development Priorities and the 
Official Development Assistance Needs (position 
paper) 
CDC/CRDB 2002 
8.  Building Partnership for Development An Update CDC/CRDB 2004 
9.  Development Cooperation Report CDC/CRDB 2004 
10.  Practices and Lessons Learned in the Management of 
Development Cooperation: Case Studies in Cambodia 
CDC/CRDB 2004 
11.  Capacity Building Practices of Cambodia‟s 
Development Partners: Results of a Survey 
CDC/CRDB 2004 
12.  Implementing the Rectangular Strategy and 
Development Assistance Needs (position paper) 
CDC/CRDB 2004 
13.  Cambodia‟s Report on Progress Toward Enhanced Aid 
Effectiveness 
CDC/CRDB 2005 
14.  Development Cooperation Report CDC/CRDB 2006 
15.  Enhancing Development Cooperation Effectiveness to 
Implement the National Strategic Development Plan 
(position paper) 
CDC/CRDB 2006 
16.  Strategic Framework for Development Cooperation 
Management 
CDC/CRDB 2006 
17.  Mutual Accountability: An Imperative for Capacity 
Development? 
CDC/CRDB 2006 
18.  What structures and processes are emerging at country 
level to support a more effective and accountable 
development partnership?: Cambodia Case Study 
CDC/CRDB 2006 
19.  Cambodia chapter of the OECD/DAC 2006 Paris 
Declaration monitoring survey 
CDC/CRDB 2006 
20.  Guideline on the Role and Functioning of the TWGs  CDC/CRDB 2006 
21.  The Government-Donor Coordination Committee 
(GDCC) and Technical Working Groups (TWGs) in 
Cambodia: A Review 
CDC/CRDB 2006 
22.  Declaration by the Royal Government of Cambodia 
and Development Partners on Enhancing Aid 
Effectiveness 
CDC/CRDB 2006 
23.  The Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum: 
Objectives and Procedures 
CDC/CRDB 2006 
24.  Aid Effectiveness Report 2007 (position paper) CDC/CRDB 2007 
25.  RGC‟s Action Plan on Harmonisation, Alignment, and 
Results: 2006-2010 
CDC/CRDB 2007 
26.  Joint Monitoring Indicators for 1st CDCF Meeting (19-
20 June, 2007 
CDC/CRDB 2007 
27.  A Capacity Development Strategy for the Cambodian 
Rehabilitation and Development Board/Council for the 
Development of Cambodia, Evaluation of Aid 
Effectiveness in Cambodia 
CDC/CRDB 2007 
28.  The Cambodia ODA Database User Manual CDC/CRDB 2007 
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29.  Policy Performance of the Royal Government of 
Cambodia: Report on Progress towards Targets of 
2006Joint Monitoring Indicators  
CDC/CRDB 2007 
30.  Technical Cooperation for Capacity Development in 
Cambodia: Making the system work better  
CDC/CRDB 2008 
31.  Developing Health Sector Capacity in Cambodia:  
The Contribution of Technical Cooperation  
Patterns, Challenges and Lessons 
CDC/CRDB 2008 
32.  Paris Declaration Country Chapter Draft Final, August 
2008 
CDC/CRDB 2008 
33.  The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2008 CDC/CRDB 2008 
34.  Synthesis Analysis of Self-Assessment Surveys  
Evaluation of Aid Effectiveness in Cambodia 
CDC/CRDB 2008 
35.  Independent Review Team-Final Report 2008 CDC/CRDB 2008 
Sources: The Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board of the Council for the Development of 
Cambodia (Retrieved date, 18 June, 2009, www.cdc_crdb.gov.kh and www.mop.gov.kh). 
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Appendix III: 19 Joint Technical Working Groups (TWGs) 
 
 
No. TWG Government 
(Chair/Co-Chair) 
Lead Donor 
Facilitators 
NGO Representatives 
1.  Agriculture and 
Water 
The Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishery 
The Ministry of Water 
Resources and 
Meteorology 
France 
Australia 
 
The Resource 
Development International 
Cambodia 
2.  Decentralisation 
and 
Deconcentration 
The Ministry of Interior The United Kingdom One NGO Representative- 
No information available. 
3.  Education The Ministry of 
Education, Youth and 
Sports 
UNESCO The NGO Education 
Partnership (NEP) with its 
five selective members 
4.  Fisheries The Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishery 
The United Kingdom The World Fish Centre, 
Greater Mekong Regional 
Office 
5.  Food Security and 
Nutrition 
The Council for 
Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
The Ministry of Planning 
World Food 
Programme 
FAO 
The NGO Forum on 
Cambodia (NGOF) and 
Cambodia and Cambodian 
Development Research 
Institute (CDRI) and 
Oxfam Great Britain82 
6.  Forestry and 
Environment 
The Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishery 
Denmark The NGO Forum on 
Cambodia (NGOF) 
7.  Gender The Ministry of 
Women‟s Affairs 
UNDP 
Japan 
One NGO Representative- 
No information available. 
8.  Health The Ministry of Health WHO Medicam 
9.  HIV/AIDS The National Aids 
Authority 
UNICEF The Khmer HIV/AIDS 
NGO Alliance (KHANA) 
10.  Land The Ministry of Land 
Management, Urban 
Planning and 
Construction 
Germany The NGO Forum on 
Cambodia (NGOF) 
11.  Mine Action The Council of Ministers UNDP The Cambodian Mine 
Action Centre (CMAC) 
12.  Partnership and 
Harmonisation 
The CRDB/CDC UN Systems The Cooperation 
Committee for Cambodia 
(CCC) 
13.  Planning and 
Poverty Reduction 
The Ministry of Planning UN Systems 
World Bank 
The NGO Forum on 
Cambodia (NGOF) and 
Cambodian Development 
Research Institute (CDRI) 
14.  Public Financial 
Management 
The Ministry of 
Economy and Finance 
World Bank The NGO Forum on 
Cambodia (NGOF) 
                                            
82 The three NGO Representatives: NGOF, CDRI and Oxfam GB participate. Sources: Food Security and 
Nutrition, 2009a, Minutes of TWG on Food Security and Nutrition Meeting, Retrieved date November 
05, 2009, http://www.foodsecurity.gov.kh/docs/docsMeetings/Draft_Minutes_TWG-
FSN%20Meeting_10Feb09.pdf; Food Security and Nutrition, 2009b, TOR of Interim Working Group 
on Social Safety Net, Retrieved date November 05, 2009, 
http://www.foodsecurity.gov.kh/docs/docsMeetings/TOR_Sub-group%20on%20SSN_10Feb09.pdf. 
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15.  Rural Water 
Supply, Sanitation 
and Hygiene83 
The Ministry of Rural 
Development 
ADB International NGOs from 
the Water and Sanitation 
(WATSAN) Group84 
16.  Infrastructure and 
Regional 
Integration 
The Ministry of Public 
Works and 
Transportation 
Japan 
ADB 
No NGO Representative 
17.  Legal and Judicial 
Reform 
The Council of Jurists UNDP 
France 
No NGO Representative 
18.  Public 
Administration 
Reform 
The Council for 
Administrative Reform 
Australia 
World Bank 
No NGO Representative 
19.  Private Sector 
Development 
The Ministry of 
Economy and Finance 
The Ministry of 
Commerce 
The Ministry of  Mine, 
Industry and Energy 
World Bank No NGO Representative 
Sources: CDC/CRDB, 2006c, 2007a, 2008d 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
83 TWG on Rural Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene was established in November 2007: MORD, 
2007, TOR of TWG on Rural Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene, Unpublished document, Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia). 
84 The TOR of TWG on Rural Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene. (Source: MORD, 2007, TOR of 
TWG on Rural Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene, Unpublished document, Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia). 
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Appendix IV: Field Research Process and Methodology 
 
The Field Research Process and Methodology included information sheets, the consent 
form, and the interview questions (for donors, government officials and NGOs). 
 
  
Information Sheet for Key Participants 
 
First of all, thank you very much for volunteering and taking part in this 
research. 
 
Research Title: “NGO Coordination and the Changing Aid Environment: 
Challenges and Opportunities-A Cambodian Case Study” 
 
Researcher: Samnang Chum: School of Geography, Environment and 
Earth Science, Victoria University of 
Wellington 
 
Purpose of the Research: 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of NGO coordination on 
development and poverty reduction in the new aid environment adopted by the 
Cambodian government and donor community. Therefore, the main objective 
for this exercise is 
 To assess evolving coordination processes among the national and 
provincial NGOs working on development and poverty reduction in 
Cambodia‟s changing aid environment  
 
I am conducting this research through semi-structured interviews by 
interviewing a number of possible key informants from the Cambodian 
government ministries and institutions, donor agencies, NGOs and educational 
and research institutions.  
 
Your identity will be kept confidential as nothing you say will be traced back to 
your position or the organization that you work for. Indeed, the researcher will 
only use the terms such as “government 1”, “donors 2‟, “NGOs 3” and “research 
institutions or think tanks 4” to identify statements. Only the researcher and the 
researcher‟s supervisor (Dr. Andrew McGregor) will be able to access the data 
collected.  
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The interviews can be conducted in your office or anywhere you prefer and will take 
around 45-60 minutes. If you would like I can email you the interview questions before 
we meet. You will be asked to sign the consent form for this study; if you do not wish to 
do so, you can provide verbal consent. Also, you will be asked to agree to an audio 
recording of the conversation, and thus your interview will be quoted by using a 
pseudonym (false name). Moreover, you can choose whether to have English or Khmer 
conversation. All interviews will later be transcribed. The important points will be 
written down in the forms of notes immediately after the conversation. Notes will be 
kept in a safe location at all times. 
 
Furthermore, upon completion of the project, notes will be disposed of (shredded), tapes 
will be wiped, and informed consent forms will be submitted to the course supervisor 
who will keep them locked in a filing cabinet in a locked office. In the final report, no 
individuals will be identified by names or position in the research. A summary of 
research findings will be made available to the interested participants upon the request 
by email after thesis completion. The thesis will be submitted to the School of 
Geography, Environment and Earth Science and deposited in the University Library. It 
is intended that one or two articles will be submitted for publication in scholarly 
journals. 
 
This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Human Ethics 
Committee at the Victoria University of Wellington.  
 
If you have any questions or would like to receive further information about the project, 
please contact me or my supervisor through the address below. 
 
 
Mr. Samnang Chum,  
Postgraduate student of Masters in 
Development Studies,  
Department of Development Studies, 
Victoria University of Wellington,  
Phone: +64-21-178-1271 
Email: cs.samnang@gmail.com 
 
Dr. Andrew McGregor, 
Senior Lecturer in Development Studies 
Department of Development Studies  
Victoria University of Wellington, 
Wellington, New Zealand 
 Phone: +64-463-8110 
Email: andrew.mcgregor@vuw.ac.nz. 
 
Samnang Chum 
 
 
Signed: 
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Consent To Participation In Research 
 
 Title of Project: “NGO Coordination and the Changing Aid Environment: 
Challenges and Opportunities-A Cambodia Case Study” 
 
 
I have been given and have understood an explanation of this research project. I 
have had an opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my 
satisfaction. I understand that I may withdraw myself (or any information I have 
provided) from this project (before data collection and analysis is complete) without 
having to give reasons or without penalty of any sort. 
 
 I consent to information or opinions which I have not given being attributed to 
me in any reports on this research. 
 I would like to tape recordings of my interview returned to me at the conclusion 
of the project. 
 I understand that I will have an opportunity to check the transcripts of the 
interview before publication. 
 (Only where appropriate) I understand that the University retains insurance 
cover against claims relating to harm, loss or damage suffered by participants in 
research projects as a result of any negligent act, error or omission by or on 
behalf of the University. 
 I understand that the data I provide will not be used for any other purpose or 
released to others without my written consent. 
 I would like to receive a summary of the results of this research when it is 
completed.  
 I agree to take part in this research 
 [Or I agree that_____________________, who is under my guardianship, may 
take part in this research]. 
 
 
Signed: 
 
 
 
Name of participant 
 
 
 
(Please print clearly)     Date : 
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List of Interview Questions for Informants such as government officials, donors, 
NCBs, NGO members and non-members* 
 
1. Could you tell me a little bit your roles in your organisation? 
 
2. How have your agency‟s operations changed since the new aid structure was 
adopted in 2004? 
 
3. What do you know of the NGO coordination existing in Cambodia? How do you 
think NGO coordinating bodies benefit the NGO sector and Cambodian society? 
 
4. How do you think the NGO coordinating bodies could be improved in order to 
represent the Cambodian society for poverty reduction, justice and equality after 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness? 
 
 What measure or options can be adopted to improve and enhance NGO 
coordination? 
 
 How well do you think the NGO community is aware of the NGO 
coordination in Cambodia?  
 
 In your perspective, what do think about the operational and ethical 
principles and guidelines and other codes initiated by the CCC to 
improve effectiveness of the NGO sector? 
 
 Should an NGO concentrate its activities just on one or few sectors? 
What are the reasons for and the implications of the diverse activities 
implemented by NGOs? 
 
5. How do you define the roles of NGO representatives/NGO coordinating bodies 
as one of the key stakeholders in CDCF, GDCC and TWGs? How do NGO 
representatives engage in the aid coordination process? 
 
 Should NGO representatives present their roles in all 19 TWGs?  
 
 There has been a clear communication between donors and the Cambodian 
government, how does the communication between NGOs, donors and the 
Cambodian government flow in the aid coordination process? 
 
6. How do you think that the new aid mechanism affects NGO umbrellas/NGO 
sector/NGO representatives and what response have they made in the aid 
coordination process? 
 
 Should NGOs adopt an approach similar to the “Paris Declaration? 
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 How do you think donors will continue to support the third sector or 
should donor communities create a special basket fund for the NGO sector 
in Cambodia? Or is there an alternative option to support them? If so, 
should common standard reporting and other common arrangements be 
developed to reduce the time consumption which NGOs are now facing? 
 
7. How do you think the relationship between NGO Coordinating Bodies/NGOs 
and the Royal Government of Cambodia has changed after the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness?  
 
 Currently, there is no NGO law in Cambodia. How does a lack of a legal 
framework for the NGO sector affect NGOs‟ activities? 
 
 Should the Cambodian government regulate NGOs operating in 
Cambodia? If so, what would a new NGO law look like? And which 
government institution should be mandated to manage the NGO sector? 
 
8. Based on your experience and observation, what is the relationship between 
NGOs and donors before and after the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness? 
 
 In your experience and observation, do donors consult with NGOs when 
their projects/programme and/or country assistance strategy for 
Cambodia are developed? What benefit do donors have in 
collaboratively working with NGO sector? 
 
 How do you think some donors have helped NGOs to influence the 
Cambodian government for policy changes? How effective is this way?  
 
9. Is there anything else you would like to say? 
 
 
*Note: The questions were revised in each interview, with government, donors, NGO 
coordination bodies, NGO members and non-members in the period of interview. 
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Appendix V:  
 
Analysis of NGO Coordination Bodies (NCBs) and Provincial NGO Alliances 
(NAs) 
 
 
1). Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC) 
 
Establishment Date: In 1991 by 24 INGOs as INGO. CCC had its first Cambodian 
executive director in 2007 
 
Vision: A strong and capable civil society, cooperating and responsive to Cambodia‟s 
development challenges. 
 
Mission: As a professional association of non-government organisations in Cambodia, 
the Cooperation Committee of Cambodia provides high quality services to 
civil society and influences Cambodia‟s development partners with a 
collective voice. 
 
Objective: To achieve its mission, CCC has adopted four strategic goals. Each goal 
relates to a sub-clause of its mission.  
 Strengthen the collective voice of civil society  
 Enhance effective cooperation across civil society  
 Influence the thinking and practice of Cambodia‟s development partners 
 Deliver high quality services appropriately responding to the true needs 
of non-government organisations 
 
Programme/Project: Analysing Development Issues (ADI) Project and CCC NGO Good 
Practice Project (NGO GPP) 
 
Members: 110 (78 International and 27 Local NGOs, as well as 5 Associate members), 
a number of sub-working groups and monthly members meeting 
 
Staff: 18 Cambodian staff, four foreign advisors and four vacant positions 
 
Budget: $466,032 ($86,059 from membership fees, $58,087 office space rent fees, 
$22,788 from publication fees and the rest from donors such as Ausaid, AAI, 
BD, CCO-CIDA, CWS, Danida, EED, ESP, FSIF, Oxfam Aus, Oxfam GB, 
UNDP-CDC in 2008 (Annual Report 2008) 
 
Governance system: Formal Structure, seven executive management committee 
members, annual management meeting and monthly member 
meeting, reporting and auditing system, five year strategic plan and 
by-laws and information system 
 
Working relationship with other actors: Has a good relationship with government 
institutions such as CDC/CRDB, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 
the Ministry of Interiors and others and the 
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donors such as Ausaid, UNDP, European Union, 
Denmark, Canada and others 
 
National Coordination Activities: Organising and preparing NGO position papers for 
CDCF, GDCC and TWG on Partnership and 
Harmonisation 
 
International Coordination Activities: Participating in regional and global conferences 
such as the Regional Conference on Aid 
Effectiveness in Hanoi and the High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra. 
 
Website: www.ccc-cambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009 
 
 
2). NGO Forum on Cambodia (NGOF) as LNGO 
 
Establishment Date: began in 1980s as an INGOs and became a LNGO in 1993 with a 
Khmer executive director 
 
Vision: Cambodia will have a well-informed and empowered population participating in 
a strong and vibrant civil society, to the benefit of poor and vulnerable people in 
Cambodia. 
 
Mission: The NGO Forum is made up of local and international non-governmental 
organisations grounded in their experience of humanitarian and development 
assistance to Cambodia. The NGO Forum exists for information-sharing, 
debate and advocacy on priority issues affecting Cambodia‟s development. 
The NGO Forum has an important role to highlight the impact of development 
processes and economic, social and political changes on Cambodians. 
 
Objective: The rights of poor and vulnerable groups in Cambodia are recognised and 
supported by the policies and practices of Cambodia‟s government and 
donors, and by the wider community. 
 
Programme/Project: Three programmes: Development Issues Programme (development 
issue, economic development policy, national budget and aid 
effectiveness), Environment Programme (environmental awareness 
and protection, pesticides reduction and sustainable agriculture, and 
hydropower and community rights), and Land and livelihood 
Programme (land titling and land grabbing, indigenous minority 
land rights, resettlement and housing rights, and forest livelihoods 
and plantations and land information centre) 
Members: 83 members (33 INGOs, 48 LNGOs and 2 Association members), Ten sub-
working groups  
Staff: 29 Cambodian staff and three foreign advisors, six vacant positions 
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Budget: $999,779 in 2008 ($8,500 from membership fees, $43,026 from other receipts, 
and the rest from donors such as AAI Cambodia, Broederlijk Delen, Catholic 
Fund for Overseas Development, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 
Christian Aid, DanChurchAid, Development and Peace (Caritas Canada), 
Diakonia, European Union, Interchurch Organisation for Development, Co-
operation (ICCO), Misereor, Norwegian People‟s Aid (NPA), Oxfam 
America, Oxfam Australia, Oxfam Great Britain, Scottish Catholic 
International Aid Fund (SCIAF), Trocaire, USAID through East West 
Management, Institute (EWMI), World Vision International - Cambodia 
 
Governance system: Formal structure, seven executive management committee 
members, annual management meeting and monthly member 
meeting, reporting and auditing system, five year strategic plan and 
by-laws and information system 
 
Working relationship with other actors: Having a good relationship with government 
institutions such as CDC/CRDB, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 
the Ministry of Interiors and others and the 
donors such as Ausaid, UNDP, European Union, 
Usaid, Norway and others 
 
National Coordination Activities: Organising and preparing NGO position papers for 
CDCF, GDCC and a number of TWGs on Planning 
and Poverty Reduction, Gender, Land, Food Security. 
 
International Coordination Activities: Participating in regional and global conferences 
such as the Regional Conference on Aid 
Effectiveness in Hanoi and the High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra. 
 
Website: www.ngoforum.org.kh, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009 
 
 
3). Medicam as LNGO 
 
 
Establishment Date: in 1989 and run by a Khmer executive director 
 
Vision: Improved health status in Cambodia by building bridges between the health 
sector's NGO community and the Royal Government of Cambodia. 
 
Mission: Medicam is the primary networking agency for the country's health-related 
NGOs. It seeks to link all health sector stakeholders by representing the voice 
of its NGO members, facilitating policy, advocacy, building capacity of 
Medicam's members and health partners, and sharing relevant quality 
information. 
Activities: In addition to its representation and advocacy role, information exchange, 
and capacity building, Medicam also provides the following services: 
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 A large e-mail network for the fast dissemination of Cambodia's health-related 
information. This network facilitates faster and easier transmission and reception 
by the membership of essential information from the field. Direct e-mail contact 
with high officials in the Ministry of Health also greatly enhances 
communication. To date, the network comprises over 900 very targeted health 
professional correspondents, with some acting themselves as a relay to other 
networks, expanding readership even further 
 The holding of a health related library/documentation centre (containing nearly 
4,000 documents and books) with an average of 30 new documents added each 
month. These include publications, reports, study findings, evaluations, etc. 
 The creation and maintenance of several Cambodian health-related databases: 
NGO health projects in Cambodia, countrywide health experts directory, etc.  
 A monthly health-related conference with information exchange, a health 
lecture/debate, and an essential tea break for informal networking! 
 A monthly newsletter, summarising the main news items in the health sector and 
broadcasting announcements from Medicam members. 
 Organisation and facilitation of working groups addressing specific health 
issues: health financing, cost-recovery/user's fee schemes, community 
participation, prison health, reproductive health working group, etc. 
 Special health-related events (conferences, workshop, courses).  
 Support to Cambodian health NGOs by having all activities bilingual 
(English/Khmer), organising courses and workshops, monthly meeting of 
Cambodian NGOs, organisational support to regional NGO networks, 
facilitating overseas scholarship, etc. 
 Orient and advise numerous visitors such as consultants, researchers, officials, 
new comers in Cambodia, new NGO/UN/IO staff, etc. 
 A website representing the Medicam Community  
 Compile in-country job vacancies in the health sector, as well as maintain a 
folder of qualified health professionals (both Cambodian and expatriate) 
available for missions. 
Projects: Information Exchange, Representing the Voice of NGOs & Facilitating 
Advocacy, Provincial Networking and Capacity Building Project (PNCB), 
Building Management Capacity for Cambodian NGOs (BMCC) and Engaging 
Communities. 
 
Members: 131 members (55 INGOs, 61 LNGOs, 13 associate members and two 
individuals), and 13 sub-sector working groups 
 
Staff: N/A (No Annual Report Available) 
 
Budget: N/A (No Annual Report Available) 
 
Governance system: Formal structure, seven executive management committee 
members, annual management meeting and monthly member 
meeting, reporting and auditing system, five year strategic plan and 
by-laws and information system (by-laws, strategic plan and annual 
reports is not available) 
 
 180 
Working relationship with other actors: Has a good relationship with government 
institutions such as CDC/CRDB, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 
the Ministry of Interiors and particularly the 
Ministry of Health, and the donors such as 
Ausaid, UNDP, European Union, Usaid, 
Norway and others 
 
National Coordination Activities: Organising and preparing NGO position papers for 
CDCF, GDCC and TWG on health. 
 
Website: www.medicam-cambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009 
 
 
4). NGO Education Partnership (NEP) as LNGO 
 
Establishment Date: in 2001 and became an LNGO with a Khmer executive director 
 
Mission: NGO Education Partnership is a membership organisation that coordinates 
dialogue and cooperation among key stakeholders to improve the quality and 
accessibilty of education in Cambodia. 
 
Programme/Project: NEP is committed to developing dialogue between government and 
civil society on education issues, undertaking and disseminating research on 
key issues, and helping education NGOs increase their effectiveness. 
  
In the past year, NEP has: 
  Supported the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS) during the 
Education Strategic/Education Sector Support Plan Mid-term Review process  
 Participated in education policy reform discussions on behalf of the education 
NGO sector 
 Completed a National Education NGO Inventory, with 78 education NGOs 
reporting on their activities, challenges, achievements and financial 
commitments 
 Produced a 2008 Position Paper on Education for the Cambodia Development 
Cooperation Forum (CDCF) 
 Released a research report on pre-school education and its impact on primary 
school enrolment 
 Produced and released a research report on teacher motivation and related issues 
 Produced and released an annual Education NGO report on education sector 
activities and challenges 
 Continued to monitor the practice of informal school fees 
 Facilitated two enrolment campaigns supporting increased primary level 
enrolment 
 Played a lead role in planning and implementing Cambodia's Global Action 
Week as part of the Global Campaign for Education 
 Organised bi-monthly information sharing meetings and offered training 
workshop for its  members 
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NEP will continue to facilitate discussions and act on opportunities for collaboration, 
collective learning and action for higher quality and accessible education. 
 
Members: 79 members (33 INGOs and 46 LNGOs) 
 
Staff: Six Cambodian staff and one foreign staff member (Understaffed) 
 
Budget: Limited financial resources (Donors are UNICEF, VSO, MISEREOR, 
ASPBAE) (Annual report is not available) 
 
Governance system: Has a structure and a five year strategic plan 
 
Working relationship with other actors: Has a good relationship with government 
institutions such as CDC/CRDB, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 
the Ministry of Interiors and particularly the 
Ministry of Education, and the donors such as 
European Union, UN agencies-UNICEF and 
others 
 
National Coordination Activities: Organising and preparing NGO position papers for 
CDCF, GDCC and TWG on education. 
 
Website: www.nepcambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009 
 
 
5). Action Committee for Human Rights (CHRAC) as LNGO 
 
Establishment Date: in 1994 by a group of LNGOs 
 
Vision: Cambodia as a peaceful and liberal democracy where development takes place 
in an environment where human rights are respected and protected. 
 
Mission: To reduce the number of serious violations of human rights in Cambodia 
 
Activities: human rights advocacy, management and investigation of human rights and 
land rights, encouragement of formulation of laws to help reduce practices of 
human rights violations in Cambodia with the National Assembly and 
Senate, and engagement and monitoring of Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT). 
 
Members: 21 members of LNGOs and associations 
 
Staff: Ten secretariat staff 
 
Budget: N/A, donors such as National Endowment for Democracy (NED), German 
Development Services (DED), East West Management Institute 
(EWMI) and Norwegian People‟s Aid (NPA) 
 
Governance system: Five steering committee members, three sub-committees: 
investigation (seven members), legislation (10 members) and KRT 
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(eight members), 18 provincial action committees. No long-term 
strategic plan, by-laws.  
 
Working relationship with other actors: Might have a good relationship with 
government institutions but no specific 
information, and with donors such as Germany, 
Norway and USaid. 
 
National Coordination Activities: Contributing to NGO position papers for KRT and 
other papers for CDCF.  
 
Website: http://www.chrac.org/eng, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009 
 
6). End Child Prostitution, Abuse and Trafficking in Cambodia (ECPAT-
Cambodia) as LNGO 
 
Establishment Date: in 1995 
 
Vision: ECPAT-Cambodia's vision is the realisation of the rights of all children to 
live  free of child  prostitution, abuse, child pornography and child  trafficking 
for  sexual  purposes. 
 
Mission: ECPAT-Cambodia works to eliminate the commercial sexual exploitation of 
children through awareness-raising, advocacy, monitoring and the 
coordination of actions and sharing information among relevant stakeholders. 
 
Objective: The objectives of ECPAT Cambodia are: 
 To create a strong and effective network to fight against the sexual exploitation 
of children by strengthening the internal management affairs of ECPAT and the 
capacity building of members. 
 To strengthen collaboration among members and stakeholders against child sex 
tourism, child trafficking, sexual abuse and exploitation, and child pornography. 
 To monitor the implementation of the National Plan against Trafficking in 
Persons and Sexual Exploitation (TIPSE) 
 To promote and uphold the rights of children and youth to participate in 
planning, implementing and assessing actions against sexual exploitation. 
 To influence the government, international government organisations and the 
private sector to become more accountable for protecting children against sexual 
exploitation 
Programme/Project: Commercial sexual exploitation  is the sexual abuse of a child by 
an adult paid for either by cash or in kind (through meals, clothes, 
payment of rent etc). The four elements are: child prostitution, 
child pornography, child sex tourism and trafficking of children for 
sexual purposes. 
 
Members: 27 Members (8 INGOs and 19 LNGOs and Associations) 
 
Staff: More than four staff (There are four management staff) 
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Budget: $ USD 393,694 in 2008 ($1,275 from membership fees and $890 from private 
contributions, $40,000 from volunteer advisor and the rest from donors such as 
ANESVAD and INTERVIDA) 
 
Governance system: Five members of board of directors, five year strategic plan and 
annual report, no by-laws, reporting, financial and auditing 
systems.  
 
Working relationship with other actors: Might have a good relationship with 
government institutions but no specific 
information, and the donors such as Usaid, the 
Asia Foundation and others. 
 
National Coordination Activities: Contributing to NGO position papers for KRT and 
other papers for CDCF.  
 
Website: www.ecpatcambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009
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Desk Review Analysis of NGO Coordination Bodies (NCBs) and Provincial NGO Alliances  (NAs) 
 
Items CCC NGOF Medicam NEP CHRAC ECPAT Other NCBs NAs 
Roles  Agency: Strong 
advocacy at the 
national level 
 Poor Capacity 
and limited 
connection at  
provincial and 
community 
levels 
 Support: 
Capacity 
building, 
research 
capacity and 
facilitating, 
coordinating 
and 
representing 
 Agency: Strong 
advocacy at the 
national level 
 Average 
Capacity and 
connection at  
provincial and 
community 
levels 
 Support: 
Capacity 
building, 
research 
capacity and 
facilitating, 
coordinating 
and 
representing 
 Agency: Strong 
advocacy at the 
national level 
 Good Capacity 
and connection 
at  provincial 
and community 
levels 
 Support: 
Capacity 
building, 
research 
capacity and 
facilitating, 
coordinating 
and 
representing 
 Agency: 
Strong 
advocacy at 
the national 
level 
 Poor Capacity 
and limited 
connection at  
provincial and 
community 
levels 
 Support: 
Capacity 
building, 
research 
capacity and 
facilitating, 
coordinating 
and 
representing 
 Agency: Strong 
advocacy at the 
national level 
 Strong 
Capacity and 
connection at  
provincial and 
community 
levels 
 Support: 
Capacity 
building, 
research 
capacity and 
facilitating, 
coordinating 
and 
representing 
 Agency: Strong 
advocacy at the 
national level 
 Poor Capacity 
and limited 
connection at  
provincial and 
community 
levels 
 Support: 
Capacity 
building and 
funding for 
projects, and 
facilitating but 
not 
representing 
 Agency: Weak 
advocacy at 
the national 
level 
 Poor Capacity 
and limited 
connection at  
provincial and 
community 
levels 
 Support: Poor 
capacity 
building and 
funding for 
projects, not 
facilitating 
and 
representing 
 Agency: 
Limited 
advocacy at the 
national level 
 Poor Capacity at 
the provincial 
level 
 Support: No 
capacity 
building and 
research 
capacity, not 
facilitating and 
representing 
  
Governance  Strong 
governance 
system as 
implementing 
NGO GPP and 
NGO 
Voluntary 
Certification 
System 
 Good financial 
reporting and 
strategic plan 
 High profile 
 Strong 
governance 
system as 
implementing 
NGO GPP and 
NGO 
Voluntary 
Certification 
System 
 Good financial 
reporting and 
strategic plan 
 High profile 
 Strong 
governance 
system as 
implementing 
NGO GPP and 
NGO 
Voluntary 
Certification 
System 
 Good financial 
reporting and 
strategic plan 
 High profile 
 Good 
governance 
system 
implementing 
NGO GPP and 
NGO 
Voluntary 
Certification 
System 
 Good financial 
reporting and 
strategic plan 
 Well known 
 Good 
governance 
system  
 Good financial 
reporting and 
strategic plan 
 Well known 
brand at 
national level 
 Clear objective 
and strategy 
 Having a 
number of sub-
 Average 
governance 
system  
 Good financial 
reporting and 
strategic plan 
 Well known 
brand at 
international 
and national 
levels 
 Clear objective 
and strategy 
 Weak 
governance 
system  
 Average 
financial 
reporting and 
strategic plan 
 average brand 
at national 
level 
 Unclear 
objective and 
strategy 
 Formal 
Institutional 
development 
does not exist, 
but informal 
gathering when 
it is necessary 
with weak 
governance 
system 
 Not well known 
at national level 
or even their 
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Items CCC NGOF Medicam NEP CHRAC ECPAT Other NCBs NAs 
brand at 
international 
and national 
levels 
 Average profile 
brand at 
community 
level 
 Clear objective 
and strategy 
 Having a 
number of 
sector and 
networking 
groups with 
monthly 
members 
meeting 
 Participation 
agreement 
 No external 
institutional 
evaluation 
report 
brand at 
international 
and national 
levels 
 Average profile 
brand at 
community 
level 
 Clear objective 
and strategy 
 Having 10 
working groups 
with monthly 
members 
meeting 
 Participation 
agreement 
 No external 
institutional 
evaluation 
report 
brand at 
international 
and national 
levels 
 Average profile 
brand at 
community 
level 
 Clear objective 
and strategy 
 Having a 
number of sub 
sector working 
groups with 
monthly 
members 
meeting 
 Participation 
agreement 
 No external 
institutional 
evaluation 
report 
brand at 
national level 
 Poor profile 
brand at 
community 
level 
 Clear objective 
and strategy 
 Having a 
number of sub-
sector working 
groups with 
monthly 
members 
meeting 
 Participation 
agreement 
 No external 
institutional 
evaluation 
report 
sector and 
networking 
groups with 
monthly 
members 
meeting 
 Participation 
agreement 
 No external 
institutional 
evaluation 
report 
 monthly 
members 
meeting 
 Participation 
agreement 
 No external 
institutional 
evaluation 
report 
 monthly 
members 
meeting 
 Participation 
agreement 
No external 
institutional 
evaluation 
report 
community 
 
 
Localisation 
and Scope 
 Headquarter in 
Phnom Penh 
 Many members 
are based in the 
capital 
 Having 
decentralised 
work in 2008 in 
mobilising 
collective voice 
on NGO law 
 Headquarter in 
Phnom Penh 
 Many members 
are based in the 
capital 
 Having 
decentralised 
work by sector 
 Monthly 
members 
meeting mostly 
 Headquarter in 
Phnom Penh 
 More members 
are based in 
provinces 
 Decentralised 
work via two 
provincial 
offices 
 All stages of 
policy process 
 Headquarter in 
Phnom Penh 
 More members 
are based in 
provinces 
 Less 
decentralised 
work 
 All stages of 
policy process 
but mostly 
 Headquarter in 
Phnom Penh 
 Decentralised 
via 18 
provincial sub 
committees 
 All stages of 
policy process 
but mostly 
policy 
formulation 
 Headquarter in 
Phnom Penh 
 Less 
decentralised 
work 
 All stages of 
policy process 
and advocacy 
 Not just 
government but 
donors 
 Headquarter in 
Phnom Penh 
 Less 
decentralised 
work 
 All stages of 
policy process 
and advocacy 
 
 Office is 
rotating by 
NGO member 
who takes a lead 
in the province 
 More 
decentralised 
work 
 All stages of 
policy process 
and advocacy 
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Items CCC NGOF Medicam NEP CHRAC ECPAT Other NCBs NAs 
and NGO GPP 
through 
workshop and 
training in the 
provinces. 
 Monthly 
members 
meeting mostly 
conducted in 
the capital 
 All stages of 
policy process  
and advocacy on 
common issues 
 Not just 
government but 
donors 
conducted in 
the capital 
 All stages of 
policy process 
and advocacy 
by sector 
 Not just 
government but 
donors 
 
but mostly 
policy 
formulation 
and 
implementation 
in health 
 Not just 
government but 
donors 
 
policy 
formulation 
and 
implementatio
n in education 
 Not just 
government 
but donors 
 
and 
implementation 
in human rights 
 Not just 
government but 
donors 
 
 for the 
provincial 
government and 
local authority 
 
Capacity and 
Skill 
 Not enough 
staff (18 
Cambodian 
staff, four 
advisors and 
four vacant 
positions) 
 Need more 
skilled and 
qualified 
Khmer staff 
(IT, policy 
analysis, and 
aid 
effectiveness) 
 Limited 
fundraising 
strategic 
 Not enough 
staff (29 
Cambodian 
staff, three 
advisors and 
six vacant 
positions) 
 Need more 
skilled and 
qualified 
Khmer staff 
(IT, policy 
analysis, and 
aid 
effectiveness) 
 Good 
fundraising 
strategic 
 Strong capacity 
of secretariat 
 Khmer staff 
 Research 
networking, 
database 
communication
s, management 
and fundraising 
skill are good 
 Capacity for 
evidence based 
policymaking 
influence 
 Good 
fundraising 
strategic 
development 
 Not enough 
staff (5 
Cambodian 
staff, one 
volunteer 
advisor and 
one vacant 
position) 
 Need more 
skilled and 
qualified 
Khmer staff 
(IT, policy 
analysis) 
 Limited 
fundraising 
strategic 
development 
 Strong capacity 
of secretariat 
 Khmer staff 
 Need more 
skilled and 
qualified 
Khmer staff 
(IT, policy 
analysis) 
 Limited 
fundraising 
strategic 
development 
skills 
 
 Strong capacity 
of secretariat 
 Khmer staff 
 Need more 
skilled and 
qualified 
Khmer staff 
(IT, policy 
analysis) 
 Limited 
fundraising 
strategic 
development 
skills 
 
 
 Not enough 
staff 
 Need more 
skilled and 
qualified 
Khmer staff 
(IT, policy 
analysis) 
 Limited 
fundraising 
strategic 
development 
skills 
 
 No support and 
skilled staff 
 Poor fundraising 
strategic 
development 
skills 
 Poor 
communication 
and IT 
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Items CCC NGOF Medicam NEP CHRAC ECPAT Other NCBs NAs 
development 
skills 
 Building staff‟s 
capacity (Some 
staff have been 
trained 
overseas and at 
university in 
Phnom Penh 
 Having a few 
advocacy 
experts but 
need more 
advocacy staff 
development 
skills 
 Having a few 
advocacy 
experts but 
need more 
advocacy staff 
 Capacity for 
evidence based 
policymaking 
influence 
 
skills 
 
 
skills 
 
Resources  Low funding 
support for the 
entire 
programme and 
external 
activities with 
the government 
such as aid 
effectiveness 
 Human 
resources are 
limited as some 
staff departed 
in 2008 
 Good ICT and 
database 
 Good funding 
support for the 
entire 
programme and 
external 
activities with 
the government 
such as aid 
effectiveness 
 Human 
resources are 
limited as some 
staff departed 
in 2008 
 Good ICT and 
database 
 Good funding 
support for the 
entire 
programme and 
external 
activities with 
the government  
 Good human 
resources  
 Good ICT and 
database 
 Low funding 
support for the 
entire 
programme 
and external 
activities with 
the 
government  
 Human 
resources are 
limited  
 Average ICT 
and database 
 Low funding 
support for the 
entire 
programme and 
external 
activities with 
the government  
 Human 
resources are 
limited 
 Good ICT and 
database 
 Low funding 
support for the 
entire 
programme and 
external 
activities with 
the government  
 Human 
resources are 
limited  
 Good ICT and 
database 
 Poor funding 
support for the 
entire 
programme 
and external 
activities with 
the 
government  
 Human 
resources are 
very limited  
 Good ICT and 
database 
 No funding 
support for the 
entire 
programme and 
external 
activities with 
the government  
 Human 
resources are 
very limited  
 No ICT and 
database 
Membership  Three levels of 
membership-
clear criteria 
for each 
 Fee is different 
 Three levels of 
membership-
clear criteria 
for each 
 Fee is different 
 Three levels of 
membership-
clear criteria 
for each 
 Fee is different 
 One standard 
of membership 
 Fee is fixed 
for INGOs and 
LNGOs 
 Unclear 
membership 
criteria  
 Fee is fixed 
 A minimum 
 Unclear 
membership 
criteria  
 Fee is fixed 
 A minimum 
 Unclear 
membership 
criteria  
 Fee is fixed 
 A minimum 
 No membership 
criteria and fee 
 Participation is 
voluntary 
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Items CCC NGOF Medicam NEP CHRAC ECPAT Other NCBs NAs 
for each level 
 A minimum 
amount of 
participation is 
required from 
members and 
some tasks are 
mandatory 
 Membership 
agreement 
 More 
heterogeneous 
membership 
 Member 
replication with 
other NCBs but 
free open 
membership 
 Representing 
only  members 
 Members 
(LNGOs) lack 
advocacy 
expertise 
for each level 
 A minimum 
amount of 
participation is 
required from 
members and 
some tasks are 
mandatory 
 Membership 
agreement 
 More 
heterogeneous 
membership 
 Member 
replication with 
other NCBs but 
free open 
membership 
 Representing 
only  members 
 Members 
(LNGOs) lack 
advocacy 
expertise 
for each level 
 A minimum 
amount of 
participation is 
required from 
members and 
some tasks are 
mandatory 
 Membership 
agreement 
 More 
heterogeneous 
membership 
 Member 
replication with 
other NCBs but 
free open 
membership 
 Representing 
only  members 
 Members 
(LNGOs) lack 
advocacy 
expertise 
 
 A minimum 
amount of 
participation is 
required from 
members and 
some tasks are 
mandatory 
 Membership 
agreement 
 More 
heterogeneous 
membership 
 Member 
replication 
with other 
NCBs but free 
open 
membership 
 Representing 
only members 
 Members 
(LNGOs) lack 
advocacy 
expertise 
 
 
amount of 
participation is 
required from 
members  
 No 
Membership 
agreement 
 Member 
replication with 
other NCBs but 
free open 
membership 
 
amount of 
participation is 
required from 
members  
 No 
Membership 
agreement 
 Member 
replication with 
other NCBs but 
free open 
membership 
 
amount of 
participation is 
required from 
members  
 No 
Membership 
agreement 
 Member 
replication 
with other 
NCBs but free 
open 
membership 
 
Organisation 
structure 
 Clear 
organisational 
structure with 
members 
(INGOs, 
LNGOs, 
associate 
members), 
executive 
 Clear 
organisational 
structure with 
members 
(INGOs, 
LNGOs, 
associate 
members), 
executive 
 Clear 
organisational 
structure with 
members 
(INGOs, 
LNGOs, 
associate 
members), 
executive 
 Clear 
organisational 
structure with 
members 
(INGOs, 
LNGOs, 
associate 
members), 
executive 
 Clear 
organisational 
structure with 
members 
(INGOs, 
LNGOs, 
associate 
members), 
executive 
 Unclear 
organisational 
structure with 
members 
(INGOs, 
LNGOs, 
associate 
members), 
executive 
 Unclear 
organisational 
structure with 
members 
(INGOs, 
LNGOs, 
associate 
members), 
executive 
 No 
organisational 
structure 
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management 
committee and 
its seven 
members 
 Has five year 
strategic plan 
and by-laws 
 High hierarchal 
structure and 
coordination 
work 
management 
committee and 
its seven 
members 
 Has five year 
strategic plan 
and by-law 
 High hierarchal 
structure and 
coordination 
work 
management 
committee and 
its seven 
members 
 Decentralised 
structure and 
coordination 
work 
 
management 
committee and 
its five 
members 
 Has five year 
strategic plan 
but no by-laws 
 Hierarchal 
structure and 
coordination 
work 
 
management 
committee and 
its five 
members 
 No five year 
strategic plan 
and by-laws 
 Decentralised 
structure and 
coordination 
work from 
national to 
provincial 
levels 
 
management 
committee and 
its five 
members  
 Has five year 
strategic plan 
but no by-laws 
 Hierarchal 
structure and 
coordination 
work 
 
management 
committee and 
its five 
members 
 No five year 
strategic plan 
but no by-laws 
 Hierarchal 
structure and 
coordination 
work 
 
Communication  Strategy, staff, 
funding and 
ICT 
 Strategy, staff, 
funding and 
ICT 
 Strategy, staff, 
funding and 
ICT 
 Strategy, staff, 
funding and 
ICT 
 Strategy, staff, 
funding and 
ICT 
 Strategy, staff, 
funding and 
ICT 
 Strategy, staff, 
funding and 
ICT 
 No strategy, 
staff, funding 
and ICT 
External 
Environment 
Cultural Challenge 
 Lack of trust 
 Weak institutions 
 Hesitation to ask for and offer help 
 Fear of losing face 
 Highly hierarchical (Patron-Client Relationships) 
 Reluctance to be critical of others 
Challenges in the NGO climate 
 Culture of participation-per-diem and free lunch and 
drink 
 Highly centralised aid industry 
 Bureaucratic institutions and process 
 Lack of capacity of staff and executive director, 
institution 
 Low NGO professionalism 
 Proliferation of NGO seeking funding 
 
Challenges in the political arena 
 Relatively low freedom of speech 
and real democratisation 
 Strong executive and weak 
legislative 
 High corruption 
 Weak judicial system 
 Lack of transparency and 
accountability 
 Juxtaposing of programmes and 
responsibilities 
Strategic 
adaptive 
capacity 
 Can deal with 
internal and 
external change 
 Flexible  
 Can deal with 
reform process 
 Can deal with 
internal and 
external change 
 Flexible  
 Can deal with 
reform process 
 Can deal with 
internal and 
external change 
 Flexible  
 Can deal with 
reform process 
 Limited 
capacity to 
deal with 
internal and 
external 
change  
 Limited 
capacity to deal 
with internal 
and external 
change  
 Low degree of 
 Limited 
capacity to deal 
with internal 
and external 
change  
 Low degree of 
Limited 
capacity to deal 
with internal 
and external 
change 
 Low degree of 
 No capacity to 
deal with 
internal and 
external change 
 No mobilisation 
of members 
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 Is upgrading 
outputs and 
strategies 
 Partly 
dependent on 
steady funding 
from external 
sources (donors 
and INGOs) 
but could be 
sustainable 
(based on 
membership, 
office space 
and publication 
fees) in the 
future 
 Slow 
mobilisation of 
members 
 No collective 
voice on the 
common issues 
 Slowly 
building the 
awareness of 
NGO 
coordination 
and NGO GPP 
 Is upgrading 
outputs and 
strategies 
 Largely 
dependent on 
steady funding 
from external 
sources (donors 
and INGOs)  
 Slow 
mobilisation of 
members 
 Limited 
collective voice 
on some  issues 
 Slowly 
building the 
awareness of 
NGO 
coordination 
 
 Is upgrading 
outputs and 
strategies 
 Partly 
dependent on 
steady funding 
from external 
sources (donors 
and INGOs) 
but could be 
sustainable 
(based on 
membership 
and publication 
fees) in the 
future 
 Slow 
mobilisation of 
members 
 Having 
appropriate 
collective voice 
on health issues 
 Slowly 
building the 
awareness of 
NGO 
coordination 
 
 Low degree of 
flexibility  
 Limited 
capacity to 
deal with 
reform process 
 Is upgrading 
outputs and 
strategies 
 Largely 
dependent on 
steady funding 
from external 
sources 
(donors and 
INGOs)  
 Slow 
mobilisation of 
members 
 Having 
appropriate 
collective 
voice on 
education 
issues 
 Slowly 
building the 
awareness of 
NGO 
coordination 
 
flexibility  
 Limited 
capacity to deal 
with reform 
process 
 Is upgrading 
outputs and 
strategies 
 Largely 
dependent on 
steady funding 
from external 
sources (donors 
and INGOs)  
 Slow 
mobilisation of 
members 
 Having 
appropriate 
collective voice 
on human 
rights issues 
 Slowly 
building the 
awareness of 
NGO 
coordination 
 
flexibility  
 Limited 
capacity to deal 
with reform 
process 
 Is upgrading 
outputs and 
strategies 
 Largely 
dependent on 
steady funding 
from external 
sources (donors 
and INGOs)  
 Slow 
mobilisation of 
members 
 Having 
appropriate 
collective voice 
on child 
exploitation, 
trafficking and 
labour issues 
 Slowly 
building the 
awareness of 
NGO 
coordination 
 
flexibility  
 Limited 
capacity to 
deal with 
reform process 
 Largely 
dependent on 
steady funding 
from external 
sources 
(donors and 
INGOs)  
 Slow 
mobilisation 
of members 
 Limited 
collective 
voice on some  
issues 
 Slowly 
building the 
awareness of 
NGO 
coordination 
 
 No collective 
voice on issues 
 No or very 
limited 
awareness of 
NGO 
coordination 
Sources: CCC (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009), NGOF (2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b), Medicam (www.medicam-
cambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009); NEP (2005, 2006, 2008); Chrac (www.chrac.org/eng, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009); ECPAT (2006, 2007, 
2008) and information from field research from March-June, 2009. 
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Appendix VI:  
List of Members of the NCBs and Analysis 
 
1). Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC): 110 (78 International and 27 
Local NGOs, as well as 5 Associate members) 
 
No. Name Acronym 
INGOs 
1.  Action Aid International Cambodia AAI 
2.  Action on Disability and Development ADD 
3.  Adventist Development and Relief Agency  ADRA 
4.  Australian Business Volunteers- (Formerly AESOP) ABV 
5.  Aide ét Action - Asie du Sud-Est AeA-ASE 
6.  American Friends Service Committee  AFSC 
7.  Asian Outreach Cambodia AOC 
8.  Association Angkor Belgique AA-B 
9.  Association of Medical Doctors of Asia AMDA 
10.  Austcare Cambodia Austcare 
11.  Australian Catholic Relief/Caritas Australia Caritas Australia 
12.  
Australian People for Health, Education & Development 
Abroad 
APHEDA 
13.  Cambodian Acid Survivors Charity CASC 
14.  Cambodian Center for Independent Media VOD 
15.  Cambodia Trust CT 
16.  Cambodian Health Committee CHC 
17.  Cambodian HIV/AIDS Education and Care CHEC 
18.  CARE International in Cambodia CARE 
19.  Caritas Cambodia  CARITAS 
20.  Catholic Relief Services CRS 
21.  Centre for Advance Study  CAS 
22.  Christian Care For Cambodia  CCFC 
23.  Child Fund Cambodia CFC 
24.  Christian Reformed World Relief Committee-Southeast Asia  CRWRC 
25.  Church World Services CWS 
26.  Cooperazione e Sviluppo  CESVI 
27.  Concern Worldwide  CONCERN 
28.  Dan Church Aid DCA 
29.  Digital Divide Data DDD 
30.  Enfants & Développment E&D 
31.  Enfants d'Angkor EDA 
32.  EveryChild  EveryChild  
33.  Food for the Hungry International - Cambodia   FHI/C 
34.  Forum Syd  Forum Syd  
35.  Foundation for International Development/Relief  FIDR 
36.  Friends-International Friends 
37.  Gender and Development for Cambodia  GAD/C 
38.  German Agro Action/Deutsche Welt Hunger Hilfe GAA/DWHH 
39.  Hagar Hagar 
40.  Handicap International Belgium   HI.B 
41.  Handicap International France   HI.F 
42.  HelpAge International  HAI 
43.  Health Unlimited HU 
44.  International Cooperation Cambodia  ICC 
45.  International Development Enterprises  IDE 
46.  International Volunteers of Yamagata IVY 
47.  Japan International Volunteer Center JVC 
48.  Jesuit Service Cambodia JS/JRS 
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49.  Legal Aid of Cambodia  LAC 
50.  Lutheran World Federation/Department for World Service  LWF 
51.  MARYKNOLL - Cambodia MARYKNOLL 
52.  Medecins du Monde  MDM 
53.  Medical Teams International - Cambodia  MTI 
54.  Mennonite Central Committee  MCC 
55.  New Humanity  NH 
56.  Norwegian People's Aid NPA 
57.  Ockenden International-Cambodia  OIC 
58.  Open Forum of Cambodia  OFC 
59.  Oxfam America-East Asia Regional Office  Oxfam America 
60.  Oxfam Australia (OAus)- Formerly Oxfam CAA 
61.  Oxfam Great Britain  Oxfam GB 
62.  Oxfam Québec Oxfam Québec 
63.  Pact Cambodia PACT 
64.  PLAN International Cambodia PLAN 
65.  Save the Children Australia   SCA 
66.  Save the Children Norway, Cambodia Office   SCN-CO 
67.  Services for the Health in Asian & African Regions  
68.  Shanti Volunteer Association    SVA 
69.  Soutien a l'Initiative Privee pour l'Aide a la Reconstruction  SIPAR 
70.  The Asia Foundation   TAF 
71.  Veterans International/Cambodia VI/C 
72.  Voluntary Service Overseas  VSO 
73.  Volunteer Service Abroad VSA 
74.  World Education - Cambodia  WE/C 
75.  World Relief Cambodia  WR-C 
76.  World Vision Cambodia   WVC 
77.  Youth With A Mission YWAM 
78.  ZOA Refugee Care Netherlands  ZOA 
LNGOs 
79.  Banteay Srei BS 
80.  Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association ADHOC 
81.  Cambodian Researchers for Development CRD 
82.  Cambodian Rural Economic Development Organisation CREDO 
83.  Caring for Young Khmer CYK 
84.  Development and Partnership in Action  DPA 
85.  House of Family HoF 
86.  KHEMARA KHEMARA 
87.  Krousar Yoeung  KrY 
88.  Meatho Phum Komah/Home Land MPK 
89.  NGO Education Partnership NEP 
90.  NYEMO Cambodia NYEMO 
91.  Partnership for Development in Kampuchea  PADEK 
92.  Ponleur Kumar PK 
93.  Ponleu Ney Kdey Sangkum PNKS 
94.  Pteah Teuk Dong PTD 
95.  Rain Water Cambodia RWC 
96.  Rural Animal Health Development Organisation RAHDO 
97.  SABORAS SABORAS 
98.  Save the Earth Cambodia STEC 
99.  Shalom Life Careserve Center  SLCC 
100.  SILAKA SILAKA 
101.  Sovann Phum Sovann Phum 
102.  Trotrung ning Akphiwat Sokapeap neak Krekror  TASK 
103.  Vicheasthan Bandosbondal Neakropkrong Kangea Aphivath  VBNK 
104.  Wathnakpheap Wathnakpheap 
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105.  Wholistic Development Organization WDO 
Associate Members 
106.  Australian Agency for International Development   AusAID 
107.  Australian Volunteers-International AVI 
108.  Canadian Cooperation Office CCO-CIDA 
109.  Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency  SIDA 
110.  United States Agency For International Development USAID 
Source: www.ccc-cambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009 
 
Having member replication: 26 NGO with NGOF or 23% (19 INGOs and 7 LNGOs); 
20 NGOs with Medicam or 18% (17 INGOs and 3 LNGOs) 
 
2). NGO Forum on Cambodia (NGOF): 83 members (33 INGOs, 48 LNGOs and 2 
Association members) 
 
No. Name Acronym 
INGOs 
1.  ActionAid International Cambodia ActionAid 
2.  Action on Disability and Development ADD 
3.  American Friends Service Committee AFSC 
4.  Australian Catholic Relief ACR/CA 
5.  Care International CARE International 
6.  Catholic Relief Services CRS 
7.  CORD CORD 
8.  Christian Reformed World Relief Committee CRWRC 
9.  Church World Service CWS 
10.  Community Forestry International CFI 
11.  Concern Worldwide Concern Worldwide 
12.  Deutsche Welt Hunger Hilfe - German Agro Action DWHH/GAA 
13.  Enfants et Développement E&D 
14.  Forum Syd FORUM SYD 
15.  Groupe de Recherche et d'Echanges Technologiques GRET 
16.  Health Unlimited HU 
17.  HelpAge International HAI 
18.  Japan International Volunteer Centre JVC 
19.  Jesuit Service Cambodia JS/JRS 
20.  Lutheran World Federation LWF 
21.  MARYKNOLL-Cambodia MaryKnoll 
22.  Mennonite Central Committee MCC 
23.  Norwegian People's Aid NPA 
24.  Oxfam Community Aid Abroad OCAA 
25.  Oxfam Great Britian Oxfam GB 
26.  Oxfam Hong Kong - Women's Agenda for Change Project WAC 
27.  PACT Cambodia PACT 
28.  Plan International Cambodia PLAN Cambodia 
29.  Save the Children - Norway SCN 
30.  Swiss Interchurch Aid HEKS 
31.  World Vision International - Cambodia WVI-C 
32.  World Wildlife Fund for Nature WWF 
33.  Youth Council of Cambodia YCC 
LNGOs 
34.  
Association of Protection Development for Cambodia 
Environment 
APDCE 
35.  Banteay Srei Banteay Srei 
36.  Buddhism for a Progressive Society BPS 
37.  Cambodia Women Culture Development CWCD 
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38.  Cambodian Farmer Economic Development CFED 
39.  Cambodian HIV/AIDS Education and Care CHEC 
40.  Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association ADHOC 
41.  Cambodian Labour Organisation CLO 
42.  
Cambodian League for the Promotion & Defence of Human 
Rights 
LICADHO 
43.  Cambodian Rural Economic Development Organisation CREDO 
44.  Cambodian Sanitation and Recycling Organisation CSARO 
45.  Cambodian Women's Development Association CWDA 
46.  Cambodian Youth Development CYD 
47.  Centre d'Etude et de Developpement Agricole Cambodgien CEDAC 
48.  Christ for Development Kampuchea CDK 
49.  Community Legal Education Center CLEC 
50.  Cooperation for Development of Cambodia Co-DeC 
51.  Culture and Environment Preservation Association CEPA 
52.  Development and Partnership in Action DPA 
53.  Farmer Livelihood Development Organisation FLD 
54.  Fisheries Action Coalition Team FACT 
55.  Gender and Development for Cambodia GAD/C 
56.  Healthcare Centre for Children HCC 
57.  Human Rights Vigilance of Cambodia Vigilance 
58.  
Human Resource and Rural Economic Development 
Organisation 
Hurredo 
59.  Indra Devi Association IDA 
60.  Khemara Khemara 
61.  Khmer Community for Agricultural Development KCAD 
62.  Khmer Farmers Association KFA 
63.  Khmer Women's Voice Centre KWVC 
64.  Legal Aid of Cambodia LAC 
65.  Meada Khmer Development Organisation MKD 
66.  Mlup Baitong Mlup Baitong 
67.  National Prosperity Association NAPA 
68.  Organisation for Assistance of Children and Rural Women CWARO 
69.  Partnership for Development in Kampuchea PADEK 
70.  Project Against Domestic Violence PADV 
71.  Prom Vihear Thor Organisation PVT 
72.  Socio-Economic Development Organisation of Cambodia SEDOC 
73.  Sor Sor Troung SST 
74.  Strey Santepeap Deiombeiy Parethan SSP 
75.  Urban Poor Women Development UPWD 
76.  Urban Sector Group USG 
77.  Vicheasthan Bandosbondal Neakropkrong Kangea Aphivath VBNK 
78.  Violence Against Women and Children of Cambodia VAWCC 
79.  Indigenous Community Support Organisation ICSO 
80.  Cambodian Disabled People's Organisation CDPO 
81.  Intervida Cambodia Intervida 
Associate Members 
82.  DanChurchAid DCA 
83.  Oxfam America Oxfam America 
Source: www.ngoforum.org.kh, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009 
 
Having member replication: 26 NGO with CCC or 31%  (19 INGOs and 7 LNGOs) and 
12 NGOs with Medicam or 14% (10 INGOs and 2 LNGOs). 
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3). Medicam as LNGO: 131 members (55 INGOs, 61 LNGOs, 13 associate members 
and two individuals) 
 
No. Name Acronym 
INGOs 
1.  Adventist Development and Relief Agency  ADRA 
2.  American Red Cross AMCROSS 
3.  Asian Outreach Cambodia AOC 
4.  Aide Odontologique Internationale AOI 
5.  CAMA Service Inc CAMA 
6.  CARE International in Cambodia CARE 
7.  Caritas Cambodia  CARITAS 
8.  Christian Care For Cambodia  CCFC 
9.  Canada Center for Int'l Study and Cooperation CECI 
10.  Cooperazione E Sviluppo CESVI 
11.  Center for International Health, Universiy of Toronto CIH 
12.  Churches of Christ Overseas Aid COCOA 
13.  Catholic Relief Services CRS 
14.  Church World Service CWS 
15.  Enfant Et Developement ED 
16.  Family Health International/Impact FHI/IMPACT 
17.  Foundation for International Development/Relief FIDR 
18.  Friends Without A Border- CBHEP FWAB-CBHEP 
19.  General Board of Global Ministries GBGM-CCMA 
20.  Groupe de Recherche et d'Echanges Technologiques GRET 
21.  HelpAge International HAI 
22.  Handicap International Belgium HI-B 
23.  Handicap International France HI-F 
24.  Helen Keller International HKI 
25.  Health Net International HNI 
26.  Health Unlimited HU 
27.  International Cooperation for Cambodia ICC 
28.  INTERNEWS INTERNEWS 
29.  International Resources for the Improvement of Sight IRIS 
30.  
Japan Overseas Christian Medical Cooperative Service 
Cambodia 
JOCS 
31.  Louvain Développement LD 
32.  Lutheran World Federation LWF 
33.  Mennonite Central Committee MCC 
34.  Mekong Eye Doctor MED 
35.  Malteser Germany MHD 
36.  Maryknoll MKL 
37.  Médecins Sans Frontières - Belgium MSF-B 
38.  NOMAD Recherche Soutien International NOMAD RSI 
39.  Programme For Appropriate Technology in Health PATH 
40.  Partners for Development PFD 
41.  Project Hope Japan PHJ 
42.  Plan International PLAN 
43.  Pharmaciens Sans Frontières PSF 
44.  Population Services International PSI 
45.  Save The Children Australia SCA 
46.  Services for the Health in Asia & African Regions SHARE 
47.  Sihanouk Hospital Center of Hope SHCH 
48.  Sok Sabay Sok Sabay 
49.  TASK-SERVANTS TASK 
50.  University Research Co. URC 
51.  VOR-ORT VOR-ORT 
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52.  Voluntary Service Overseas(UK) VSO 
53.  
Flemish Office for Development Cooperation and Technical 
Assistance 
VVOB 
54.  World Relief Cambodia WR-C 
55.  World Vision Cambodia WVC 
LNGOs 
56.  Association For Care of Children and Youth ACCY 
57.  Agriculture Development Foundation ADF 
58.  Association for Development and Over Villager's Right ADOVIR 
59.  Buddhism for Health BFH 
60.  Bandos Komar BK 
61.  Buddhist Study Association BSA 
62.  
Cambodian Organisation for Assistance to Families and 
Widows 
CAAFW 
63.  
Cambodian Association for Development of Farmer and the 
Poor 
CADFP 
64.  Cambodia Anti- Tuberculosis Association CATA 
65.  Community of Cambodian Women for Development CCWD 
66.  Cambodian Development and Relief Center for the Poor CDRCP 
67.  Community Economic Development CED 
68.  Cambodian Family Economic Development Association CFEDA 
69.  Cambodia Global Action CGA 
70.  Cambodian Health Committee CHC 
71.  Cambodian HIV/AIDS Education and Care CHEC 
72.  Chet Thor CHETTHOR 
73.  Cambodia Health and Human Rights Alliance CHHRA 
74.  Children and Love Association CLA 
75.  Cambodian Medical Services Support Organisation CMSSO 
76.  Cambodian Save Children Network CSCN 
77.  Cooperation for a Sustainable Cambodian Society CSCS 
78.  Community Support Improve Development CSID 
79.  Cambodian World Family CWF 
80.  Development and Partnership in Action DPA 
81.  Mith Samlanh Friends 
82.  Hope Association for Development HAD 
83.  Islamic Local Development Organisation ILDO 
84.  Khmer Farmer Association KFA 
85.  Khmer Traditional Medecine Health Association KHA 
86.  Khmer HIV/AIDS NGO Alliance KHANA 
87.  Kienkes Health Education Network KHEN 
88.  Kunathor KNT 
89.  Kum Nit Thmey Organisation KNTO 
90.  Khmer Rural Development Association KRDA 
91.  Khmer Women's Cooperation for Development KWCD 
92.  Leucaena/CCN LEJ/CCN 
93.  
Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human 
Rights 
LICADHO 
94.  MARIE STOPS Cambodia MSC 
95.  New Life Foundation NLF 
96.  NYEMO Cambodia NGO NYEMO 
97.  Operation Enfant du Cambodge OEC 
98.  Partners in Compassion PC 
99.  Partner For Health And Development PFHAD 
100. Ponleu Ney Kdey Sangkhem PNKS 
101. Ponleu Sokhapheap PSP 
102. PROMVIHEAR THOR PVT 
103. Reproductive and Child Health Alliance RACHA 
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104. RACHANA RACHANA 
105. 
Rural Community and Environment Development 
Organisation 
RCEDO 
106. Rural Development Association RDA 
107. Reproductive Health Association of Cambodia RHAC 
108. Social Environment Agricultural Development SEADO 
109. Society for Malaria Control in Cambodia SMCC 
110. Transcultural Psychosocial Organisation TPO 
111. 
Vocational Training for Alleviation of Poverty and Social 
Development 
VAPSD 
112. Vulnerable People Support VPS 
113. Vulnerable Teenager for Help VTH 
114. Woman Development Association WDA 
115. Woman Organisation for Modern Economy and Nursing WOMEN 
116. Women and Youth Action WYA 
Individual members 
117. Robyn Devenish  
118. David Wilkinson  
Associate members 
119. GTZ-Support to the Health Project Sector Reform Programme GTZ-SHSRP 
120. Support to the Health Sector Reform SHSR 
121. United States Agency for International Development USAID 
122. St.Elisabeth Sick Shelter-CATHOLIC CHURCH SESSC 
123. Asian Health Institute AHI 
124. Department for International Development DFID 
125. Intervida World Alliance INWA 
126. The World Bank WB 
127. United Nations Population Fund UNFPA 
128. United Nations Children's Fund UNICEF 
129. World Food Programme WFP 
130. World Health Organisation WHO 
131. Belgian Technical Cooperation BTC 
Source: www.medicam-cambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009 
 
Having member replication: 20 NGOs with CCC or 15% (17 INGOs and 3 LNGOs) and 
12 NGOs with NGOF or 9% (10 INGOs and 2 LNGOs). 
 
4). NGO Education Partnership (NEP) as LNGO: 79 members (33 INGOs and 46 
LNGOs) 
 
No. Name Acronym 
INGOs 
1.  Aide et Action  AeA 
2.  Assemblies of God  AOG 
3.  Cambodian Children's Advocacy Foundation  CCAF 
4.  CARE  CARE 
5.  Caring for Young Khmer  CYK 
6.  
CCS ITALY Centro Cooperazione Sviluppo/ Center of 
Cooperation and Development  
CCS Italy Cambodia 
7.  Centro Italiano Aiuti all Inanzia  CIAI 
8.  CORD South and East Asia  CORD 
9.  Don Bosco  DBFC 
10.  Family Health Promotion  FHP 
11.  Federation for the Development of Book Sector in Cambodia  FDBC 
12.  Hagar  Hagar 
13.  Handicap International France  HIF 
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14.  Health Education and Development Organisation  HEADO 
15.  InnerChange  InCh 
16.  International Cooperation - Cambodia  ICC 
17.  Intervida Cambodia  INWA 
18.  Jesuit Service Cambodia  JRS 
19.  Maryknoll-Cambodia  Maryknoll 
20.  New Humanity  NH 
21.  New Life Foundation  NFL 
22.  Operations Enfants du Cambodge  OEC 
23.  Plan International  Plan 
24.  Protect the Earth Protect Yourself  PEPY 
25.  Pour un Sourire d'Enfant  PSE 
26.  Room to Read -Cambodia  RtR 
27.  Save the Children Norway  SCN-CO 
28.  Schools for Children of Cambodia  SCC 
29.  Shanti Volunteer Association  SVA 
30.  Soutien a L'Initiative Privee pour L'Aide a la Reconstruction  SIPAR 
31.  Voluntary Service Overseas  VSO 
32.  World Education  WE 
33.  World Vision  WV 
LNGOs 
34.  AFESIP Cambodia  AFESIP 
35.  BANDOS KOMAR  BK 
36.  Cambodia Support Group  CSG 
37.  Cambodian Border Community Development Organisation  CBCDO 
38.  Camodian Disabled People's Organisation  CDPO 
39.  CGF Cambodia'Building the future generations of Cambodia  CGF-Cambodia 
40.  Cooperation for a Sustainable Cambodian Society  CSCS 
41.  Cooperation for Prosperity  CFP 
42.  Damnok Toek /Goutte d' Eau Cambodia, Neakloeung  DTC 
43.  DAMNOK TOEK POIPET  DTP 
44.  Development Association of Cambodia  DAC 
45.  Disability Action Council  DAC 
46.  
Disabled Youth Children Foundation for Education and 
Vocation  
DYCFE 
47.  Homeland (Meahto Phum Ko'mah)  MPK 
48.  Human Rights and Development Organisation  HRDO 
49.  Kampuchean Action for Primary Education  KAPE 
50.  Khmer Angkor Development Organisation  KADO 
51.  Khmer Chit Vit Thmey  KCTO 
52.  Khmer Cultural Development Institute  KCDI 
53.  Khmer Development of Freedom Organisation  KDFO 
54.  Khmer Development Organisation  KDO 
55.  Khmer Serving the Poor Children Organisation  KSPC 
56.  Khmer Student Representative Association  SKAR 
57.  Khmer Youth Camp for Culture  KYCC 
58.  KNK network Cambodia  KnK 
59.  Komar Pikar Foundation  KPF 
60.  Komasantipheap 2/ Peaceful Children Home 2  Ksp II/ PCH II 
61.  Krousar Yoeung  KrY 
62.  Kumar Ney Kdey Sangkheum  KNKS 
63.  Leadership Character Development Institute  LCDI 
64.  Mith Samlanh  Friends 
65.  Mlup Baitong  MB 
66.  Ong Cambodia Institute Foundation  OCIF 
67.  Open Institute  NI 
68.  People Improvement Organisation  PIO 
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No. Name Acronym 
69.  Professors‟ Alliance for Development  PAD 
70.  Promviheathor  PVT 
71.  Puthi Komar Organisation  PKO 
72.  Rural Development Association  RDA 
73.  Save Cambodia's Wildlife   SCW 
74.  Sovann Phoum  SP 
75.  Street Children Assistance and Development Project  SCADP 
76.  Urban Poor Women Development  UPWD 
77.  Wathnakpheap  WP 
78.  Women Development Association  WDA 
79.  Youth Resource Development Programme  YRDP 
Source: www.nepcambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009 
 
Having member replication: 15 NGOs with CCC or 19% (14 INGOs and 1 LNGO) and 
11 NGOs with NGOF or 14% (8 INGOs and 3 LNGOs) 
 
5). Action Committee for Human Rights (CHRAC) as LNGO: 21 LNGOs 
 
No. Name Acronym 
LNGOs And Associations 
1.  The Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association ADHOC 
2.  The Cambodian Defenders Project CDP 
3.  The Centre for Social Development CSD 
4.  The Cambodian Women in Crisis Centre CWCC 
5.  The Khmer Institute for Democracy KID 
6.  The Cambodian Centre for Protection of Children‟s Rights CCPCR 
7.  The Coordination of Action Research on AIDS and Mobility CARAM-Cambodia 
8.  The Cambodian Health and Human Rights Alliance CHHRA 
9.  
Cham Khmer Islam Minority Human Rights and 
Development Association 
CKIMHRDA 
10. Mission of Generous Cambodian Alliance GENEROUS 
11. Human Rights Organisation for Transparency and Peace HROTP 
12. Indradevi Association IA 
13. Khmer Institute for National Development KIND 
14. Khmer Kampuchea Krom Human Rights Organisation KKKHRO 
15. 
Khmer Kamuchea Krom for Human Rights and Development 
Association 
KKKHRDA 
16. Khmer Student Association KSA 
17. Khmer Youth Association KYA 
18. Legal Aid of Cambodia LAC 
19. People Centre for Development and Peace PDP 
20. Protection of Juvenile Justice PJJ 
21. Human Rights Vigilance of Cambodia VIGILANCE 
Source: http://www.chrac.org/eng, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009 
 
6). End Child Prostitution, Abuse and Trafficking in Cambodia (ECPAT-
Cambodia) as LNGO: 27 Members (8 INGOs and 19 LNGOs and Associations) 
 
No. Name Acronym 
INGOs 
1.  AIDe Tous Cambodia AIDeTous 
2.  International Center for Family and Children in Cambodia CIFA 
3.  Friends International FI 
4.  Hagar  Hagar  
5.  Save the Children Australia SCA 
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No. Name Acronym 
6.  Save the Children Norway SCN 
7.  
South East Asia Investigations into Social and Humanitarian 
Activities 
SISHA 
8.  World Vision Cambodia WVC 
LNGOs 
9.  Agir pour les Femmes en Situation Precaire AFESIP 
10.  The Cambodian Centre for Protection of Children‟s Rights CCPCR 
11.  Child Assistance for Mobilisation and Participation CAMP 
12.  Children and Love Association CLA 
13.  Child Rights Foundation CRF 
14.  Cambodia Women Development Agency CWDA 
15.  Mith Samlanh Friends 
16.  HealthCare Centre for Children HCC 
17.  Khmer Development Freedom Organisation KDFO 
18.  Khemara Khemara 
19.  Khmer Youth Camp for Culture KYCC 
20.  Legal Aid of Cambodia LAC 
21.  Protection of Junevile Justice PJJ 
22.  Pteas Teuk Dong PTD 
23.  Promvihear Thor PVT 
24.  Rural Aid Organisation RAO 
25.  Save Incapacity Teenagers SIT 
26.  Vulnerable Children Assistance Organisation VCAO 
27.  Watanak Pheap WP 
Source: www.ecpatcambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009 
 
Having member replication: 7 NGO with NEP or 26% (3 INGOs and 4 LNGOs) 
 
 
Analysis of the NCBs’ Members  
 
Type of 
NCBs 
Members of NCBs Total NGOs in Cambodia 
INGOs 
% of 
Total 
INGOs 
LNGOs 
% of 
Total 
LNGOs 
Total % INGOs LNGO Total 
CCC 78 17.30% 27 2.00% 110 6.10% 
450 1,341 1,791 
NGOF 33 7.30% 48 3.60% 83 4.60% 
Medicam 55 12.20% 61 4.50% 131 7.30% 
NEP 33 7.30% 46 3.40% 79 4.4% 
CHRAC 0 0.00% 21 1.60% 21 1.10% 
ECPAT 8 1.70% 19 1.40% 27 1.50% 
Total 207 46% 222 16.60% 451 25.20% 
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Appendix VII: 
 
ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CDC/CRDB 
 
EXTRACTS 
============= 
 
KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA 
 
NATION RELIGION KING 
 
 
Royal Government of Cambodia 
No. 147 ANK BK 
SUB DECREE 
ON THE 
ORGANISATION AND FUNCTIONING OF THE COUNCIL FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF CAMBODIA 
The Royal Government of Cambodia 
 
- Having seen the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia; 
- Having seen the Royal Decree N° NS/RKT/0704/124 dated 15 July 2004 on the 
formation of the Royal Government of Cambodia; 
- Having seen the Royal Kram N° 02/ NS/ 94 dated 20 July 1994 on the 
Organisation and Functioning of the Council of Ministers; 
- Having seen the Royal Kram N° 03/NS/94 dated 5 August 1994 on the 
Promulgation of the Law on Investment of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the 
Royal Kram N° NS/RKM/0303/009 dated 24 March 2003 on the Promulgation 
of the Amendment to the Law on Investment of the Kingdom of Cambodia; and 
- Pursuant to the needs of the Council for the Development of Cambodia. 
 
It Is Hereby Decided: 
 
I 
ORGANISATION OF THE COUNCIL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
CAMBODIA 
 
Article 1:  The composition of the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC) is 
as follows: 
 
1. Samdech Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Cambodia as 
Co Chairman 
2. Samdech Krom Preah Norodom Ranaridh, Special Adviser to the Royal 
Government of Cambodia as Co Chairman 
3. H.E. Mr. Keat Chhon, Senior Minister, Minister of Economy and Finance as 
First Vice Chairman 
4. H.E. Mr. Cham Prasidth, Senior Minister, Minister of Commerce as Vice 
Chairman 
5. H.E. Mr. Kong Vibol, First Secretary of State, Ministry of Economy and 
Finance as Vice Chairman 
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6. Minister in Charge of the Council of Ministers or Representative as Member 
7. Minister in Charge of the Royal Palace or Representative as Member  
8. Co Ministers of Interior or Representative as Member 
9. Co Ministers of National Defense or Representative as Member 
10. Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation as Member 
11. Minister of Education, Youth and Sports as Member 
12. Minister of Information as Member 
13. Minister of Rural Development as Member 
14. Minister of Health as Member 
15. Minister of Culture and Fine Arts as Member 
16. Minister of Justice as Member 
17. Minister of Water Resources and Meteorology as Member 
18. Minister of Post and Telecommunication as Member 
19. Minister of Labor and Vocational Training as Member 
20. Minister of Women's Affairs as Member 
21. Minister of Social Affairs, Veteran and Youth Rehabilitation as Member 
22. Minister of Planning as Member 
23. Minister of Industry, Mines and Energy as Member 
24. Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries as Member 
25. Minister of Environment as Member 
26. Minister of Public Works and Transport as Member 
27. Minister of Tourism as Member 
28. Minister of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction as Member 
29. Minister of National Assembly Senate Relations and Inspection as Member 
30. Minister of Cult and Religious Affairs as Member 
31. Governor of the National Bank of Cambodia or Representative as Member 
32. Secretary of State of the Secretariat of Public Function or Representative as 
Member 
33. Secretary of State of the Secretariat of Civil Aviation or Representative as 
Member 
34. Commander in Chief of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces or 
Representative as Member 
35. National Police Commissioner or Representative as Member 
36. Commander in Chief of the Royal Para Military or Representative as 
Member 
37. Secretary General of the CDC as Member 
38. Secretary General of the Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board 
as Member 
39. Secretary General of the Cambodian Investment Board as Member 
40. Secretary General of the Cambodian Special Economic Zone as Member 
41. Director General of the Cambodian Petroleum Authority as Member 
42. Municipal and Provincial Governors or Representative as Member 
43. President of the Phnom Penh Chamber of Commerce or Representative as 
Member 
 
Article 2:  The organisational structure of the CDC is as follows: 
 
1. The Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board (CRDB) under the 
direct supervision of a Secretary General. 
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2. The Cambodian Investment Board (CIB) under the direct supervision of a 
Secretary General. 
3. The Cambodian Special Economic Zone Board (CSEZB) under the direct 
supervision of a Secretary General. 
4. The General Secretariat under the direct supervision of the Secretary General 
of CDC 
 
Article 3:  The Secretary General of CDC, the Secretary General of CRDB, the 
Secretary General of CIB, and the Secretary General of CSEZB shall be 
respectively assisted by a Deputy Secretary General. The Deputy Secretaries 
General shall perform their duties as assigned by the Secretaries General 
with approval of the executive committee of CDC. The Secretaries General, 
in performing their duties, shall consult their Deputy Secretaries on a regular 
basis. 
 
Article 4: The organizational structure of CRDB is composed of the following units: 
 
1. Public Relations and Aid Mobilisation and Coordination 
2. Documentation and Information Management 
3. Bilateral Aid Coordination with Asia Pacific and Oceania countries 
4. Bilateral Aid Coordination with European Union and countries in Europe and 
the Americas 
5. Aid Coordination with Multilateral Institutions (such as ADB, WB and IMF) 
6. Aid Coordination with UNDP and other UN Agencies 
7. NGO Coordination 
8. Programme/Project Analysis 
9. Administration 
….. 
 
Article 8:  Each unit has the rank of a department and under the supervision of a 
Director assisted by a number of Deputy Directors. 
 
….. 
 
II 
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CDC 
 
Article 10: CDC is an executive agency of the Royal Government of Cambodia and 
shall have the following roles and responsibilities: 
 
1. Act as the "Etat Major" and "One Stop Service" of the Royal 
Government of Cambodia in the areas of Rehabilitation and 
Development and Public Investment, Private Investment, and the 
establishment and management of Special Economic Zones. 
2. Lead in the formulation of development visions and strategies for 
Cambodia by collaborating with concerned institutions. 
3. Liaise with foreign countries, bilateral and multilateral partners and 
NGOs to get them informed of national economic development visions 
and strategies and priorities in national rehabilitation and development 
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plans with the aim of making external aid coordination and utilisation 
effective and aligned with national development needs and priorities. 
4. Coordinate the work of the Ministries that are working with donor 
countries and institutions and investors. 
5. Provide directions in the allocation and utilisation of public and private 
resources for national development. 
6. Facilitate and streamline administrative procedures for donor countries 
and agencies and investors. 
7. Review and make decision on work pertaining to rehabilitation and 
development and public investment, private investment and the 
establishment and management of Special Economic Zones. 
…… 
 
Article 13: In Rehabilitation and Development, the roles and responsibilities of CDC are 
as follows: 
 
1. Act as the "Focal Point" and "One Stop Service" of the Royal 
Government of Cambodia in its relations with donor countries, agencies 
and NGOs; and as the "Focal Point" and "One Stop Service" for 
Government ministries and agencies in aid coordination and 
allocation/utilisation. 
2. Formulate and implement the Strategic Framework on Development 
Cooperation Management to strengthen Government ownership and 
leadership in development process and to strengthen partnership between 
Royal Government of Cambodia and the donor community. 
3. Mobilise and allocate external assistance to implement the priorities set 
out in the National Strategic Development Plan and other sectoral 
development plans. 
4. Directly lead the harmonisation of development partners' practices and 
procedures to enhance aid effectiveness. 
5. Provide technical support to the Government Donor Coordination 
Committee that is the mechanism for policy dialogue and provide 
support to strengthen the Technical Working Groups mechanism. 
6. Cooperate with ministries and agencies in formulating national 
rehabilitation and development strategies, and setting immediate, 
medium and long term national development priorities for the 
preparation of annual plans of action. These plans of action must be 
coherent, systematic and inter-related. 
7. Participate in the preparation of national socio economic development 
plans and sectoral development plans. 
8. Manage public investments by closely cooperating with relevant 
ministries and agencies. This is mainly related to coordinating and 
guiding the allocation and utilisation of national and external resources 
for the rehabilitation and development of Cambodia. 
9. Pursuant to the delegation of power from the Prime Minister, sign on 
behalf of the Royal Government of Cambodia the acceptance and/or 
allocation of external assistance with bilateral and multilateral donors 
and international organisations. 
10. Lead the preparation of government policy papers to be submitted to 
conferences for the rehabilitation of Cambodia such as the Consultative 
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Group Meeting of Cambodia with cooperation from relevant ministries 
and agencies. 
11. Prepare six-month and annual report and submit to the Royal 
Government of Cambodia for review and guidance to further improve 
rehabilitation and development. 
 
Article 14: In the management of public investments, working relationships between 
CDC and ministries and agencies are as follows: 
 
1. CDC shall coordinate the formulation of visions and strategies for public 
investments and shall coordinate the ordering of priorities for public 
investment for medium term and one year. 
2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation shall be the 
diplomatic window. 
3. The Ministry of Planning, by cooperating with other ministries and agencies, 
shall prepare the 5 year public investment plan. 
4. The Ministry of Economy And Finance shall prepare the macroeconomic 
framework for the medium term, shall prepare national budget for the 
implementation of the annual public investment plan, and shall monitor the 
implementation of financing. 
5. Line ministries shall prepare sectoral public investment plans by closely 
cooperating with the Ministry of Planning and CDC and shall implement 
those sectoral public investment plans. 
 
Article 15: All ministries and agencies shall perform their duty related to public 
investment in a coordinated manner through the "One Stop Service" 
mechanism. 
 
……. 
 
III 
THE FUNCTIONING OF CDC 
 
Article 25:  The Vice Chairmen of CDC shall have the following responsibilities: 
 
 A. H.E. Mr. Keat Chhon, First Vice Chairman: 
i. Oversee the overall functioning of CDC in the absence of the Co Chairmen 
of CDC. 
ii. Propose national development strategy. 
iii. Supervise the functioning of CRDB with focus on coordinating public 
investment and mobilising and coordinating external assistance. 
iv. Manage and supervise the daily operations of CDC. 
v. Chair the executive meeting of CDC and the plenary meeting of CDC and 
sign the minutes in the absence of the Co Chairmen of CDC. 
vi. Coordinate between CDC and ministries and agencies. 
vii. Liaise with donor countries and agencies. 
viii. Chair the "One Stop Service" meetings organised by CDC on matters 
pertaining to rehabilitation and development and investments prior to 
submission for approval from CDC Executive Committee. 
ix. Perform tasks as delegated by Co Chairmen of CDC. 
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Article 26: The roles and responsibilities of the Secretary General of CDC are as 
follows: 
 
i. Responsible for the coordination and monitoring of the performance of 
CRDB, CIB and CSEZB as well as for the management of the Secretariat of 
CDC. 
ii. Act as technical "Etat Major" for CDC in the implementation and monitoring 
of policies and strategies on trade, industry, private investment and special 
economic zones. 
iii. Prepare CDC's work plan, agenda and other relevant documents for CDC 
Executive Committee and Plenary meetings. 
iv. Prepare the minutes of CDC Executive Committee and Plenary meetings for 
signature of the meeting Chairman. 
v. Prepare press release for CDC. 
vi. Coordinate the preparation of annual and six month progress reports on 
matters pertaining to rehabilitation and development, private investment and 
the special economic zones for review and approval by CDC prior to 
submission to the Royal Government. 
vii. Participate in the "One Stop Service" meeting for review and approval of 
work pertaining to rehabilitation and development, private investment and 
special economic zones. 
viii. Perform tasks as delegated by Co Chairmen of CDC or Vice Chairmen of 
CDC. 
ix. Act as the Secretary General of the Government Private Sector. 
 
Article 27: The roles and responsibilities of the Secretary General of CRDB are as 
follows: 
 
i. Supervise the functioning of CRDB. 
ii. Prepare agenda and relevant documents for the "One Stop Service" meetings 
on matters pertaining to rehabilitation and development. 
iii. Assist the Secretary General of CDC in preparing necessary documents 
related to rehabilitation and development for submission to CDC Executive 
Committee and Plenary meetings. 
iv. Monitor the implementation of public investment programmes by 
cooperating with concerned Government ministries and agencies, and 
prepare progress report and recommendations for review and corrective 
actions by CDC Executive Committee. 
v. Assist the Secretary General of CDC in preparing annual and six month 
progress on work pertaining to rehabilitation and development for review 
and approval by CDC prior to submission to the Royal Government. 
vi. Participate in the "One Stop Service" meeting on matters pertaining to 
rehabilitation and development. 
vii. Perform tasks related to rehabilitation and development as delegated by 
Chairman of CDC or Vice Chairmen of CDC. 
 
Article 35: The implementation of the "One Stop Service" mechanism of CDC on 
matters pertaining 
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i. to rehabilitation and development, investment and the special economic 
zones shall be based on the following principles: 
 
 A. For CRDB: 
 
i. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance, the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of 
Planning shall respectively designate an official of the rank of director of 
department to work with CRDB. The official must: 
- Be competent in his/her field of specialty. 
- Have the delegation of authority from the head of his/her institution 
and must liaise closely with the latter and in particular must prepare 
reports and seek recommendations from the head of his/her institution. 
- Be proactive with the work of CRDB. 
- Have good command of one or two foreign languages especially 
English. 
ii. Other Government ministries and agencies shall also appoint a representative 
to participate in the "One Stop Service" mechanism, but this is done on an ad 
hoc basis and upon the request of the Secretary General of CRDB on matters 
pertaining to public investment which involves the concerned ministries and 
agencies. 
iii. The Secretary General of CRDB shall provide all the documents necessary 
for the "One Stop Service" meeting to all representatives of relevant 
ministries and agencies one week before the meeting date so that the head of 
the relevant institutions shall be able to review and make recommendations. 
iv. After preparing all the necessary documentation, the Secretary General of 
CRDB shall submit the documents for review and approval of the "One Stop 
Service" meeting. 
v. The Secretary General of CRDB shall prepare the necessary documents and 
relevant information which are the outcome of the "One Stop Service" 
meeting and forward them to the Secretary General of CDC for submission 
for review and approval by CDC Executive Committee. 
 
Article 37: The Council for the Development of Cambodia shall have its own staff and 
budget. The management of the revenues and expenditures of CDC shall be 
governed by the Law on Finance. 
 
Article 38: The Sub Decree N° 70 ANK/BK dated 27 July 2001, Sub Decree N° 112 
ANK/BK dated 12 November 2002, and Sub Decree N° 35 ANK/BK dated 4 
August 2004 shall be rendered null and void. 
 
 
 
Phnom Penh, 29 December 2005 
Prime Minister 
Hun Sen 
 
